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1  INTRODUCTION: THE SCANDINAVIAN ANOMALY 
Think of a bumblebee. With its overly heavy body and little wings, supposedly 
it should not be able to fly—but it does.... This is how so-called analysts view 
the Swedish economy. We ‘defy gravity.’ We have high taxes and a large 
public sector, and yet, Sweden reaches new heights. We are still flying, so 
well that many envy us for it today.  
Prime Minister Göran Persson, Opening Address to the Extra Party Con-
gress of the Social Democrat Party in Stockholm on March 10, 2000.  
   
1.1 Research questions 
In Germany the discussion about fiscal policy is dominated by one rarely ques-
tioned premise: Only the retreat of the state from many to date public tasks and, 
as a consequence thereof, a reduced ratio of government expenditures and 
taxes to GDP could ensure the competitiveness in a globalised economy. A look 
at the Scandinavian countries, however, shows that this premise does not hold 
necessarily. In fact, those countries have had a substantially higher government 
expenditure ratio with 58.3% in Denmark, 56.3% in Finland and 63.5% on the 
average throughout the 1990s than Germany with 48.2% (Afonso, Schuknecht 
& Tanzi, July 2003), the average economic growth in the Scandinavian coun-
tries has been higher since the second half of 1990s, despite the fact that 
Finland and Sweden suffered from serious economic crises in the first half of 
the 1990s. This significant macroeconomic resilience of the Nordic EU-countries 
is rather puzzling for conventional mainstream economics and leads us straight-
forward to our overall research questions concerning the relation between the 
government activity rate and the economic performance of nations: 
•  How was it possible for Scandinavian EU-countries to develop such a strong 
macroeconomic during the 1990s and take a lead in realising international 
competitiveness despite their extraordinarily high degree of government ac-
tivity?   9
•  Does the Scandinavian experience provide evidence for the assumption that 
even in the era of financial globalisation there is some autonomy of national 
fiscal policy, at least as an option for every nation to choose its own pre-
ferred level of government intervention? 
With regard to these research questions we suggest the following hypotheses 
as a framework for this analysis: 
1.  For the explanation of the strong macroeconomic resilience of the Nordic 
EU-countries it is of crucial importance to understand the peculiar confi-
dence-building role of the Scandinavian welfare state and its underlying 
egalitarian preferences for the formation and the execution of macroeco-
nomic policies even in response to most severe macroeconomic crises. 
2.  For the explanation of the sustainability of the impressive size and scope 
of the Nordic welfare state it is central to understand its interdependen-
cies with the rules governing macroeconomic policies: the norms underly-
ing the welfare regime restrict the choice of macroeconomic policies, 
and, simultaneously, the chosen macroeconomic policies allow to main-
tain an extensive welfare state and to accomplish its egalitarian objec-
tives. Hence, there is a choice of the preferred level of government activ-
ity even in times of financial globalisation.  
Our investigation focuses on the EU-part of Scandinavia, because Norway and 
Iceland are distinct cases of resource abundant countries, which would limit the 
possibility to transfer the macroeconomic results of the investigation to other 
countries. The restriction of our inquiry to the Nordic EU-countries, however, 
allows for some interesting comparisons of the macroeconomic implications of 
different exchange rate policies, given that Finland is a member of the EMU, 
while Denmark and Sweden have hesitated to join the euro area. 
1.2 Research background 
In the 1990s some scholars would use the concept of a “borderless world”, 
where nation states would loose their influence on the economic and social des-
tiny of the countries encompassed by them. Others talked about the erosion of   10
the nation state as a consequence of intensifying tax races to the bottom, in-
cluding an erosion of the welfare state and the room to maneuver especially in 
national fiscal policy. And did not the severe crisis the Scandinavian countries 
Denmark and particularly Finland and Sweden suffered from in the early 1990s 
prove that “big government”, with its extensive forms of welfare states, guaran-
teed social security and egalitarian income distribution were no longer afford-
able in a globalised context? 
1.2.1 The optimum scope of government activity 
In the meantime the evidence seems to be overwhelming that theories, based 
on such simple hypotheses of the erosion of welfare states due to globalisation 
have to be rejected: Now “there exists a broad consensus among welfare state 
researchers that the welfare state has not been retrenched in any fundamental 
manner”, (Kautto & Kvist, 2002). Furthermore, as the International Monetary 
Fund, one of the most influential macroeconomic institutions studying the Swed-
ish experience, concluded: “At the most fundamental level, the powerful role 
given to government in Sweden reflects a strong social consensus whose eco-
nomic expression tends to provide a stability that is itself supportive for contin-
ued growth”, (Thakur, Keen, Horvath & Cerra, 2003).  
Preparing the Global Competitiveness Report on behalf of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), McArthur and Sachs questioned an important assumption of their 
own work: „It certainly would not be correct to infer that economic growth would 
be maximized at zero government expenditures (though our equation has that 
perverse property)“, (McArthur & Sachs, 2002). Two years later, their succes-
sors at the WEF concluded even more generally, that it would be impossible to 
define an optimum scope of government activity from the point of view of eco-
nomic growth. Consequently, they replaced the government activity rate as 
growth inhibiting factor of the WEF growth competitiveness index with a new 
“government waste index” on the basis of survey data from the WEF executive 
opinion survey (Blanke, Paua & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). After testing a number of 
candidate variables, the WEF researchers selected three of them: 
•  Extent of distortive government subsidies   11
•  Diversion of public funds 
•  Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians. 
This new approach was obviously strongly influenced by the ongoing debate on 
good governance. The most important result of the survey probably is that the 
quality of public governance is nowadays a primary factor of growth and devel-
opment. With the help of a comprehensive world governance indicator the 
World Bank researcher Daniel Kaufmann showed the extent to which national 
governance matters: a country that significantly improves key governance di-
mensions such as the rule of law, corruption, the regulatory regime, and voice 
and democratic accountability can expect dramatic increases in its per capita 
income and in other social dimensions in the long run. This is particularly true 
for developing and transition countries. Kaufmann’s findings, however, show no 
reverse causality or feedback mechanism: higher incomes in themselves are 
not automatically translated into improved governance. This is an important 
message for advanced countries: “The fact that there is no automatic virtuous 
circle means that continuous political resolve and interventions are required to 
attain good governance”, (Kaufmann, 2004). 
As a result of the replacement of the government activity rate by the newly cre-
ated government waste index, the country ranking according to the Growth 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) of the WEF changed significantly: A comparison 
of the old results of the GCI 2002, based on hard government expenditure data, 
with a revised GCI 2002, based on survey data on government wastefulness, 
revealed a completely new ranking. Especially the three Scandinavian EU-
countries made a big jump ahead. Owed to this new approach: 
•  Denmark jumped uphill from the 10
th rank to the 4
th rank 
•  Sweden from the 5
th onto the 3
rd rank 
•  Finland from the 2
nd to the first rank 
•  Accordingly, the USA lost its championship in 2002. 
Since then, the three Nordic EU-countries defended their top positions in the 
Global Competitiveness Reports of the WEF. They are still on ranks 2 (Finland),   12
3 (Sweden), and 4 (Denmark), while the USA fell off even more (World Eco-
nomic Forum, 2006). 
The overall informative value of such country rankings might be highly contro-
versial (Heilemann, Lehmann & Ragnitz, 2006). The methodological shift of the 
WEF research team indicates a paradigm shift in macroeconomic growth ac-
counting from the use of simple quantitative indicators of government activity to 
the incorporation of more sophisticated indicators of public sector performance 
as an explanation of diverging growth performances in international compari-
sons. So, in another approach to this issue Afonso, Schuhknecht and Tanzi 
used “opportunity indicators”, such as administrative capability (corruption, red 
tape, efficient judiciary, size of shadow economy), education participation and 
performance (secondary school enrolment, education achievement), health in-
dicators as infant mortality and life expectancy, the quality of public communica-
tion and transport infrastructure, as well as “Musgravian tasks”, such as income 
distribution, variation of growth, standard deviations of inflation, per capita in-
come, average growth, and unemployment rates to measure public sector per-
formance (Afonso, Schuknecht & Tanzi, July 2003). Their results differed, as 
they had expected, according to the size of government activity, but also ac-
cording to different weights of the overall objectives of government activity and 
to different country samples. Their original sample included 23 OECD countries 
which they divided into three groups, according to the share of public spending 
to overall GDP in the average of the 1990s: small governments < 40% of GDP; 
big governments > 50% of GDP; medium government 40% >public spend-
ing>50% of GDP.    13
Figure 1-1: Public sector performance, 1990s, AST indices 
Public sector performance, 2000, AST indices






































Using this original data for our own calculations, we excluded four countries 
from the sample, because they might have distorted the results: Iceland and 
Luxembourg as very small countries with medium-sized governments, Japan as 
a special case of a small government with high public-private networks and 
special social functions of the enterprises otherwise not represented in the 
sample, and Italy because of its special macroeconomic problems during the 
1990s. The results presented in Figure 1-1 are quite surprising: The group of 
countries with medium-sized governments (Canada, Germany, Greece, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom) on average showed significantly 
inferior performance indicators compared to both group with small governments 
(Australia, Ireland, Switzerland, and the USA) and the group with big govern-
ments, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden. These results are independent of the weighting of the perform-
ance indicators:  
•  baseline (with equal weighting assigned to each of the seven sub-indicators)   14
•  opportunity (2/3 assigned to the opportunity indicators and 1/3 to “Mus-
gravian indicators”) 
•  equality (1/3 assigned to the distribution indicator and 2/3 to the other indica-
tors) 
•  stability (1/3 assigned to the stability indicator and 2/3 to the other indicators) 
•  economic performance (1/3 to the economic performance indicator and 2/3 
to the other indicators).  
Comparing the groups with small and big governments we find an obviously 
superior economic performance of the country group with small governments. 
With most of the other weightings this superiority shrinks significantly, but still 
persists. There is only one important exception: this is the indicator with a high 
weighting of equality. Here we find a superior performance of countries with big 
governments, compared to countries with small shares of government activity 
and even more significantly compared to countries with medium-sized govern-
ments. It is probably no coincidence that the three Nordic EU-countries, Swe-
den, Denmark, and Finland, belong to this group with comprehensive govern-
ment activities. 
As far as performance is concerned, the overall results falsify the assertion that 
there is no alternative to a reduction of the government activity rate. In contrast 
to this obviously wrong claim, we could contend strong evidence for a choice 
between different varieties of market economies. Depending on their normative 
preferences, nations could choose between a big government favoring equality 
and a small government generating somewhat higher economic growth rates. 
The worst of all worlds seems to be a situation without clear preferences con-
cerning this trade-off between equality and economic performance. 
1.2.2 Welfare regimes and varieties of capitalism 
It was probably not by chance that around 1990, when the “real existing social-
ism” ceased to exist, a new strand of research emerged, which could roughly be 
summarised under the heading of “varieties of capitalism”. The research focus 
shifted from the comparative analysis of different economic systems to the   15
comparative studies of particular economies in the framework of the remaining 
capitalist economic system. The credit for the seminal contribution to this de-
bate has to be given to Gøsta Esping-Andersen, who coined the concept of wel-
fare regimes as an expression of his observation that welfare-state variations 
were not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime types (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). According to the norms underlying these types, he distinguished “three 
worlds of welfare capitalism”: the liberal, the conservative-corporatist, and the 
universalistic, “social democratic” welfare regime, according to the norms under-
lying them. 
Central for the understanding of his theory of welfare regimes are the concepts 
of mode of solidarity, locus of solidarity, and degree of decommodification. 
Table 1-1: Characteristics of welfare regimes 
  Liberal  Social democratic  Conservative 
Dominant mode of 
solidarity 
Individual Universal Kinship 
Corporatism 
Dominant locus of 
solidarity 
Market State  Family 
Degree of de-
commodification 
Minimal  Maximum  High (for male 
breadwinner) 
Modal examples  USA  Sweden  Germany 
Source: adapted from (Esping-Andersen, 2000) 
The concept of decommodification reflects the granting of social rights: “If social 
rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are invio-
lable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than perform-
ance, they will entail a decommodification of status of individuals vis-à-vis the 
market” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21). The degree of decommodification is obvi-
ously derived from the highly normative dominant mode of solidarity: Normative 
basis for the Anglo-Saxon welfare regime is the liberal work-ethics: “it is one 
where the limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare in-  16
stead of work. Entitlement rules are therefore strict and often associated with 
stigma; benefits are typically modest”, (Esping-Andersen 1990, 26). In contrast, 
conservative welfare regimes are dominated by the preservation of status dif-
ferences based on gender, kinship, or corporatist ties. Hence the prominence of 
the principle of “subsidiarity” in conservative welfare regimes: the state will only 
interfere when the capacity of the family, i.e. the male breadwinners, or corpora-
tist structures to service its members is exhausted. Last but not least, the uni-
versal, “social democratic” welfare regime is based on an egalitarian normative 
basis and an essentially universal solidarity in favour of the welfare state: “All 
benefit; all are dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay” (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 28). 
This seminal contribution was followed by a lively debate in social sciences 
about the questions of whether there are more than three different clusters of 
welfare states to be identified: the Antipodes, the Mediterranean, and Japan 
were suggested as candidates for such additional worlds of welfare capitalism. 
Esping-Andersen somewhat ironically summarized this debate: “Assuming the 
validity of all three claims, we will find ourselves with a total of six models for a 
total of 18-20 nations. The desired explanatory parsimony would be sacrificed, 
and we might well return to individual comparisons” (Esping-Andersen, 2000, S. 
88). 
Originally, this debate focused on issues of the welfare state in a narrow sense, 
i.e. social policy, distribution and labour-market regimes. Macroeconomic impli-
cations of different welfare regimes were beyond consideration. This changed 
somewhat as the varieties of capitalism approach entered the stage and shifted 
the focus of the inquiry from the welfare state to a relational view of the firm 
(Hall, &Soskice, 2001) as key concept of a comparison of different kinds of capi-
talism. This approach distinguishes between liberal market economies (LMEs) 
on the one side of a continuum, where economic decisions of companies and 
other actors are mainly coordinated by competitive markets. On the other side, 
there are the coordinated market economies (CMEs), where companies depend 
more strongly on non-market relationships to trade unions, financial intermediar-  17
ies and other actors, and hence, on strategic interactions with their environment 
(Hall, &Soskice, 2001), (Hall & Gingerich, 2004).  
They found the differences between liberal and coordinated market economies 
reinforced by the presence of institutional complementarities, another key con-
cept of their approach: “Here, two institutions can be said to be complementary 
if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns (or efficiency) of the 
other", (Hall, &Soskice, 2001, S. 17). The existence of institutional complemen-
tarities therefore means that institutions supporting an effective strategic (or 
competitive) coordination in one sphere of the economy correspond to institu-
tions with analogous strategic (or competitive) modes of coordination in other 
spheres of the economy. Hence, these institutional complementarities would 
allow the consistency of different modes of coordination even in the framework 
of private market economies.  
Two central hypotheses of the varieties of capitalism approach can be formu-
lated: 
•  If institutional complementarities exist, it is (a) beneficial for a nation to care 
for the consistency of the coordination modes used and (b) possible to dis-
tinguish between different clusters of LMEs and CMEs.  
•  Firms vary their own structures and strategies systematically across different 
nations and clusters of coordination modes with the aim of using the institu-
tional complementarities in their distinguished contexts to the benefit of their 
own business. 
In an attempt to find empirical evidence for the validity of these two hypotheses, 
Hall and Gingerich calculated correlation coefficients indicating whether the 
presence of institutional practices of a particular type in one sphere was associ-
ated with institutional practices in adjacent spheres. Using cross-national data, 
they found that companies’ strategies varied systematically relative to the insti-
tutional support available for different types of coordination in the four spheres 
they identified as central for corporate endeavour: labour relations, vocational 
training, relations between companies, and corporate governance (Figure 1-2) 
(Hall & Gingerich, 2004).    18
Figure 1-2: Institutional Complementarities as Context of Companies’ 
Strategies 
 
Source: (Hall & Gingerich, 2004) 
Building on their result which validated distinguished clusters of LMEs and 
CMEs, they approached the implications of such varieties for the economic 
growth performance of nations. They hypothesised that rates of economic 
growth were to be higher in nations with a consistent mode of coordination 
(LME or CME), but lower in nations where neither type of coordination is well 
developed. Using a fixed-effects model, they found a U-shaped relationship be-
tween coordination and growth, which confirmed their hypothesis (Figure 1-3). 
Interestingly, this U-shaped form of superior growth projections according to the 
consistency of coordination modes in clusters of LMEs and CMEs coincides 
with our findings concerning the influence of government size on public sector 
performance. This might be more than a mere coincidence, since small gov-
ernment activity could  be attributed to LMEs and big government to CMEs.   19
Once more, the intermediate world, here in the sense of a world with hybrid, 
and probably inconsistent coordination forms, would be the worst of all worlds.  
Figure 1-3: Estimated Relationship between Coordination and Economic 
Growth 
 
Source: (Hall & Gingerich, 2004) 
It would, however, be entirely misleading to conclude from this U-shaped rela-
tionship between coordination and economic growth that it predicts the best 
growth performance either for completely anarchic market economies without 
any institutionalised coordination mechanism or for completely centralised 
planned economies without any market interactions. Every interpretation of the 
U-shape has to acknowledge that the research focus is on varieties of modern 
advanced market economies, i.e. economies within an institutional setting con-
sisting of private property rights, rule of law, public finance and monetary policy, 
and that the data is drawn from a sample of OECD countries.   20
1.2.3 Macroeconomic regimes and market constellations 
The research results sketched above defined the role of norms and institutional 
complementarities for the persistence of diverging clusters of welfare regimes 
and varieties of capitalism. Their macroeconomic implications, though, have 
been explored only partially, as issues of long-term growth, for instance. 
The Latin-French originated word regime means the method or system of gov-
ernment or administration, or simply the set of rules for doing something (for 
example for diet, exercise, etc). As methodos it means the way to something, 
for example to reach a certain place or aim. In contrast to that, the term policy 
has to be understood as a statement of ideals and aims (sometimes embracing 
a certain plan of action as well). So, the concept regime is defined here as a set 
of rules aimed at certain objectives given by policy.  
As such a set of rules the term regime has found its way into economics as well. 
Here, it occurs in its first usage as exchange rate regime, for instance, referring 
to the set of rules defining how economies manage the external value of their 
currencies. Most influential in macroeconomics was the introduction of the con-
cept of monetary regimes by Robert Lucas in 1976. His eloquent critique of the 
macroeconometric models of the 1960s predicting too little inflation in the 1970s 
suggests that the parameters of traditional term structure equations relating 
long to short interest rates do not remain stable across regimes, as older mod-
els (such as Modigliani and Sutch 1966) had assumed. He argued that the de-
cision rules describing the behaviour of private agents vary with the rules de-
scribing monetary policy, according to his premise of rational expectations gov-
erning the behaviour of private agents.  
A very helpful explication of what this concept of monetary regimes implies can 
be found in Leijonhufvud (1983): 
A monetary regime is, first, a system of expectations governing the behavior 
of the public. Second, it is a consistent pattern of behavior on the part of the 
monetary authorities such as will sustain these expectations. The short-run 
response to policy actions will depend on the expectations of the public, 
which is to say, on the regime that is generally believed to be in effect. Since   21
the predicted consequences of the same action may differ between regimes, 
we need a different macro model for each regime. […] The expectations of 
the public and the actual behavior of the authorities mesh in equilibrium; 
when they do not mesh, it does not make sense to speak of a regime. (Our 
emphasis, Leijonhufvud, 1983, S. 208) 
In more general terms, we could define a macroeconomic regime as a consis-
tent set of rules in a distinct field of macroeconomic policy interlocking the ex-
pectations governing the behaviour of the public with a pattern of behaviour on 
the part of the government. It becomes immediately clear that this concept is 
entirely at odds with a naïve understanding of a hierarchical macroeconomic 
control by monetary or fiscal authorities using simple impulse-response 
schemes without caring for their feedback with the expectations of the public. In 
contrast to this naïve view, the concept of macroeconomic regimes is in accor-
dance with the idea of a “market participation theory of economic policy” as op-
posed to the traditional “market failure theory of economic policy” (Riese, 1988), 
(Riese, 1998). From the point of view this kind of theory 
… economic policy towards establishing full employment is not solely a func-
tional device of “market repair” but must be established by a political will 
(normative target) and can only be pursued by way of participating in the 
market process. Therefore, the political actor(s) is not a subject external to 
the market participants (objects) but a market participant (object) himself who 
is constrained by market forces just like any other market participant. Gov-
ernmental (and other corporatist actors’) interventions will have measurable 
impacts on quantities and prices, but as any other market participant, the po-
litical (or corporatist) actor has finally to accept the market outcome, i.e. can-
not ex ante discriminate between warranted quantity and unwarranted price 
effects. (Heise, 2006, S. 2) 
In such a non-hierarchical context, macroeconomic regimes could be functional 
in the sense that they reduce the magnitude of contingency of policy outcomes 
by introducing a consistent set of rules and, thus, significantly reducing the un-
certainty about future outcomes of macroeconomic policy by meshing the ex-  22
pectations of the public with the behaviour of the government. If the government 
does not succeed in establishing consistent sets of rules for its macroeconomic 
policy, this situation might be termed a dysfunctional macroeconomic regime, 
and characterised by a high degree of uncertainty for all market participants. 
1.2.4 The role of norms for the consistency of macroeconomic re-
gimes 
In his 2007 presidential address to the annual assembly of the American Eco-
nomic Association George Akerlof criticised the missing motivation of prefer-
ences in the world of New Classical economic theory, leading mistakenly to the 
five neutralities of modern macroeconomics (Akerlof, November 15, 2006). 
From his point of view, these preferences are wrongly motivated, because New 
Classical economics ignores the role of norms for macroeconomically relevant 
decisions and, therefore, could not model macroeconomic behaviour convinc-
ingly without assuming the presence of frictions. Thus, introducing the motiva-
tion into the preferences of economic agents would make the assumption of 
frictions an unnecessary detour for the relevant modelling of macroeconomic 
behaviour and, even more fundamentally, would falsify the five neutrality results 
of New Classical macroeconomics. 
His approach is characterised by the introduction of norms into the utility func-
tions of macroeconomically relevant decision makers. Introducing norms into 
such utility functions would fundamentally jeopardise the five neutrality results of 
the New Classical macroeconomics, which depend on real outcomes only. 
Norms are opinions of people as to how they should, or how they should not, 
behave, as well as views regarding how others should, or should not behave: 
“The role of norms can be easily represented in peoples’ preferences by modify-
ing the utility function to include losses in utility insofar, as they or others, fail to 
live up to their standards”, (Akerlof 2006, 8f). 
Discussing the five neutrality results of modern macroeconomics he concludes: 
•  Ricardian Equivalence will fail, if the parent has utility from gift-giving. Con-
sidering that the giving of gifts, such as parent-to-child bequest are eco-  23
nomic transactions highly governed by norms, in this case by norms of fam-
ily life, and that the “warm glow” from giving enters the utility function of the 
parents as separate term he concludes: “With a social security transfer more 
money is hers, and the same consumption allocation to herself entails a gift 
to her child. With declining marginal utility for bequest-giving, she will then 
divide an increased social security transfer between additional consumption 
for herself and an additional bequest to her child” (Akerlof 2006, 17).  
•  The consumption-income neutrality of the permanent income hypothesis will 
fail, if norms are determining consumption and these norms could be viewed 
as entitlements or as obligations. Then, in turn, current income would be one 
of the major determinants of these entitlements, and obligations, and hence, 
consumption would be dependent on current income, as Keynes assumed. 
•  The Modigliani-Miller theorem, claiming an independence of investment of 
the companies’ finance decision will fail, if a norm like “empire-building” is in-
troduced into the investment function. “If they are committed to their mis-
sions, managers with sales or production orientations will be empire build-
ers. In contrast, the role of the conscientious CFO is to curb those enthusi-
asms.” But, following Zorn (2004), Akerlof (2006, 36f) admits, that when 
Modigliani-Miller first appeared, “it did not describe the investment decisions 
of large corporations. Now, quite possibly, changes in corporate decision-
making since that time make it more realistic.” 
•  The theory of a natural rate of unemployment will fail, if norms regarding the 
wage or salary increase that employees think they should receive enter their 
utility functions: This would cause the long-run inflation-unemployment 
trade-off to be downward sloping. 
•  And finally, the theory of rational expectations will be called into question as 
well, if the ways in which nominal wages and prices enter into preference 
functions - via employee’s views of the wages they ought to receive and 
consumers’ views of the process that ought to be paid – are considered. 
The implications of such a norms-augmented macroeconomic approach (with 
norms in decision makers’ objective functions) are still to be explored. Here we   24
could assume that norms might be a crucial device for consistency and persis-
tence of macroeconomic regimes, as norms are fundamental for the welfare 
regime chosen and thus, for example, for the functionality of public finance.  
1.2.5 Institutional complementarities and the consistency of macro-
economic regime constellations 
Aiming to assess the consistency of a particular macroeconomic regime, as for 
example in monetary or fiscal policy, we have to consider its interdependence 
or mutual causality with other fields of macroeconomic policy. For example, the 
interaction of monetary policy and wage bargaining is now widely studied (cf. 
Dullien, 2004 for an extensive overview on this literature) and has shaken the 
assumption of a long-term neutrality of monetary policy. Similarly, studies on the 
interaction of fiscal and monetary policy could demonstrate the different out-
comes in terms of inflation and unemployment depending on the degree of co-
operation between central bank and public finance (Heise, 2006). 
Hall and Soskice extended the concept of institutional complementarities coined 
by Aoki to the field of political economy: "Here, two institutions can be said to be 
complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from 
(or efficiency of) the other". Conversely, two institutions could be said to be sub-
stitutable if the absence of inefficiency of one increases the return of the other 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001, S. 17); cf. as well (Aoki, 1994), (Amable, 2003). 
Implicitly the concept of institutional complementarities is not entirely new for 
macroeconomics. As one of the best examples to illustrate this point we may 
choose the largely stylized case of the policy trilemma for open economies 
(Figure 1-4). Actually it is a variant of the confidence problem or Triffin dilemma 
(Triffin, 1960). Let us start with the top vertex of the triangle: Given a regime of 
fixed exchange rates, a combination with an autonomous monetary regime is 
only possible if this country is capable of maintaining a regime of effective con-
trols on capital flow. Thus, capital controls are complementary for a monetary 
regime which likes to control the external and internal value of its money simul-
taneously. This monetary regime has two possible substitutes. The first option is 
a monetary regime designed to allow full freedom of capital movement, but to   25
maintain the control of the external value of its currency at the same time: Here 
a currency board would be the institutional complement, implying a complete 
loss of control over the internal value of the currency. The second option is a 
monetary regime designed to allow full freedom of capital movement maintain-
ing full control over the internal value of the currency: This would imply a com-
plete loss of control over the exchange rate, hence, the external value of the 
currency. 
Figure 1-4: Policy Trilemma for Open Economies 
 
Source: (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006) 
The policy trilemma sketched here has many implications, for example for the 
complementarity of the monetary and the fiscal regime. We want to discuss only 
briefly some new insights concerning the question, whether to opt for a regime 
of free capital movement or not. In a recent comprehensive survey the tradi-
tional view that financial globalisation would lead “automatically” to higher GDP 
growth and less consumption volatility (by means of more efficient international 
allocation of capital, capital deepening, and international risk-sharing) is chal-
lenged by the new view that reaping the growth and stability benefits of capital 
account liberalisation depends significantly on threshold conditions to be met:   26
financial market development, institutional quality, macroeconomic policy re-
gimes, and trade openness (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff & Wei, August 2006). 
Threshold conditions is just another word for institutional complementarities in 
this context: So, for example, they quote Mishkin arguing that inadequate or 
mismanaged domestic financial sector liberalisations have been a major con-
tributor to crises that may be associated with financial integration (Mishkin, 
2006). Furthermore, they find it compelling that a rigid exchange rate regime 
could make a country more vulnerable when it opens its capital market and 
show that combinations of capital account liberalisation have often ended in 
forced and messy exits to more flexible exchange rate regimes. 
These examples of the policy trilemma of open economies and of the threshold 
conditions for successful capital account liberalisations demonstrate the impor-
tance of being aware of institutional complementarities for the success of a 
macroeconomic strategy under consideration.  
1.3 Conceptual approach 
Summing up the above sketched research background, we could derive the 
following key concepts: 
•  Normative-institutional complementarities (NIC) might be a concept helping 
to explain the persistence of particular macroeconomic regimes, as well as 
of welfare regimes. They can change, if norms introduced in the utility func-
tion of decision-makers change, but normally this may be considered as a 
very slow, long-term process. 
• Institutional  complementarities are crucial for the consistency and the suc-
cess of the macroeconomic regime constellation (MERC) chosen. If macro-
economic regimes are substitutes instead of complements, their combination 
will be inconsistent and will most probably lead to a failure of the macroeco-
nomic regimes constellation chosen
1. 
                                            
1 We choose the concept of macroeconomic regime constellations, because the term market 
constellations preferred by Arne Heise may evoke misleading connotations with industrial eco-
nomics.   27
Building on these concepts we could imagine different equilibria of MERC and 
NIC as demonstrated in the following figure. 
Figure 1-5: Equilibria of normative-institutional complementarities (NIC) 
and macroeconomic regime constellations (MERC) 
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MERC, the macroeconomic regime constellation, could be described as func-
tion of the coordination between the openness of the goods market (openness), 
the exchange rate regime (XRR), the capital account regime (CAR), the mone-
tary regime (MR), the fiscal regime (FR), the labour-market regime (LMR), and 
the welfare regime (WFR). The breakdown of a system of fixed exchange rates, 
for instance, would induce the MERC-curve to shift to the left, indicating a lower 
degree of macro-economic coordination “supplied”. 
NIC, the normative-institutional complementarity, may be seen as function of 
the welfare regime (WFR), the labor-market regime (LMR), and the openness of 
the goods market. So, for example, a greater openness of the goods market 
would induce an accelerated structural change on the labor market, and thus, a 
higher demand for social security, hence, a more universal welfare regime.   28
The C-axis denotes the degree of coordination. Thus, on the left we find, ac-
cording to Hall and Soskice (2001), LMEs and CMEs on the right. The G-axis 
denotes growth. The MERC-curve represents the “supply” of coordination by 
the macroeconomic regime constellation, the NIC-curve the “demand” for nor-
mative-institutional complementarities. 
Consider point A: Here we have, according to the NIC, a relatively low “de-
mand” for coordination, but high growth prospects, for example, because the 
Calvinist work-ethos or the “American dream” represent very individualistic 
ways to personal wealth: Thus, the dominant mode of solidarity is individual and 
complementary to the market as the dominant locus of solidarity. Due to the low 
demand for coordination by NIC at this point we could have a relatively stable 
equilibrium with MERC here (represented by the slight slopes of both curves), 
implying that only a low degree of coordination of the macroeconomic regime 
constellation would be required: The MERC-curve would have to shift to left. 
Now consider point B: To reach this equilibrium, NIC would have to shift signifi-
cantly to the right implying a much higher demand for coordination to reach the 
same growth prospects as in point A. Here the mode of solidarity is obviously 
less individualistic and, complementarily, the locus of solidarity is more public, 
as represented by the state. However, this equilibrium could as well be stable 
due to the similar slightness of the slopes of both curves as in point A. 
At point E the slopes of both curves are significantly steeper and the equilibrium 
of NIC and MERC generates significantly lower growth prospect as the high 
road equilibria at point A und B. Even more, minor shocks to MERC or NIC or 
both could generate a high volatility of growth prospects. We therefore call this 
zone of steep slopes of NIC and MERC zone of transitional turbulence. Econo-
mies, formerly in relatively stable equilibria with high growth prospects at A or B 
could get trapped into this zone due to major shocks to MERC or NIC. 
Hence the link between the two curves is in broad terms established by the 
overall welfare regime (including the labor-market regime and a propensity for 
an open economy). Consider, for example, the universal Scandinavian welfare 
regime: “… the enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic, and   29
de-commodifying welfare system means that is must minimize social problems 
and maximize revenue income” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 28). Thus, it has to 
espouse full employment as an integral part of its welfare commitment. Hence a 




With respect to our main hypotheses mentioned above and the recent macro-
economic developments in the Scandinavian countries together with our theo-
retical assumptions, we can derive the following hypotheses to describe the 
core elements of the Scandinavian macroeconomic and welfare state model:  
•  The normative-institutional complementarities of the Scandinavian model are 
highly determined by the basic norms of social and gender equality (as well 
as by the transparency of the execution of public affairs).  
•  Key elements of the macroeconomic regimes are a broad acceptance of the 
equal priority of the objectives of full employment and price stability. 
•  Under the conditions of a regime of a fixed exchange rate the main burden 
in reaching these both macroeconomic objectives simultaneously was laid 
on a specific combination of fiscal and labor-market policy. 
•  This peculiar equilibrium of NIC and MERC came severely under pressure 
as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system significantly reduced the 
degree of macroeconomic regime coordination: The NIC-MERC equilibrium 
moved into the zone of the transitional turbulence and became highly vola-
tile. 
•  The reconstruction of a high-road equilibrium of NIC and MERC in Scandi-
navia was due to the successful reconstruction of a high degree of macro-
economic regime coordination by means of new instruments of monetary 
and fiscal policy.    30
1.5 Outline of the following 
In the descriptive part of our inquiry, based on an extensive survey of the litera-
ture and the data, we are going to describe the main features of the Scandina-
vian welfare state. We will consider its egalitarian bases and norms and analyse 
its consent-forming institutions such as the labor-market policy and the social 
security system as well as the tax system as its financing basis. Then we will try 
and explore the effects of the confidence-building institutions and policy on the 
employment rate, the redistribution of income, the social expenditures and tax 
revenues. Finally, we present the Rehn-Meidner model as an early, archetypical 
example of the interaction between the normative-institutional complementari-
ties and the macroeconomic regime constellations found in Scandinavia. 
In the econometric section, we first aim at an analysis of the macroeconomic 
regimes of the Scandinavian countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark under a 
medium to short-run perspective as corresponds to our first hypothesis. This is 
realised by separately calculating indicators for fiscal, monetary and wage pol-
icy in the three countries, as well as by identifying structural breaks and 
changes in regime using correlation analysis and state-space models. Second, 
we attempt to identify interdependencies between the different areas of macro-
economic policy and output in a SVAR-model. With the aim of verifying our sec-
ond hypothesis, then we will analyse the impact of different welfare state prox-
ies on the long-run growth trend in the Scandinavian countries. Due to the data 
structure of the welfare state proxies, this is done in a cross-section analysis of 
a sample of industrialised countries.   31
2  THE SCANDINAVIAN WELFARE STATE 
The Scandinavian welfare state, represented in this study by Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden, is characterised by its egalitarian attitude towards its citizens. In 
general, politics aim at treating different population groups equally as far as 
gender, age, class, family situation, region etc. are concerned (Kvist, 2002). It is 
the state which has large social liability towards the market and the civil society. 
Accordingly, the Scandinavian welfare state’s economic system finds itself so-
cially embedded, and its cornerstone are social rights (Kvist, 2006), which, as a 
matter of fact, are considered as civil rights, i.e. they do not depend on the indi-
vidual’s position in the production process (Kaufmann, 2003). Although every 
citizen is entitled to public transfers or social services, covering a multitude of 
different social situations, these universal social rights are highly individualised, 
as transfer payments and social services are principally granted on the basis of 
the individual situation (independent of the situation of the rest of the familiy
2) 
(Kvist, 2002).  
Initially, we will give a brief survey on the egalitarian bases and norms which 
characterise the Scandinavian welfare state, and will then continue with describ-
ing the Scandinavian countries’ consent forming institutions and their macro-
economic effects in Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Finally we present the 
Rehn-Meidner model as an early archetypical example for the interaction of the 
normative-institutional complementarities and the macroeconomic regime con-
stellations of the Scandinavian economies. 
2.1 Egalitarian bases and norms 
Liberal economists in the tradition of Adam Smith assume that, the lesser an 
economy is regulated, the more efficient it can work and hence produce the 
greatest possible equity, if only the invisible hand is not constrained. From the 
normative point of view of the Scandinavian welfare state, however, efficiency is   32
not the essential precondition for obtaining equity. On the contrary, equity and 
equality have to be established before the economy is able to work efficiently. If 
inequities and inequalities hindered affected citizens from being productive, this 
would undermine the political system and destroy the political and social con-
sensus. Hence equity and equality are mandatory for the political as well as the 
social continuity (Kersting, 2000). 
The principal idea of equality and the efforts to create and ensure equality are 
often regarded as a “passion”, being a substantial part of the Scandinavian cul-
tural heritage: “The welfare state did not create this passion for equality, but 
rather is itself an economic, social, cultural, and organisational expression of 
efforts to promote it”, (Andersen 1984, here cited by Kaufmann, 2003). Hence 
the Scandinavian welfare state finds itself deeply embedded in a social and po-
litical consent where equality itself and its importance have never been really 
discussed, but where the issues being discussed are rather related to how the 
current level of equality can be guaranteed or even increased. Two main equal-
ity targets of the Scandinavian welfare state are gender equality and income 
equality. 
The necessity of equal opportunities for women in both political and working life 
has been emphasized for many decades.
3 “Equal working life and a more even 
allocation of responsibilities between men and women in the home are not only 
a matter of equality and justice. They are necessary for long-term economic 
growth.”, (Nordh, 2005). Allowances for families and children are designed gen-
erously to give women the opportunity to combine raising a family and take up 
employment. Furthermore, high marginal tax rates on the first earner and the 
direct link between wages and many social benefits give women additional in-
centives to work (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003). As a consequence, the 
share of women in the labour force is, as we will later show in greater detail, 
                                                                                                                                
2 Allowances for families with children and social benefits are exempt from this individualisation 
Kvist, 2002. 
3 In Sweden, for example, a woman’s entitlement for her children’s allowance does not depend 
on her marital status; the fact that she is a mother, be she married or single, is sufficient for 
receiving transfer payments from the government Kaufmann, 2003.    33
very high compared to other OECD countries; but the desire for complete equal-
ity has not been satisfied yet - Scandinavian governments still feel that much 
remains to be done in the area of gender equality
4 (Norden: Nordic Council and 
Nordic Council of Ministers, 2006). 
As to income equality, this has been targeted by a redistribution of incomes. 
Solidaristic wage policy has been fostered by the implementation of centralised 
wage bargaining, which helps equalising the distribution of gross earning by 
both compressing the wage scale and promoting employment of low-skilled 
employees (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003). However, it must be em-
phasized that income equality in the terms of the Scandinavian welfare state 
does not mean a general equalisation of wages, but, on the contrary, the ambi-
tion to establish fair wage differentials, which then should “reflect ‘objective’ dif-
ferences in working environment, responsibility, experience and education, not 
short run profit (or labour market) conditions.”, (Erixon, 2000).  
2.2 Consent forming institutions of the Scandinavian countries 
Long before the United Nations passed an “International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights”
5 in 1966 (UN (United Nations), 1966) (which 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden ratified in 1976) and thus laid down, among oth-
ers, the right for social security, the state’s responsibility for the welfare of its 
citizens had already been common consent in all three EU-Scandinavian coun-
tries.
 
In Sweden, for instance, this was partly based on the Lutheran state church, 
which contributed largely to the extensive activity of the public sector. Further-
more, the historically strong position of the Swedish yeomen was an important 
                                            
4 For instance, there is still inequality between parents: Women with children receive lower 
wages per working hour than childless women (whereas fathers are paid a higher wage per 
hour than men without children). In general, equal payment of men and women for the same job 
has not been achieved in practise yet, and about 50% of the women in Scandinavian countries 
work in traditionally “female” jobs, as health and education services, which often implies lower 
pay and fewer career possibilities Nordh, 2005. 
5 These economic, social and cultural rights are not suable by individuals, but the ratifying states 
commit to guaranteeing these rights for their citizens as far as possible, Kaufmann, 2003.    34
factor for the development of a welfare state model including all inhabitants, not 
only industrial workers. Last but not least, Sweden lacked to a large extent con-
stitutional conflicts, so the state’s responsibilities and its dimensions were never 
actually questioned (Kaufmann, 2003). 
"The Nordic welfare systems are based on a high degree of universalism, i.e. all 
citizens are entitled to basic social security and services irrespective of their 
position in the labour market. The universalism has contributed to a broad pub-
lic support to the welfare policy", (Norden: Nordic Council and Nordic Council of 
Ministers, 2006). In the Scandinavian welfare state, fair distribution is the central 
idea influencing every policy sector. The government is responsible for ensuring 
that everything is done to achieve a more equitable situation. As a matter of 
fact, redistribution towards a higher degree of equality has not been only a po-
litical consensus within the social-democratic party, which has had large influ-
ence in each of the three EU-Scandinavian countries for decades, but also, and 
most notably, it has been a social consensus of a great majority of the resi-
dents. The solidaristic attitude within Scandinavian societies was consolidated 
and fostered by a large transparency of political decision-making, (Thakur, 
Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003).   
The broad and solidaristic consensus of Scandinavian societies on the welfare 
state and its characteristics has been consolidated by institutions which were 
designed to maintain confidence in the government's policies and the corre-
sponding high public expenditures. We are going to present two major consent-
forming institutions: the labour market policy and the social security system. 
Another paragraph will deal with the tax system in the EU-Scandinavian coun-
tries, as labour market policies and social benefits are financed mostly through 
large tax revenues. 
2.2.1 Labour market policy 
Labour market policy has proved to be one of the major consent-forming institu-
tions of the Scandinavian welfare state.    35
One of the traditional labour market instruments of the Scandinavian model en-
suring a more equal distribution of labour income is the centralised wage bar-
gaining. Labour unions combined into a unions’ federation, as did the employ-
ers’ associations, and these two labour market parties have then been man-
dated to meet and negotiate wages nationwide (Ortigueira, October 20, 2006). 
Naturally, this requires a high unionisation level. As the eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits required union membership for at least one year before becoming 
unemployed, the unionisation rates in the EU-Scandinavian countries have 
been considerably high (in the order of 90%) (ibid.). From the early 1980s on, 
however, wage bargaining has been more and more decentralised in Denmark 
and in Sweden. Since the late 1990s, however, Sweden has aimed – more or 
less successfully – at reintroducing centralised wage bargaining. Finland, how-
ever, has never given up on centralised wage bargaining (although there were 
years, when a nationwide wage agreement could not be found). Centralised 
wage bargaining also tends to diminish wage distribution, particularly at the bot-
tom of the wage scale. This compression of the wage scale is pursued by un-
ions for the reason of equity (Johansson, 24.07.2006).  
However, centralised wage bargaining does not only hold advantages for em-
ployees in view of income and equity. It is assumed that the negotiators are well 
aware of the macroeconomic risks of high wage settlement, and in order to 
avoid unemployment and inflation, they will find agreements which include rela-
tively low wages and high employment (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003).  
Another common and well-approved instrument of the Scandinavian labour 
markets is the use of Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs). ALMPs have 
been implemented to foster re-employment of the unemployed through improv-
ing their skills and qualifying them further. This is done either by vocational 
training, like computer courses or classroom training of technical and adminis-
trative occupations, or by on-the-job practice, like start-up grants or subsidised 
on-the-job training. Another form of ALMPs are wage and employment subsi-
dies, which help sustaining the unemployeds’ work experience (Carling & 
Richardson, 2001). The emphasis on qualification does not only reduce the time   36
the unemployed remain without a job, but, by attacking skill mismatches, this 
also helps lowering structural unemployment.    
Additionally, the EU-Scandinavian countries put emphasis on temporary and 
part-time work. In Sweden, for instance, a large availability of part-time work, 
especially in the public sector, has been decisive mainly for women with chil-
dren to take up employment, because it enables them to combine family care 
and breadwinning (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003). Thus, their high par-
ticipation in the labour force also increases the employment rate. 
2.2.2 Social security system 
The Scandinavian welfare state is based on the assumption, that it does not 
matter which social class or which market position a resident has – every citizen 
has similar rights. Its social security system aims at solidarity within the society 
and enhances equality through its universal character. Everybody profits of it, 
everybody depends on it – and hence, most probably everybody feels obliged to 
pay for it (Esping-Andersen, 1998). It must be emphasised, that equally satisfy-
ing the minimal needs of every citizen is not the purpose of the social security 
system. On the contrary, it is designed to create equality on the highest possible 
level (ibid.). 
The social security system includes health care, which all residents have ac-
cess to (independent of whether they pay taxes or not), as well as transfer 
payments. Only a part of the social transfers are means-tested, as, for instance, 
social assistance, childcare payments and student loans. Principal benefits 
which are not means-tested - unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, pen-
sions, parental and child benefits - do depend on the income level, though, but 
are relatively generous, compared to the average OECD level of transfers to 
households (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003). 
In the period of 1980-2001, social spending in the EU-Scandinavian countries 
were not affected by cuts, despite the severe economic crises which all had to 
suffer from. Maintaining the high level of government's social expenditures 
throughout times  of recession was possible because of “the wide degree of   37
popular support for many of these services, especially where they are well fi-
nanced and of high quality as in the social democratic welfare states”, (Glyn, 
2006), such as the EU-Scandinavian countries. 
Both ALMPs and the universal social security system require a broad financial 
basis, which, in the Scandinavian welfare state, is achieved through maximized 
tax revenues. 
2.2.3 Taxes 
In the early 1990s, the three EU-Scandinavian countries established the so-
called “dual income tax system”, which combines progressive taxation of labour 
income with a flat tax rate on capital income. Denmark was the first to introduce 
the dual income tax in 1987, followed by Sweden in 1991 and Finland in 1993 
(Genser, June 07-09, 2006). 
The progressive taxation of labour income has an immediate redistributive ef-
fect by reducing the difference between the inequality of market incomes and 
that of disposable incomes. A flat tax on capital income, however, seems to 
contradict the egalitarian aim of the Scandinavian welfare state. In view of the 
liberalisation of the capital markets in the 1980s, a flat tax on capital income 
was given preference to progressive taxation, though, in order to collect the 
largest possible sum of revenues, trusting that a flat tax on capital income would 
avoid the evasion of tax through investments abroad and the “failing to declare 
the receipts” (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003), at least to a certain extent. 
Naturally, implementing the dual income tax made the tax system considerably 
less progressive. However, Sweden, for instance, managed to absorb the re-
sulting additional inequalities by increasing the redistribution on the income side 
through higher child allowances and higher housing allowances (both only 
available to those with children), (Thakur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003).
6  
                                            
6 Consequently, the redistribution between residents with children and those without children 
has increased after the tax reform, “while within household types it has, if anything, fallen” Tha-
kur, Keen, Horváth & Cerra, 2003.   38
The Scandinavian welfare state has often been criticised for granting very large 
(or even too large) social benefits to its residents. Social benefits in EU-
Scandinavia are generous indeed, however, it must be pointed out that the ma-
jority of them is taxable. Denmark, Finland and Sweden raise taxes on unem-
ployment benefits, sickness benefits, retirement pensions, disability pensions 
and on social benefits granted to non-insured persons (Nordic Social-Statistical 
Committee (NOSOSCO), 2006). In accordance with the welfare state’s empha-
sis on increasing gender equality and hence orientating its social policy towards 
a higher participation of women in political and social life, children allowances 
and housing allowances are exempt from taxation (Nordic Social-Statistical 
Committee (NOSOSCO), 2006).  
2.2.4 Brief summary 
In the Scandinavian welfare state, both labour market and social security con-
tribute to generating and maintaining broad public consent for the welfare poli-
cies.  
One of the instruments of the labour market is highly coordinated centralised 
wage bargaining, which, through income redistribution and compression of the 
wage scale, strongly enhances a high degree of equality among the employed. 
The implementation of ALMPs ensures that the participation rate in the labour 
force has been considerably high (and as we will see in paragraph 2.3, even 
higher than the EU-average and the OECD-average) and thus an above-
average share of residents profits from the equalising effects of centralised 
wage bargaining. Centralised wage bargaining also implies negotiating levels of 
income which are acceptable for all parties involved – employees and employ-
ers (and also the state, as it is presumed that the former two parties will avoid 
risking unemployment and inflation and hence will settle wages at moderate 
levels), enlarging the public consent to the overall working population. The em-
phasis on temporary and part-time work, particularly giving women with children 
the opportunity to take up work, has additionally increased the employment rate 
in the EU-Scandinavian countries and also contributed to increasing gender 
equality.    39
The social security system has also an egalitarian character. The high level of 
social benefits and the universal eligibility for one transfer payment or the other 
contributes to the redistribution of income towards more income equality. The 
high allowances for families with children, independent of the women’s marital 
status, improve social equality in general and gender equality in particular. 
As the equalising effects of the labour market and the social security system 
involve a large majority (labour market) or even the overall population (social 
security system), the public consent for the Scandinavian welfare state and its 
institutions is almost all-encompassing – even though this implies a high tax 
burden for the residents. Trying to provide the highest possible level of equality, 
as, for instance, through ALMPs and extensive social expenditures, requires a 
broad tax revenue basis, as these measures are mainly financed through taxes. 
Keeping employment at a constantly high level, redistributing income, raising 
taxes on social benefits and a flat rate tax on capital income all contribute to 
augmenting the welfare state’s financial basis. The rate of taxation in the EU-
Scandinavian countries is, as a matter of fact, considerably high, but it is well-
based on society’s ample consent, as a large amount of the public revenues 
prove advantageous for the residents and a high degree of equality among 
them. 
In the following, the effects of the consent-forming institutions mentioned above 
will be described in detail. 
2.3 Effects of Confidence-Building Institutions and Policies 
The Scandinavian welfare state has committed itself to the objective of full em-
ployment. At the same time, it is absolutely dependent on its realisation. Tax 
revenues have to be maximised to finance the universal social security system, 
which can only be achieved through a maximum level of employment (Esping-
Andersen, 1998). Therefore, in the following, we will take a closer look at the 
employment rates, the degree of income redistribution, social expenditures of 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden in order to scrutinise the empirical data in view 
of the degree of equality in the EU-Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, we will   40
examine their total tax revenues, as these are vital for funding the extensive 
social security system. 
2.3.1 Employment rate 
Full employment has been one of the main, if not the main target of macroeco-
nomic policy in the Scandinavian Welfare State. In order to achieve a maximum 
participation in the labour force, ALMPs were introduced and temporary and 
part-time labour have been promoted, the latter aiming particularly at increasing 
women’s share of the labour force. 
2.3.1.1 Total employment rate 



























































































Denmark Finland Sweden EU 15 total OECD total
Source: OECD, e4globe calculations   41
Sweden’s employment rate (see Figure 2-1) has had the tendency to rise, with 
the exception of two declines – a considerable one between 1990 and 1994, 
when a severe economic crisis hit the country, and, after a slight increase from 
71.5% in 1994 to 72.2% in 1995, another smaller decrease from 1996-1997. 
Nonetheless, it always stayed well above the OECD-average between 1966 
and 2005 and has never fallen under 70.2%, which was Sweden’s 1967’s em-
ployment rate. (The maximum value, which the OECD-average employment 
rate gained between 1968 – first year for which OECD-average values are 
available - and 2005, was 65.7% in 2000. In that year, Sweden’s employment 
rate was 74.9%.) 
For the overall period of 1966-2005, Finland’s employment rate shows at first a 
development that differs from Sweden’s. Starting in 1966 with an even higher 
employment rate than Sweden (71.6%), it already began to decline in the fol-
lowing year, and after a few ups and downs, Finland experienced the first major 
decrease of its employment rate between 1974 and 1978 from 71.7% to 67.2%, 
due to an exceptional price shock after the 1
st oil crisis and the following infla-
tion. Sustained by the bilateral trade with the Soviet Union, Finland successfully 
weathered the 2
nd oil crisis and, until 1989, Finland’s employment rate con-
stantly increased until it reached its peak of 74.2%. The economic recession of 
the early 1990s had an even more severe impact on Finland than on Sweden, 
and between 1991 and 1994, the total employment rate sharply declined by al-
most 15 percentage points to 59.9% in 1994 (Finland’s overall minimum), being 
even below OECD-average (64%) in that year. From 1995-2005, Finland’s em-
ployment rate has slowly recovered from this free fall, reaching 68% in 2005, 
which is still more than 3 percentage points below its initial rate of 1966. 
OECD records for Denmark only start in 1983. Compared to Sweden and 
Finland, Denmark’s employment rate shows the least volatile development. 
Having increased fast in the first three years from 70.3% in 1983 to 76.3% in 
1986, it reached its peak of 76.7% in 1988. In order to avoid an overheating of 
the economy, the Danish authorities implemented an administrative credit mar-
ket tightening in order to enhance private saving, and in the following years, 
growth slowed. As a consequence of this and also of the early 1990’s economic   42
crisis, the total employment rate went through a slight downward tendency in 
the years from 1988 (76.7%) until 1994 (72.4%), but it resumed its growth in 
1995, almost obtaining its peak of 1988 in 2004 (76%). From 1994, Denmark’s 
employment rate has been consistently higher than Sweden’s. 
2.3.1.2 Participation of women in the labour force 
All three EU-Scandinavian countries have endeavoured in increasing the share 
of women in the labour force, mainly by fostering part-time work, in order to give 
the female residents the opportunity to both raise a family and work, which 
raises the total employment rate and, at the same time, improves gender equal-
ity. 
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Source: OECD, e4globe calculations 
As can be clearly seen in Figure 2-2, the participation rate of women in the la-
bour force has constantly been considerably higher than both the EU-average   43
and the OECD-average. Unfortunately, records for Denmark only start in 1983, 
but nonetheless since that moment they show a clear picture, which is congru-
ent to that of Sweden and Finland. The share of women in the labour force has 
always been high, reaching its peak in 1990, with 70.6% in Denmark, 71.5% in 
Finland and 81% in Sweden (OECD-average in 1990: 53.9%, EU-average in 
1990: 48.7%).  Between 1991 and 1996 (Denmark and Finland), respectively 
1997 (Sweden), the participation rate decreased due to the recession which all 
of the three countries experienced during that time and the resulting growth of 
general unemployment. After that, in the course of the economic recovery, the 
participation of women in the labour force has increased again, constantly in 
Finland and Sweden and with slight movements up and down in Denmark. 
However, Sweden and Finland have not been able to regain the high level they 
had during the 1980s, whereas Denmark has not only been successful in re-
turning to its 1990 peak, but even managed to even surpass it in the years of 
1999-2002 and in 2004.  
Nevertheless, in spite of the developments mentioned above, the share of 
women in the workforce in Denmark (70.8%), Finland (66.5%) and Sweden 
(71.8%) in 2005 was substantially higher than the EU-average (57.5%) and the 
OECD-average (56.1%).  
Summarising the above, it can be stated that the EU-Scandinavian countries all 
have successfully aimed at attaining a very high level of employment (compared 
to the OECD-average and the EU-average during the observed period) both in 
terms of the total employment rate and the women’s share in the labour force. It 
seems likely that ALMPs and the promotion of part-time and temporary em-
ployment have enhanced a high degree of labour market participation in general 
and sizeable improvements of the employment rate after economic downturns 
in particular. For instance, figures show that the economic crisis in the early 
1990s also took its toll in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, but obviously, these 
countries were able to recover within rather short periods of time. Furthermore, 
increased unemployment due to downswings of the economy has hardly led to 
structural manifestations in the labour market, but long-term rates of unem-
ployment were considerably more volatile than the average in the EU- and in   44
the OECD-countries and have always remained sizeably lower than the EU-
average, and mostly also lower than the OECD-average (see Figure 2-3).   
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Source: OECD, e4globe calculations 
2.3.2 Redistribution of Income 
All consent-building policies described under chapter 2.2 basically target the 
redistribution of unequal market incomes towards more equal disposable in-
comes. And, indeed, as the Gini coefficients for Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
show, the redistribution of household disposable income has been successful in 
the EU-Scandinavian countries during the last two decades (see Figure 2-4).    45
Figure 2-4: Distribution of household disposable income among individu-



























Denmark Finland Sweden OECD average 1
Source: OECD, e4globe calculations 
In the mid-1980s, Sweden was the most efficient country in view of redistribut-
ing income (Gini coefficient of 19.9) closely followed by Finland (20.7) and 
Denmark (22.8). A decade later, Sweden still showed the best performance 
(21.1) of the three, but then Denmark had almost caught up (21.3), leaving 
Finland in third place (22.8). Other than Denmark that was able to improve its 
income redistribution, Sweden and Finland have changed for the worse. In 
2000, finally, Denmark’s Gini coefficient (22.5) almost returned to the value it 
had in the mid-1980s. Sweden and Finland’s Gini coefficients (24.3 respectively 
26.1), however, have deteriorated considerably.    46
The different developments of the Gini coefficents reflect the different economic 
progressions, especially the different durations of recovery after the crisis in the 
early 1990s in these countries, which will be described in detail in chapter 3.  
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that during the overall period from the mid-
1980s until 2000, all three EU-Scandinavian countries maintained the three top 
positions in the OECD-ranking and showed a considerably better performance 
than the OECD-average. 
2.3.3 Public social expenditures 
A broad range of social benefits and a universal social security system have led 
to an extensive level of public social expenditures in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden. OECD data available for the period of 1980-2003 show that all three 
countries have continuously spent more on social services than the OECD-
average has done (see Figure 2-5).    47
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Source: OECD, e4globe calculations 
Out of the three, Sweden continuously shows the highest public social expendi-
tures, starting in 1980 with 28.6% (Denmark: 25.2%, Finland: 18.4%). The 
OECD data show that, in the face of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, all 
three countries largely increased their public social expenditures, hence promot-
ing the work of the automatic stabilisers.  
While Finland proved to be the country which was affected most seriously by 
this recession, it was not only the first to raise its public social spending in 1990, 
but also the one with the largest increase, namely by 10.7 percentage points 
between 1989 (22.9%) and 1992 (33.6%). As will be explained in greater detail 
in chapter 3, the crisis had not yet been overcome by 1993, but the banking cri-
sis in 1992 forced Finnish authorities to cut down social expenditures, despite 
their stabilising function. Therefore, Finland reduced its social expenditures from   48
1993 until 2003 to an overall 22.5%, which is even below the rate they had had 
before the increase in 1990. 
Sweden also started to raise its public social expenditures in 1990, but com-
pared to Finland, it progressed more slowly (the peak was reached in 1993 at 
36.2%) and to a lesser extent, i.e. by 6.5 percentage points from 29.7% in 1989. 
From 1994 to 2000, the rate of social expenditures was gradually reduced to 
28.8% and since then has been increased again to 31.3% in 2003. 
Denmark was the last to increase public social expenses in 1991 and showed 
the smallest amplitude of 3.9 percentage points between 1990 (25.5%) and its 
maximum expansion in 1994 (29.4%). Like Sweden, Denmark then decreased 
public social expenditures until 2000 (25.8%) and has afterwards raised them 
step by step to 27.6% in 2003. 
Throughout the observed period of 1980-2003, Denmark and Sweden not only 
surpassed the OECD-average, but also the EU-average, whereas Finland 
started below the EU-average in 1980, surpassed it in 1984 and sank below it in 
1999, from 2001 to 2003 its progress paralleled the EU-average graph showing 
1.5 percentage points (2001 and 2002) respectively 1.4 percentage points 
(2003) less. 
The development of public social expenditures in all three EU-Scandinavian 
countries does not only show a high level compared to OECD-average and 
partly also to EU-average, but it also seems to corroborate the assumption un-
derlying this study, namely that these social expenditures fulfilled their function 
as automatic stabilisers in economic downturns. This will be discussed more 
detailed in chapter 3. 
2.3.4 Tax revenues 
Redistribution of income, high employment rates including a large participation 
of women in the labour force, and a number of generous social benefits liable to 
taxation led to considerable tax revenues generating a broad financial basis for 
the three EU-Scandinavian countries’ welfare policy.   49
OECD data show no records for the period of 1961-1964, so this short analysis 
starts in 1965.  
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Source: OECD, e4globe calculations 
Figure 2-6 illustrates that, since 1965, Denmark and Sweden have been able to 
collect much higher tax revenues (as share of the GDP) than both the OECD-
average and the EU-average. Sweden (35%) had started with 5.1 percentage 
points more than Denmark (29.1%) in 1965, but Denmark managed to catch up 
during the course of time, twice even surpassing Sweden slightly 1970-1974 
and 1993-1995. In 2004, Denmark’s tax revenues as share of the GDP (48.8%) 
were only 1.6 percentage points lower than those of Sweden (50.4%). 
Finland had had about the same starting situation as Denmark (30.4% of GDP 
in 1965), but has not been able to reach the same level as Denmark or Sweden. 
Finland’s development with regard to tax revenues also shows an upward trend,   50
but almost entirely on a lower level. It was only in 1976 and 1977 that Finland 
collected slightly more taxes than Denmark, and it almost managed to reach 
Denmark’s tax revenue level in 1991 and that of Sweden in 1994. Apart from 
these few exceptions, Finland remained well below the tax revenues of the 
other two countries. 
Nevertheless, all three EU-Scandinavian countries collected considerably more 
taxes as share of the GDP than the OECD-average throughout the observed 
period of 1965-2004. Sweden and Denmark have also managed to exceed the 
EU-average during that time. Except for 1983, when Finland fell below the EU-
average by 0.5 percentage points, it also maintained a higher tax revenue level, 
although, as said before, considerably lower than that of Denmark and Sweden. 
The Scandinavian welfare state works as a point of intersection between mar-
ket, state and family, constantly striving to moderate the inequalities of market 
outcomes by means of redistributing incomes and by providing universal social 
security and a broad range of social benefits. Naturally, the large budgetary ex-
penditures necessary for welfare services require high tax revenues; in 2005, 
income taxes on the average worker (OECD 2007) were 47.9% in Sweden, 
44.6% in Finland and 41.4% in Denmark, whereas the OECD-average income 
tax on the average worker was 37.3%. However, as already stated above, the 
EU-Scandinavian citizens consent to the extensive tax burden, as they find the 
advantages of the welfare state to outweigh the disadvantages of high taxes.  
A connecting link between the Scandinavian welfare state and its macroeco-
nomic policies is the Swedish Rehn-Meidner-Model, which aims at solving the 
conflict between the two mutually exclusive targets of full employment and price 
stability, which are generally regarded as diametrically opposed. 
2.4 The Rehn-Meidner model: an early example of the NIC-MERC-
interactions 
The macroeconomic reality of a Welfare State is complex and can be described 
best as “an interwoven bundle of different policies on taxation, … social affairs 
and labour markets, just to mention a few” (Kvist, 2006). In the following, the   51
Rehn-Meidner-Model (RMM), which was developed and presented first in 1951 
by the two Swedish trade union economists Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, 
will be introduced as an early archetypical example for the interaction of the 
normative-institutional complementarities and the macroeconomic regime con-
stellations of the Scandinavian economies. 
Rehn and Meidner developed their model at a time when the Swedish economy 
was overheated. After World War II, a post-war depression had been expected, 
and accordingly, a Keynesian programme for full employment was developed. 
However, the anticipated depression did not come true, but, on the contrary, 
Swedish industry (being specialised, among others, in investment goods) prof-
ited from the fast economic recovery of Western Europe and from the increase 
in households’ demand for consumer durable goods. Expansive economic pol-
icy additionally augmented the inflationary tendencies (Erixon, 2000).  
It was therefore necessary to find a solution for the conflict between the objec-
tives of full employment and price stability, which emerge from expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy. Hence, the central idea of the RMM was to combine 
full employment and growth with price stability and equity. The means Rehn and 
Meidner propose in order to achieve the four objectives are: restrictive general 
economic policy, solidaristic wage policy, labour market policy and marginal 
employment subsidies (ibid.). 
In the RMM, the restrictive general economic policy mainly has to be tight over 
the business cycle, in order to cut back the rate of inflation, to foster rationalisa-
tions and structural change in low-profitable industries and companies and to 
limit wage drifts. 
Solidaristic wage policy, too, aims at curbing wage disparities by providing the 
same wage rates for comparable work, allowing, however, wage differentials 
between different groups of wage earners. Together with a restrictive general 
economic policy, solidaristic wage policy jeopardises the persistence of low-
profitable companies and thus leads to rationalisations in least profitable indus-
tries.    52
Rehn and Meidner predicted that restrictive general economic policy and solida-
ristic wage policy would lead to so-called “islands of unemployment” (Lundberg, 
1996). Therefore, they argued, it is necessary to counter-balance the negative 
effects of unemployment by labour market policy, mainly through supply-
orientated measures, such as relocation and retraining grants and occupational 
programmes, and by improving the matching process on the labour market, so 
that the employees who are made redundant in low-productivity companies will 
then be transferred through labour market policy measures to companies with 
higher productivity.  The increased flexibility on the labour market then would 
not only induce growth and help hiring labour in profitable sectors, but also curb 
inflation, because greater labour mobility would also mitigate wage increases 
and shortage of labour in those sectors.  
Additionally, marginal employment subsidies are introduced in the RMM to fight 
unemployment and inflation. They should be offered to companies in all regions 
and sectors and for all sorts of labour, however, only to recruiting companies, 
whose marginal costs they would reduce. In case product markets are competi-
tive or the prices are determined by companies’ marginal costs, the effect would 
be a decrease of prices. Rehn and Meidner show that the price-reducing effect 
and the raise of employment would be larger for marginal subsidies than for 
intra-marginal subsidies, as for instance, reducing pay-roll taxes, which is also 
the case for an open economy with given world market prices (Erixon, 2000). 
The RMM is “both an economic and wage policy programme and a theory of 
wages, profits, inflation and growth” (Erixon, 2000). Attaining its four targets of 
full employment, growth, price stability and equity is only possible, if the means 
described above are applied simultaneously. Only if all instruments - restrictive 
general economic policy, solidaristic wage policy, labour market policy and 
marginal employment subsidies – are allowed to cooperate, the implementation 
of the RMM will have overall positive effects and will counter-balance negative 
impacts, which a partial application of the model would undoubtedly have. For 
instance, restrictive economic policy and a solidaristic wage policy will lead to 
unemployment if they are not accompanied by complementary labour market 
policy measures. On the other hand, restrictive general economic policy in turn   53
is needed to curb the inflationary effects of labour market policy measures. Fur-
thermore, only the synchronous use of all instruments ensures that they can 
work effectively, e.g. labour market policy measures and a restrictive economic 
policy must sustain a solidaristic wage policy in order to control wage dispari-
ties. If the RMM is implemented the way its authors designed it, then not only 
full employment and price stability would be achieved, but also growth and eq-
uity. 
The structural change, i.e. eliminating least profitable companies and industries, 
enhance raising average productivity. More profitable companies gaining a lar-
ger share of the profits, can invest their extra profit in establishing new compa-
nies in dynamic sectors, thus realising further technical progress and applying 
more capital-intensive techniques. When the profit differences between low- 
and high-profitable sectors become larger, the incentives to shift resources from 
the former to the latter become stronger, and employees will then be relocated 
from low-productivity to expanding companies with relatively high productivity 
(Lundberg, 1996).  
As to equity aspects, redistribution of income through solidaristic wage policy 
and marginal employment subsidies influence the functional distribution of in-
come and thus result in a more eual distribution of personal income and wealth. 
(ibid.) By increasing labour mobility, labour market policies contribute to the re-
duction of significant wage differences between sectors. By creating full em-
ployment they can also amend the functional distribution of income to the bene-
fit of labour and, consequently, raise the wage earners’ share of value added 
(Erixon, 2000).  
Combining full employment and growth with price stability and equity is un-
doubtedly irresistible to every economy, and especially so to a country which 
embodies the concept of the Scandinavian Welfare State. Sweden, of course, 
did implement the RMM – successful at first, but after the first oil crisis, it started   54
abandoning it, because the RMM did not prove to be capable to cope with the 
immense problems arousing from the subsequent recession.
7
2.4 Brief summary of the macroeconomic developments in the Nordic EU-
countries 
The three EU-Scandinavian countries being analysed in this study – Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark – all belong the Scandinavian welfare state model. They 
all strive for equality, in view of social circumstances in general and of income 
and gender aspects in particular. A universal social security system, which in-
cludes generous unemployment benefits and access to extensive health care, 
as well as a labour market designed for achieving a maximum participation rate 
both contribute enormously to the public consent that the state and its authori-
ties are to a large degree socially liable not only with respect to the civil society, 
but also with reference to the market. Hence macroeconomic policies in EU-
Scandinavia have focused on overcoming problematic economic situations as 
quickly as possible in order to maintain a prospering welfare state.  
Whenever it was possible, the EU-Scandinavian countries have profited from 
the effects of automatic stabilisers, often enhancing them by countercyclical 
fiscal measures, as raising public expenditures and using fiscal stimuli during 
economic downturns, and stimulating private saving through tax increases or 
credit market tightening during economic upswings. After the recession in the 
early 1990s and in view of the advancing EMU, it became mandatory to con-
solidate the public finances, and it was chosen for a medium-term fiscal target-
ing framework, formulating the reduction of the public debt to GDP ratio as a 
target to be achieved over the cycle. This has allowed for the automatic stabilis-
ers to work further on, and has reduced the necessity for fiscal constraints or 
cyclical expenditure pressures, so that countercyclical fiscal policy was still pos-
sible, while each of the three countries have managed to reduce the public debt 
                                            
7 For a detailed chronological description of the RMM’s application in Sweden and the varying 
success, please see Erixon, 2000.   55
to GDP ratio substantially after the implementation of medium-term fiscal tar-
gets. 
The EU-Scandinavian financial markets were deregulated in the mid-1980s, but 
this has not had the same effects in each of the three countries. Denmark, 
where the deregulation was accompanied by a prudential supervision, disclo-
sure rules and a tightening of the already strict capital adequacy standards, did 
not experience a subsequent economic boom phase, but it still was the country 
that was least affected by the recession of the early 1990s. In Sweden and 
Finland this recession was largely aggravated by the capital market deregula-
tion, as these countries profited from the following credit expansion and the vast 
increase in domestic demand, without being able to curb the overheating and 
successfully fight the arising inflationary pressures. Hence, it were Sweden and 
Finland who had to cope with a massive banking crisis in the early 1990s. 
Out of the three, Finland was the country to be affected worst by the early 
1990s recession (also because of the sudden and sharp decline in the bilateral 
trade with the Soviet Union after the latter’s collapse in 1991) and the entailing 
banking crisis, but it also was the fastest to recover from it. In contrast to Swe-
den and Denmark, where the economic recovery was based on an increase in 
domestic demand, Finland emphasized the opening of its economy to foreign 
ownership and a structural change towards the ICT-sector, both inducing an 
export-led economic growth. However, the excellent performance of the ICT-
sector has only had negligible spillover effects on employment and domestic 
demand, and Finland’s strong economic growth after the recession could not 
reduce unemployment. 
As for monetary policy, Sweden, Finland and Denmark all used appreciations 
and depreciations of their currency in order to ensure competitiveness and to 
induce economic recovery. Denmark was the first to give up on active exchange 
rate policy and joined the ERM in 1982 (and the ERM II in 1999, when the out-
come of the referendum was against the adoption of the euro). Since then, it 
has put the emphasis on fiscal measures when it came to issues of competi-
tiveness and economic development. In view of the deep recession, Finland   56
and Sweden abandoned their fixed exchange rates in late 1992 and allowed 
their currencies to float, later pegging them to the ECU (with Finland joining the 
ERM in 1996). The target of full employment, which had dominated mac-
roeonomic policies before, was given up in favour of the target of price stability. 
Sweden did so officially in 1993 after the floating of the Swedish krona had 
been terminated and, since then, Swedish monetary policy has been based on 
an inflation target of 2% per year, which was also due to the fact that Sweden 
wanted to keep an open door for the EMU joining in 1999. Denmark and 
Finland, too, have put a stronger emphasis on a low inflation rate, in order to be 
able to join the EMU in the future. Until today, each of the three countries uses 
inflation targeting and complies with the deficit and inflation targets given by the 
Maastricht treaty, although only Finland has become a member of the EMU, so 
far. 
As the Scandinavian welfare state implies a considerable level of public expen-
ditures, the aim in all three EU-Scandinavian countries was traditionally to 
achieve full employment, guaranteeing maximum possible tax revenues and 
thus funding generous social benefits and fiscal measures. ALMPs have played 
a major role when it comes to fighting unemployment and increasing the em-
ployment rate, although the intensity with which they have been applied varies, 
with Denmark (flexicurity model) and Sweden relying to a very large degree on 
ALMPs, and Finland only intensifying their use after the deep recession of the 
early 1990s, when the export-led growth did not prove to be able to reduce un-
employment. Centralised wage bargaining also was a traditional feature of the 
EU-Scandinavian labour market, and Finland has maintained this form of wage 
negotiation until today (although it was not always possible to reach an agree-
ment), while it was abandoned in Denmark in the late 1980s and finally in Swe-
den in 1990, whereas Sweden was gradually returning to that system in the 
course of the Rehnberg commission later in the 1990s.  
The similarities as well as the differences in macroeconomic policies and fea-
tures of Sweden, Finland and Denmark will be analysed in greater detail in the 
following econometric section of this study.   57
3  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE MACROECONOMIC REGIMES IN 
SWEDEN, FINLAND AND DENMARK  
In this part, we analyse the main areas of economic policy in the Scandinavian 
countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark by means of an econometric analysis 
of their respective macroeconomic regimes during the time range from 1970q1 
until 2006q4. The macroeconomic regime constellation, as introduced in chap-
ter 1, describes the mutual interaction of fiscal, monetary and wage policy, in 
combination with the implications of the external economic environment. Taken 
as a whole, the macroeconomic regime constellation thus defines the overall 
orientation of the economic policy in a given country for a given period in time.
8 
In contrast to the results obtained in mainstream neoclassical and ‘new’ en-
dogenous growth theory models (see for example Solow, 1956, Grossman & 
Helpman, 1994, Romer, 1986, Romer, 1990, Romer, 1994, Lucas, 1988, Solow, 
2000), the concept of a macroeconomic regime constellations thus implies a 
mutual dependence of the areas of macroeconomic policy, thereby assuming 
that macroeconomic policy has real effects. The growth performance of a coun-
try is then not wholly predetermined by external factors such as exogenous 
technological development, but can rather be influenced endogenously by 
adapting macroeconomic policy in the corresponding areas of the economy 
(see e.g. Kaldor, 1957, Kaldor, 1961, Robinson, 1956, Robinson, 1962, Hein, 
2006)
9   
Here we concentrate our analyse of the macroeconomic regimes in the Scandi-
navian countries on the cyclical effects of economic policy over the course of 
the business cycle, since we hypothesise that macroeconomic policy in Scandi-
navia was allowed to act rather flexibly and could thus adapt to prevailing eco-
                                            
8 For a more extensive definition of macroeconomic regimes see Heine, Herr & Kaiser, 2006 
and Hein, Menz & Truger, 2006 (2006).    58
nomic challenges that occurred in the short to medium run. The long-run growth 
effects of the welfare state in the Scandinavian countries then served as a con-
fidence-building frame, within which macroeconomic policies were allowed to 
operate relatively freely. The impact of the welfare state on the long-run growth 
trend is analysed in the next section. 
Our analysis of the macroeconomic regimes in the Scandinavian countries 
draws on Fritsche (2006) who conducted a similar investigation on distinct fields 
of macroeconomic policy of a series of Western industrialised countries. How-
ever, here we also take into account the mutual interaction of fiscal, monetary 
and wage policy and analyse their interdependencies and their concerted influ-
ence on the output, hence what we call macroeconomic regime constellation. 
The econometric analysis of the macroeconomic policy regimes in Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark is structured as follows.  
First, we investigate fiscal policy in the Scandinavian countries by constructing a 
simple fiscal indicator, which enables us to identify periods of expansive or re-
strictive fiscal policy. With the aim of examining periods of countercyclical or 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy and of identifying structural breaks of the fiscal policy 
regimes, we furthermore employ simple and recursive correlation analysis be-
tween fiscal policy aggregates and the output gap.  
The second chapter of this part deals with the econometric analysis of monetary 
policy in the Scandinavian countries. We first calculate a simple monetary indi-
cator using the real interest rate as a measure of monetary policy and identify-
ing restrictive or expansive periods over the span of time covered in our analy-
sis. Finally we will proceed to estimate forward-looking Taylor rules in state-
space models. By doing so, we can discover the underlying importance of each 
variable in the Taylor rule for the explanation of the nominal interest rate at each 
data point. We thus obtain insights concerning restrictive and expansive periods 
                                                                                                                                
9 Macroeconomic policies were found to be significant determinants of unemployment differ-
ences between countries in Baker, Glyn, Howell & Schmitt, 2005 and Palley, 2006. Hein & 
Truger, 2004 and Fritsche, Heine, Herr, Horn & Kaiser, 2004 apply the concept of interdepend-
ent economic policy and its consequences for the economic growth performance to the EMU 
and the USA, respectively.    59
in monetary policy as well as the relative importance of each variable in the 
Taylor rule at every point in time. We estimate Taylor rules including expected 
inflation, the output gap, and the nominal effective exchange rate as explana-
tory variables.  
The third chapter of this part is dedicated to the analysis of wage policy in the 
Scandinavian countries. In order to examine whether wage policy was stability-
oriented, we calculate a simple wage indicator and analyse periods with wage 
increases above or below the stability-norm. With the aim of discriminating 
wage-induced price inflation and price inflation due to exogenous price shocks, 
we then estimate a wage-price system with a state-space model for the Scandi-
navian countries. By doing so, we obtain the time-varying shocks to wage in-
creases and the remaining external price shocks.  
Finally, the fourth chapter of this part is dedicated to the investigation of the ef-
fect of the mutual interaction of the areas of macroeconomic policy, or what we 
term macroeconomic regime constellation, represented by the policy indicators 
calculated before, on the growth of real GDP. We attempt to solve this question 
with the estimation of a vector-autoregressive (VAR) system. In order to control 
for the effect of exchange rate policy on the output gap, we augment the VAR 
additionally with the real effective exchange rate.  
For our investigation, we used quarterly data for the time span 1970q1 to 
2006q4. With a few exceptions, data was obtained from the OECD Economic 
Outlook No. 80 (OECD, 2007a) and the OECD Main Economic Indicators Data-
base (OECD, 2007b) for Sweden, Finland and Denmark. If they were not avail-
able from the OECD, we drew on data from the ‘International Financial Statis-
tics’ (IFS) database of the IMF (IMF, 2007). Data for government expenditure 
and government revenue for Denmark were taken from the MONA model of the 
Danish Nationalbank (Danish Nationalbanken, 2007). 
3.1 Fiscal policy 
We regard the main task of fiscal policy as stabilising the business cycle, i.e. 
reducing the volatility of the fluctuations in output over the course of the busi-  60
ness cycle. This can be achieved by the automatic stabilisers (for example so-
cial benefits in the case of unemployment, progressive income tax etc.), by dis-
cretionary fiscal policy aiming at securing internal demand during recessions, or 
by a combination of both instruments. In order to remain sustainable, fiscal pol-
icy should act countercyclical and thus preserve a balanced budget over the 
course of the business cycle. This also implies that automatic stabilisers, on the 
one hand, and discretionary fiscal policy, on the other hand, should always op-
erate in the same direction.  
In this chapter, we first establish a simple fiscal indicator, which enables us to 
identify periods of expansive and restrictive fiscal policy.  
Second, the direction of the fiscal policy in the Scandinavian countries Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark is analysed by means of a correlation analysis between 
the de-trended fiscal indicator, established in the first section of this chapter, on 
the one hand, and de-trended output as a measure of the business cycle, on 
the other hand. Due to the restricted data availability, we were only able to con-
duct our investigation of fiscal policy in Denmark from 1980q1 until 2006q4. 
3.1.1 The fiscal indicator 
Both government expenditure and government revenue contribute to diminish-
ing the fluctuations of output over the business cycle: Ideally, government ex-
penditure grows with a constant trend, implying slower growth than the output 
during upturns and slower reduction than the output during downturns. In con-
trast, government revenue should fluctuate stronger than output over the busi-
ness cycle, thereby stabilising demand over the course of the cycle. We can 
thus construct a fiscal indicator by calculating the difference between cyclical 
government expenditure and cyclical government revenue, both in percent of 
GDP, to obtain the fiscal demand impulse in relation to the output: 
(1)       100
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Values of the fiscal indicator above zero show periods of expansive fiscal policy, 
while negative values of the indicator point to periods of restrictive fiscal policy.   61
In order to obtain the cyclical components of output, government expenditure 
and government revenue, respectively, we first de-trended the data using a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) for government expenditure as 
well as government revenue (both deflated by the GDP-deflator), and an 
asymmetric band-pass filter (Baxter & King, 1995, Christiano & Fitzgerald, 
2003) for real GDP as a measure of output. Generally, both filters are suitable 
for extracting the trend component (defined as fluctuations that have amplitudes 
exceeding eight years) of time series. We employed those filters that gave the 
most plausible results with respect to the data. The cyclical development of real 
output as well as real government expenditure and revenue was then obtained 
by subtracting the trend from the time series. Thereafter, we estimated the fiscal 
indicator as the difference of cyclical government expenditure and cyclical gov-
ernment revenue (both in percent of GDP) as in equation (1). Figure 3-1 shows 
the fiscal indicator for Sweden and Finland from 1970q1 until 2006q4 as well as 
the fiscal indicator for Denmark from 1980q1 and 2006q4.  
Figure 3-1: Fiscal Indicator for Nordic EU-countries 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 171) 
The comparison of the fiscal indicators of EU-Scandinavia reveals three striking 
similarities at the end of the time series that is closest to the present: Going 
backwards chronologically we find expansive fiscal impulses in all three Nordic 
EU-countries in the first half of the 2000s, succeeding a common “restrictive 
peak” of the fiscal indicator in 2000, which could be interpreted as the final turn-
ing point of a restrictive trend, starting in 1993. Following this perception would 
hint at common features of the fiscal policy regimes in the countries observed: a 
major influence of the EMS-crisis in 1992/93 and of the preceding preparation of 
EMU start in 1999 (despite only Finland joined the euro area yet), an underes-
timation of demand contraction due to the burst of the “new economy”-bubble in 
2000 and, finally a surprisingly pronounced expansive fiscal demand impulse in 
times of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) governing the fiscal policy in the 
EU of the early 2000s.   62
In contrast to these similarities we have to consider some differences in the fis-
cal policies ot the three Nordic EU-countries as well: First of all, in the time pe-
riod comparable fiscal policy in Denmark seems to have followed a pattern that 
differs significantly from the ones in Sweden and Finland.
10 This divergence 
might have started sometime or other in the early 1980s and ended with the 
common restrictive peak in 2000. The fiscal indicator suggests the beginning of 
the 1980s in Denmark was dominated by expansive fiscal policies that were 
caused by high unemployment and high fiscal deficits after the second oil crisis. 
Around 1986 and in contrast to Sweden and Finland at that time, the indicator 
points to a sudden restrictive peak. For the time following and most of the 
1990s, the indicator implies rather neutral fiscal policies, with an expansive pe-
riod standing out in 1993 due to an income tax cut. From 1998 until 2001, how-
ever, a period of restrictive fiscal policies can be observed, which reflects the 
higher tax burden with the implementation of the Whitsun package in 1998. The 
indicator suggests that this was followed by a more extended period of expan-
sive fiscal policies, representing Danish tax freezes and cuts in labour income 
taxes in response to the crisis in 2001. Finally, around 2005 the indicator once 
more points to restrictive fiscal policies. 
In contrast to Denmark, the Swedish and Finnish fiscal policy has two out-
standing demand peaks in common: a very restrictive one around 1990 and a 
very expansive in 1993. The restrictive peak in 1990 seemingly was the turning 
point ending distinct restrictive periods of fiscal policy, which started in Sweden 
already in 1986 and in Finland in 1988. Considered together with the develop-
ments of the Danish fiscal policy we could suppose an important trigger of the 
regime shifts of fiscal policy around the year 1985. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that Sweden and Finland showed distinct peri-
ods of restrictive fiscal policy, 1976/77, after the first oil shock. In contrast to that 
Sweden reacted to the second oil shock (1979-1980) already in 1979 with an-
                                            
10 Due to the different sources for our data, compared to the fiscal indicators for Sweden and 
Finland, the fiscal indicator for Denmark exhibits a less smooth pattern, which is however, not 
due to seasonal changes in the data.   63
other rather restrictive fiscal impulse before shifting to an expansive policy in 
1980, while Finland turned to a restrictive policy only 1981, after an expansive 
impulse in 1978/79. 
3.1.2 Correlation analysis of fiscal policy aggregates and output: 
How strong were the overall countercyclical patterns? 
With the aim of determining whether fiscal policy in the Scandinavian countries 
acted counter- or pro-cyclically, we calculated the correlation between the fiscal 
indicator, on the one hand, and the output gap
11 on the other hand. With coun-
tercyclical fiscal policy, we generally expect cyclical government expenditure to 
be correlated negatively to the output gap, while cyclical government revenue 
should be correlated positively to the output gap. Considered as evindence of 
countercyclical fiscal policy, the fiscal indicator calculated in the preceding sec-
tion should be correlated negatively to the output gap over the business cycle 
(see also Fritsche, 2006). 
Figure 3-2: Correlation between fiscal indicators and output gaps in EU-
Scandinavia 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 172) 
 Considering the correlation between the fiscal indicator and the output gap in 
Sweden, we find a negative albeit weak correlation
12, supporting the suggestion 
of an overall countercyclical fiscal policy in Sweden. As a consequence of the 
weak correlation between the government finance aggregates and the output 
gap, the correlation between the fiscal impulse and the output gap is also found 
to be quite weak. The correlation between the fiscal indicator and the output 
gap in Finland also shows the expected negative sign. Although some of the 
data points in the scatter plot are still relatively widely dispersed, the negative 
correlation is more pronounced than in the case of Sweden. This is probably 
                                            
11 We define the output gap as the difference of real GDP and its trend obtained by the band-
pass filter in percent of real GDP. It is thus the production above or below trend at any given 
time, which we use here as an indicator for booms and recessions, respectively.   64
due to a stronger negative correlation between government expenditure and the 
output gap. In sum, thus, our results point to a countercyclical fiscal policy in 
Finland over the time span covered here, which seems to be more distinct than 
in Sweden. The result for Denmark is very preliminary and there is substantial 
reason to be cautious in its interpretation, since some of the correlations are 
very weak and close to zero. The correlation between the fiscal indicator and 
the output gap is found to be negative, pointing to countercyclical fiscal policy, 
but also likely not very significantly so. Probably due to the hardly detectable 
negative correlation between government expenditure and the output gap, we 
thus can sum up that at a first glance, compared to Sweden and Finland, there 
seems to be a less pronounced countercyclical orientation of fiscal policy in 
Denmark.  
3.1.3 Tests of structural breaks of the fiscal policy regimes: Are 
there any regime shifts?  
While we have determined the general direction of fiscal policy in the Scandina-
vian countries employing simple correlation analysis, it remains to test for struc-
tural breaks in the relationship between fiscal policy and output over the course 
of the business cycle. We therefore estimated recursive correlation coefficients 
to test for structural breaks as in Fritsche (2006):  
Recursive forwards estimated coefficients start with 20 data points (5 years) at 
the beginning of the sample, then add one data point and estimate the correla-
tion coefficient again. This is being repeated until the end of the sample period. 
Using this estimation method, structural breaks at the beginning of the span of 
time covered in the analysis become more apparent than those at the end of the 
period, since as the sample increases, the earlier observations gain increasingly 
more weight in the estimation.  
In contrast, recursive backwards estimated correlation coefficients start the es-
timation with the last 20 data points of the sample and then successively add 
                                                                                                                                
12 This is obvious from the widely dispersed data points in the scatter plot, which are relatively 
far from the regression line and follow no readily obvious trend.    65
another data point until the beginning of the time span is reached. Obviously, by 
employing this estimation method, structural breaks towards the end of the 
sample period are more distinctly pronounced than those at the beginning.  
Finally, correlation coefficients estimated with a ‘rolling regression’ estimate the 
correlation with a window of 32 data points (8 years), which is ‘rolled’ over the 
time span of the analysis. These coefficients are more sensitive to small 
changes in the data structure, since a new window may change the relationship 
significantly. Therefore, it is regarded as most insightful to interpret all recursive 
coefficients jointly. Generally, correlation coefficients below zero for the correla-
tion between the fiscal indicator and output imply a countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Outliers with the opposite sign thus suggest a period of pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Figure 3-3: Structural breaks of the fiscal indicators in EU-Scandinavia 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 173) 
Considering the recursive correlation coefficients for the correlation between the 
fiscal indicator and the output gap in Figure 3-3, we find that both recursive es-
timated coefficients in Sweden remain below the zero line throughout the whole 
time span, which confirms our assumption of a generally countercyclical fiscal 
policy. The rolling correlation coefficients indicates two structural breaks in the 
fiscal policy of Sweden with a positive correlation between the fiscal indicator 
and the output gap, one around 1985 (tight fiscal policies after the devaluations) 
and one in the second half of the 1990s (introduction of the nominal expenditure 
ceiling for government expenditures). Since the pro-cyclical periods are rather 
short and seemingly not very pronounced, they are probably not dominant 
enough to be represented fully in the recursive estimates. The countercyclical 
fiscal policy in Sweden, however, seems to have been most dominant in the first 
half of the 1990s (fiscal expansion in the crisis of the early 1990s) and after 
2000 (fiscal expansion in response to the crisis in 2001 and consequent fiscal 
surplus after the recovery).  
When analysing the correlation coefficients for the relationship between the fis-
cal indicator and the output gap, the picture for Finland turns out to be quite a 
different one from the one for Sweden: The recursive forwards estimated corre-  66
lation coefficients suggest a pro-cyclical or neutral fiscal policy in Finland 
throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. After 1986, however, the 
recursive forwards estimated coefficients turn significantly negative, thereby 
indicating a countercyclical fiscal policy in Finland from this date onwards. The 
rolling correlation coefficients suggest a positive correlation between the fiscal 
indicator and the output gap, and thus pro-cyclical fiscal policies, in Finland dur-
ing the second half of the 1970s (expansionary fiscal policy with booming econ-
omy) and show a bump which reaches the zero line around 1997 (restrictive 
fiscal policies after the crisis of the 1990s along with laggard growth in the non-
export sectors). On the other hand, between 1985 and 1995 countercyclical fis-
cal policy in Finland (fiscal tightening in order to dampen the overheating econ-
omy before 1990 and working automatic stabilisers after the crisis) seems to 
have been very distinct, with rolling correlation coefficients near –1. After 1997, 
the rolling regression indicates another countercyclical orientation. 
The recursive estimated correlation coefficients for the correlation between the 
fiscal indicator and the output gap reinforce our assumption of generally coun-
tercyclical fiscal policies in Denmark as both remain firmly below the zero line. 
Both show a structural break around 1987 (‘potato diet’, reduction of employers’ 
social security contributions and increase in effective VAT). The rolling correla-
tion coefficients detect a major change in the correlation between the fiscal indi-
cator and the output gap around 1992, with positive correlation coefficients dis-
played between 1990 and 1993 suggesting pro-cyclical fiscal policy in those 
years. This could point at the combination of slow growth due to the crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990s in Denmark and the implementation of the EU-initiated 
debt ceilings and deficit targets at the same time. 
3.1.4 Preliminary summary of the results 
One common feature of all three countries of EU-Scandinavia is a significant 
countercyclical orientation of the fiscal policy regimes after 2000. For the period 
before this date, we could detect structural breaks of the fiscal polices in Swe-
den and Finland in 1985 and 1995, while Denmark has followeda distinct fiscal 
policy regime since the early 1980s.   67
An overall summary of our results with regard to fiscal policies in the Scandina-
vian countries Sweden, Finland and Denmark indicates that each of the three 
countries show cyclical changes between expansive and restrictive fiscal poli-
cies over the relevant time span  that generally follow a countercyclical pattern. 
We therefore conclude that the principal task of fiscal policy we had defined as 
the stabilisation of the business cycle was generally accomplished.  
However, we also identified various periods of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in each 
country: Sweden seems to have employed pro-cyclical fiscal policies in re-
sponse to restrictive shocks such as the devaluations in the 1980s and the in-
troduction of the nominal expenditure ceiling for its government in the second 
half of the 1990s after the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast, the 
period of pro-cyclical fiscal policy we observe in Finland in the 1970s up to the 
first half of the 1980s, seems to have arisen from expansive fiscal policies in a 
period of booming economic activity. However, the deep economic crisis at the 
beginning of the 1990s ensued restrictive fiscal policies in the second half of the 
1990s also in Finland. In Denmark, a short period of pro-cyclical fiscal policy is 
suggested at the beginning of the 1990s probably related to the implementation 
of EU-initiated fiscal rules when growth still suffered from the crisis.  
3.2 Monetary policy 
It is widely acknowledged that the principal task of monetary policy the mainte-
nance of price stability. However, we also regard it as an important task of the 
central bank to encourage the growth of real output over the business cycle, 
thus allowing a certain degree of price inflation which enhances the economic 
climate for growth. Therefore, the inflation target must not be set too low so as 
to avoid a situation where deflation might occur.  
In this chapter we first calculate a simple indicator of monetary policy in Swe-
den, Finland and Denmark, making use of the real interest rate, since it is as-
sumed that the central banks target a certain real interest rate. We then en-
hance our analysis of monetary policy by estimating various Taylor rules of 
monetary policy in the Scandinavian countries with state-space models. 
Thereby, we are able to extract the unobservable, stochastic characteristics of   68
the variables determining the nominal interest rate in the Taylor rule. This en-
ables us to generate time-varying coefficients that measure the importance of 
the exogenous variables in the Taylor rule for the explanation of the nominal 
interest rate at any given moment within covered the span of time.  
3.2.1 The de-trended real interest rate as an indicator of monetary 
policy 
With the aim of analysing the monetary policy in the Scandinavian countries 
since 1970, we calculated the real interest rate as an indicator of monetary pol-
icy. It is assumed that the central bank sets its key interest rate according to a 
targeted short-run real interest rate. Insofar as price rigidities exist, it is under-
stood that the central bank can influence the real interest rate, at least in the 
short run.
13 The real interest rate was taken as the appropriate indicator of the 
direction of monetary policy, since it is assumed that the real interest rate influ-
ences investment expenditures and consumption. 
We further assume that investment and consumption decisions are forward-
looking, which means that they are calculated with the expected real interest 
rate, rather than the present one. Therefore, we took the core rate of inflation, 
i.e. excluding price changes for food and energy, as a proxy of the inflation ex-
pectations to calculate the expected real short-run interest rate (as in Fritsche, 
2006). In order to calculate the cyclical real inflation rate as a normative indica-
tor of monetary policy during the business cycle, i.e. our monetary indicator, we 
employed a Hodrick-Prescott filter ((Hodrick & Prescott, 1997)) to the time se-
ries.
14 We thus allowed for a time-varying trend in the short-run real interest rate 
and defined our indicator the direction of monetary policy over the business cy-
cle as the cyclical real interest rate: 
                                            
13 See for example Bernanke & Gertler, 1995, Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 1998, Clarida, Galí & 
Gertler, 1999, Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 2000 and Bagliano & Favero, 1998. For different theoreti-
cal explanations of wage and price rigidities and stickiness due to non-rational expectations see 
Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 1996, Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 2000, Mankiw & Reis, 2002 and Car-
roll, 2003. 
14 The filter was chosen according to the plausibility of the results.    69
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Positive values of the monetary indicator then imply a real short-run interest rate 
above the expected value, suggesting that monetary policy tightened in this pe-
riod. Alternatively, negative values of the indicator suggest an expansive mone-
tary policy with a short-run real interest rate below the expected value.   
Figure 3-4: Monetary Indicators for the Nordic EU-countries 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 174) 
Comparing the monetary indicators for EU-Scandinavia we find some striking 
similarities as well: First, we observe an expansive monetary policy as common 
reaction to the first oil price shock in 1974/75. Second, we identify severe re-
strictive monetary episodes in all three Nordic EU-countries during the EMS-
crisis in 1992/93, and third, a remarkable stabilisation of monetary policy after 
the blow-up of EMS-1 (with one significant restrictive outlier in the case of Den-
mark in the year 2000). These results substantiate our assumption that the 
EMS-crisis probably triggered an important regime shift in macroeconomic pol-
icy, at least in Sweden and Finland.  
Again and in comparison, the Danish monetary policy showed a more stable 
pattern already before the EMS-crisis, at least since the mid-1980s.This was 
probably due to fact that Denmark as EU-country (since 1973) was a genuine 
member of the EMS. In 1986, the EMS switched to a policy, in effect using the 
Deutschmark as an anchor for the ERM (actually the EMS without the UK, 
which decided not to join the ERM until October 1990, and to withdraw from it  
as soon as September 1992). As a consequence of the simultaneous introduc-
tion of full capital mobility in preparation of the Single European Market to be 
completed in 1992, all members of the ERM, including Denmark, lost their ca-
pability to execute a monetary policy independent of the decisions of the Ger-
man central bank. Interestingly, it were the Danes, who voted against the ratifi-
cation of the Maastricht treaty with the transition of the EMS into the EMU as 
one of its core elements, thus triggering the open crisis of the EMS in the sum-
mer of 1992. This consequence was due to the provision of the Treaty stating 
that it, including the ambitious EMU-project, would be void unless ratified by all   70
EU countries. The succeeding speculative attacks against Lira and Pound as 
well as the decision of the German central bank to stop unlimited interventions 
in favor of the narrow band of the currency parities result in the withdrawal of 
the Italian and British currencies from the ERM in mid-September 1992. Specu-
lation shifted to the currencies of Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and even to curren-
cies of countries like Belgium, Denmark and France, with inflation rates below 
the (relatively high) German level. Finally, the crisis was not resolved before the 
EU monetary authorities adopted a new ultra-large band of fluctuations for the 
ERM, which de-facto hardly differed from a floating exchange rate regime. The 
granting of opt-outs on the single currency (and in the case of Denmark on de-
fence matters as well), after all, made it possible for the Maastricht Treaty to 
come into force in November 1993. 
In contrast to Denmark, Sweden and Finland did not join the EU before 1995. 
Until their EU accession, they were free to conduct an independent monetary 
policy and to unilaterally peg or not to peg the ECU or another currency. This 
notwithstanding, these countries had decided to liberalise their capital accounts 
in the mid-1980s in order to meet the provisions of the Single European Market 
and the criteria for their own EU accession ten years later. Ironically the early 
member of EU and EMS, Denmark, paved the way for the Swedish opting-out 
on the single currency, while the new EU member country Finland directly 
joined EMS in 1995 and the Euro area in 1999.  
Throughout the 1970s until the mid-1980s, the Swedish indicator shows a 
strong cyclical pattern, suggesting alternating expansive and restrictive mone-
tary impulses without major shocks to monetary policy in Sweden. This can be 
explained by the active exchange rate policy employed throughout this period, 
which concentrated on maintaining full employment via exchange rate devalua-
tions rather than stabilising the real exchange rate. In contrast, in 1991 the indi-
cator demonstrates a strong negative outlier with an even stronger positive out-
lier afterwards, indicating a sudden monetary expansion followed immediately 
by a strong monetary tightening. The outliers represent the unilateral currency 
peg of the Swedish krona to the ECU in 1991, on the one hand, and the floating 
of the currency in 1992, on the other hand. After the monetary shock, the volatil-  71
ity of the monetary indicator decreases significantly, thus pointing at a consider-
able overall change in monetary policy after 1995. This can be interpreted as a 
decline in variability and shocks to inflation after the Swedish Riksbank imple-
mented a formal inflation target in 1995 and succeeded in stabilising inflation 
around the target in the following years. 
The de-trended short-run real interest rate of Finland as an indicator of Finnish 
monetary policy since 1970 reveals several periods of monetary tightening in 
Finland: There are two less strong restrictive episodes in the first and in the 
second half of the 1970s and two periods of rather strong monetary tightening 
from 1983 to 1987 (increasing pressure to dampen inflation after the capital 
market liberalisation) and from 1990 to 1993 (increased interest rates in order to 
defend the peg to the ECU before the floating in 1992). On the other hand, 
monetary expansions according to the de-trended real interest rate seem to 
have been most pronounced around 1975 (reflecting a devaluation after the first 
oil crisis) and preceding the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s.  
Similar to our findings of monetary policy in Sweden, the Danish indicator also 
reveals a pronounced cyclical pattern until 1982 owing to various devaluations 
of the Danish kroner, with a particularly strong monetary expansion around 
1975 in response to the first oil shock. Between 1982 and 1985, the indicator 
points to a monetary expansion. For the second half of the 1980s the monetary 
indicator suggests a rather neutral monetary policy in Denmark. The indicator of 
Denmark points towards a strong monetary tightening in 1992/93, which was 
obviously supposed to defend the parities of the ERM against the speculative 
attacks on the Danish kroner. Again, we observe a much less active monetary 
policy after 1995 also in Denmark. However, the monetary indicator proceeds in 
a more volatile way than is the case for the Swedish and the Finnish indicator, 
with a monetary tightening indicated around 2000 before the failed referendum 
on the adoption of the euro. Thus, although Danish monetary policy has gener-
ally followed the course of the ECU/euro area ever since the country has joined 
the EMS, the Danish Nationalbank takes care to preserve its independence and 
makes sure this is acknowledged elsewhere.   72
3.2.2 Estimation of a Taylor rule with a state-space model 
With the aim of obtaining additional insights on the direction of monetary policy 
and on the relative importance of various exogenous variables in the interest 
rate decisions of the Scandinavian central banks at any given moment, we es-
timated different Taylor rules in state-space models.  
Taylor (Taylor, 1993) first defined a simple rule for monetary policy, where the 
nominal interest rate (it) that is set by the central bank is influenced by the long-
run equilibrium real interest rate (
r
i ), the current rate of inflation ( ), the infla-
tion gap (
t π
π − πt ), and the output gap ( y yt − ): 
(3)       ) y y ( ) ( i i t t t
r
t − β + π − π α + π + = . 
Recent theoretical and empirical literature on monetary policy has, however, 
emphasised the importance of the deviation of expected inflation and output 
from their targeted values rather than their current or past gaps in determining 
the short-run nominal interest rate.
15 It is assumed that temporary nominal wage 
and price rigidities induce a positive relationship between output and inflation in 
the short run. In accordance with the current state of the economy, the central 
bank thus has a target for the short-run nominal interest rate that is set in line 
with the following rule: 
(4)       ] y ) y ( E [ ] ) ( E [ i i t t t t k t t
*
t − Ω γ + π − Ω π δ + = + ,  
where  is the targeted short-run nominal interest rate in period t, 
*
t i i denotes the 
long-run equilibrium nominal rate and  ) x ( E t t t Ω  is the expected value of vari-
able x in period t, making use of the information set Ω available in period t.  
                                            
15 Forward-looking Taylor rules are derived theoretically and estimated in a wide variety of pa-
pers, see Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 1998, Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 2000, Clarida, 2001, Kamps & 
Pierdzioch, 2002 and Fritsche, 2006 to name just a few. For a summary of recent monetary 
theory see Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 1999. The model estimated here follows Fritsche, 2006 and 
is essentially the same as the ones in Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 1998, Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 
2000 and Kamps & Pierdzioch, 2002.   73
It is further understood that the central bank sets the short-run nominal interest 
rate so that the targeted rate is approached gradually. This procedure called 
‘interest rate smoothing’ (Goodfriend, 1991) is usually employed in order to 
avoid capital market distortions, maintain credibility etc. The actual nominal in-
terest rate thus follows a partial-adjustment model: 
(5)       ,   t 1 t
*
t t i ) L ( i ) 1 ( i ν + ρ + ρ − = −
with 0<ρ<1 measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing and an i.i.d. shock 
to the interest rate, υ. Combining equations (4) and (5) and defining  π δ − ≡ φ * i  
and  y y y t
gap
t − ≡ , we obtain 
(6)   t 1 t t
gap
t t t k t t t i ) L ( )] y ( E ) ( E )[ 1 ( i ν + ρ + Ω γ + Ω π δ + φ ρ − = − + . 
For the estimation of the forward-looking Taylor rule in equation (6), we as-
sumed the expected output gap in period t to equal the actual output gap in this 
period. Since the expected inflation rate between periods t and k constitutes a 
forward-looking variable that is unknown and thus correlated to the residual υt, 
we forecasted expected price inflation over the whole investigation period sepa-
rately before estimating equation (6). This was achieved in a vector-
autoregressive (VAR) model, where the inflation expectations of the central 
bank were taken to be formed by considering inflation itself, the short-run nomi-
nal interest rate, the output gap and the change in commodity prices. We 
proxied commodity prices with the change in energy prices, which were taken to 
be exogenous. All other variables were assumed to be endogenous and in-
cluded with up to 8 lags (quarterly data). In order to avoid structural breaks in 
the model, we divided the sample period after analysing the system’s residuals 
and estimated the VARs for the following sub-samples: Sweden: 1
st VAR 
1973q1 – 1990q4, 2
nd VAR 1991q1 2006q2; Finland: 1
st VAR 1972q1 – 1992q4, 
2
nd VAR 1993q1 – 2006q4; Denmark: 1
st VAR 1973q3 – 1989q4, 2
nd 1990q1- 
2006q4. Differences with respect to the start and end dates of the inflation fore-
cast are due to the availability of data. With the VAR model, we then generated 
inflation forecasts with a horizon of four quarters (assuming a constant inflation 
regime for the estimation period of the model), which we employed as the time   74
series of expected inflation in equation (6). Generally, the forecasted time series 
of expected inflation matches actual inflation in the three Scandinavian coun-
tries quite closely.
16  
Modeling the forward-looking Taylor rule in a state-space model enables us to 
estimate the unobservable, stochastic processes underlying the observable 
course of the data process. Hence, state-space analysis renders it possible to 
estimate the time-variant influence of the exogenous variables in the Taylor rule 
with respect to the nominal interest rate
17: 
(7)   , with      t 1 t
gap
t 2 k t t 1 t i ) L ( ] y z ) ( E z )[ 1 ( i ν + ρ + + π + φ ρ − = − + ) e , 0 ( N ~ t
η ν
(8)       t 1 1 t 1 t 1 z z ν + = −        ) e , 0 ( N ~ t 1
ϕ ν
(9)       t 2 1 t 2 t 2 z z ν + = −      .  ) e , 0 ( N ~ t 2
κ ν
The state-variables z1 and z2 are modeled as random walks and measure the 
time-variant influence of expected inflation and the output gap, respectively, on 
the short-run nominal interest rate. The state-space model hence allocates the 
state-variables the value that explains the nominal interest rate best at any 
given moment. It is therefore not necessary to test separately for structural 
breaks in order to detect changes in regime, but rather the state-variables 
themselves reveal any structural breaks in their importance for the interest rate 
decision of the central bank. 
In order to control also for the influence of the nominal exchange rate for the 
setting of interest rates by the central bank, we estimated an augmented Taylor 
rule where the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) was included: 
(10)  ,    t 1 t t 3
gap
t 2 k t t 1 t i ) L ( ] neer z y z ) ( E z )[ 1 ( i ν + ρ + + + π + φ ρ − = − + ) e , 0 ( N ~ t
η ν
(11)       t 1 1 t 1 t 1 z z ν + = −        ) e , 0 ( N ~ t 1
ϕ ν
                                            
16 See Figures A1-A3 and Tables A1-A6 in the appendix for the results of the VAR estimation of 
expected inflation.  
17 For an extensive description of state-space analysis methods see Hamilton, 1994 and espe-
cially Durbin & Koopman, 2001.   75
(12)       t 2 1 t 2 t 2 z z ν + = −          ) e , 0 ( N ~ t 2
κ ν
(13)       t 3 1 t 3 t 3 z z ν + = −                  .  ) e , 0 ( N ~ t 3
τ ν
The state-space estimation of the Taylor rule including the nominal effective 
exchange rate for Sweden gave way to the following coefficients (standard er-
rors are in parentheses)
18: 
(10a)     t 1 t ) 020 . 0 ( t 3
gap
t 2 k t t 1 ) 224 . 0 ( ) 020 . 0 ( t i 410 . 0 ] neer z y z ) ( E z 267 . 4 )[ 410 . 0 1 ( i ν + + + + π + − = − +
Figure 3-5: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Sweden 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 175) 
Our estimates of the time-varying state-variables of the augmented Taylor rule 
according to equation (10) for Sweden are presented in Figure 3-5. The influ-
ence of expected inflation and the output gap, respectively, on the short-run 
nominal interest rate is depicted by z1 and z2. We observe the effect of in-
creased inflation expectations due to the currency depreciations in the middle of 
the 1980s and due to the currency crisis in the first half of the 1990s with values 
of z1 significantly above 1. The structural break in z1 is also shown very clearly, 
albeit not until 1999 when inflation expectations had already stabilised. The 
time-varying influence of the output gap is estimated to be insignificant before 
1991, negative between 1991 and 1995 and significantly positive after 1998.  
The state-variable z3 finally depicts the influence of the nominal effective ex-
change rate (NEER) on the nominal interest rate. It is clearly visible that during 
the period of fixed exchange rates before 1992, z3 shows a much more volatile 
course, which is also reflected in the larger significance bands. Positive peaks 
indicate depreciations at the beginning of the 1980s and an appreciation in the 
                                            
18 Again, some of the variances of the signal and the state equations had to be restricted in 
order to obtain stable results:  ,  ) 0 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t ν ) 01 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 1 ν  and  ) 0 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 2 ν . υ3t was 
estimated to be  . The covariances between υ ) e , 0 ( N ~
) 094 . 0 (
958 . 0
t 3 ν t and υ1t, on the one hand, and 
between υt and υ3t, on the other hand, were restricted to 0.01 and 0.0, respectively. The covari-
ance between υt and υ2t was estimated to be -0.062 (0.007).   76
second half of the 1980s, whereas a negative outlier points to the depreciation 
in 1992 after the floating of the Swedish krona. After 1992, the influence of the 
NEER on the nominal interest rate is shown to have stabilised significantly. 
The state-space estimation of the Taylor rule including the NEER for Finland 
yielded the following coefficients (standard errors are in parentheses)
19: 
(10b)   .  t 1 t ) 046 . 0 ( t 3
gap
t 2 k t t 1 ) 879 . 1 ( ) 046 . 0 ( t i 215 . 0 ] neer z y z ) ( E z 193 . 5 )[ 215 . 0 1 ( i ν + + + + π + − = − +
Figure 3-6: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Finland 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 176) 
The estimated time-varying coefficients of the exchange-rate-augmented Taylor 
rule for Finland are presented in Figure 3-6. The peaks indicate a strong restric-
tive influence of expected inflation on the nominal interest rate around 1986 and 
between 1990 and 1992. , The structural break in 1995 is also obvious. The 
time-varying coefficient of the output gap is found to be strongly insignificant 
before 1985. Afterwards, the coefficient alters between positive and insignificant 
values and becomes negative after 2002. The z2 variable thus suggests that 
monetary policy only took account of the real economy after the stabilisation of 
inflation expectations, however, time-varying coefficients for the output gap re-
main small. The z3 variable, depicting the time-varying influence of the nominal 
effective exchange rate, seems to be insignificant for most of the sample period. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the variance of z3 has decreased substantially 
after 1993. Positive peaks of z3, indicating depreciations in Finland and thus 
restrictive impacts on the nominal interest rate, are suggested around 1986 and 
between 1990 and 1991. These coincide with the monetary tightenings indi-
cated by z1 and a speculative attack against the Finnish markka along with the 
                                            
19 Again, we had to restrict some of the variances, leading us to set  ) 5 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 1 ν   and 
. υ ) 0 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 2 ν
t and υ3t were estimated to be   and  , 
respectively. Finally, the covariances between υ
) e , 0 ( N ~
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t and υ1t, between υt and υ2t, and between υt and 
υ3t were estimated to be 0.471 (3.82e
-5), 0.158 (0.003) and 0.223 (0.016), respectively.   77
liberalisation of the capital markets, as well as the devaluation after the floating 
of the markka during the currency crisis in the early 1990s. After 1995, z3 
shows a close to zero influence of the NEER on the nominal interest rate which 
can be interpreted as the loss of the exchange rate instrument in monetary pol-
icy after the Finnish accession to the EMU was initiated.  
The state-space model estimation for the Taylor rule including the nominal ef-
fective exchange rate for Denmark gave way to the following coefficients (stan-
dard errors are in parentheses)
20: 
(10c)     t 1 t ) 004 . 0 ( t 3
gap
t 2 k t t 1 ) 166 . 0 ( ) 004 . 0 ( t i 619 . 0 ] neer z y z ) ( E z 727 . 7 )[ 619 . 0 1 ( i ν + + + + π + − = − +
Figure 3-7: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Denmark 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 177) 
The time-varying coefficients of the NEER-augmented Taylor rule in Denmark 
are shown in Figure 3-7. We observe mostly insignificant values of z1 until the 
beginning of the 1990s. The monetary tightening in 1987 and 1990 with values 
close to or above 1 due to increased inflation expectations during the ‘potato 
diet’ and the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s are also visible in the aug-
mented Taylor rule estimation, and z1 values suggest that only the second tight-
ening is significant. The structural break in 1993, with a strong positive outlier of 
z1 indicating a very restrictive impact of expected inflation followed by equally 
strong negative values of z1 reflecting the speculative attack on the Danish 
kroner and the subsequent monetary expansion, is also clearly depicted. After 
the structural break, we again observe negative values of z1, pointing at statisti-
cal problems as mentioned above. The time-varying coefficient of the output 
gap here is found to be largely insignificant, with a positive peak around 1993, 
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reflecting the implementation of the medium-term fiscal framework. Finally, the 
nominal effective exchange rate seems to have been largely neglected in the 
Danish Nationalbank’s exchange rate decisions which is not a surprising result 
considering the implementation of a fixed exchange rate regime as early as 
1982. Before 1990 we do not find any significant influence of the exchange rate 
on the central bank’s interest rate setting. Between 1990 and 1992, the state-
variable z3 shows very small positive values, which are reversed to negative 
values after 1997, albeit hardly reaching values under –1. The small values of 
z3 reflect the fact that the Danish kroner never surpassed its fluctuation range 
of 2.25% against the ECU and the euro, respectively.  
3.2.3. Preliminary summary of the results 
The analysis of monetary policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark revealed 
some interesting insights with respect to its achievement of price stability, 
monetary disturbances and the role of expected inflation. We generally observe 
a distinct stabilisation of monetary policy in each of the three countries after 
1995, which in Denmark seems to have been achieved around 1985 already. 
Various factors can be mentioned as causes for the increased price stability, but  
the most prominent reason for the decline in monetary shocks and the conse-
quent stabilisation of inflation expectations seems to have been the introduction 
of an inflation target regime in Sweden and Finland after the devaluations dur-
ing the EMS crisis in 1992/93. In the case of Denmark, the  EMS membership 
combined with a transparent monetary system were flexible enough to react to 
domestic challenges to price stability and growth, and ensured a stable mone-
tary environment as early as the 1980s thus avoiding the banking and currency 
crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. 
                                                                                                                                
) 01 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t
20 Again, we had to restrict the sample period to 1984q1 until 2005q1 and the variances of all 
the signal and state equations to ν ,  ) 10 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 1 ν ,  ) 0 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 2 ν  and 
 in order to ensure the stability of the model. The covariances between υ ) 0 . 0 , 0 ( N ~ t 3 ν t and υ2t 
as well as between υt and υ3t were restricted to 0.0 and 0.01, respectively. Finally, the covari-
ance between υt and υ1t was estimated to be –0.639 (0.007).   79
3.3 Wage policy 
In the macroeconomic policy mix of a country, wage bargaining systems are 
assigned the task of coordinating wage increases. One the one hand, these 
must not be too high in order to avoid pressure on prices and price inflation. On 
the other hand, they should not be too low, either, because insufficient nominal 
wage increases imply real wage decreases, which would deprive the economy 
of private demand and thus entail the risk of price deflation.  
If firms set prices with a mark-up (1+m) on nominal unit labour costs (Wn/λ), 
wages will be related to the price level according to the following equation: 





= , implying that 
(15)       ) m 1 log( ) log( ) P log( ) W log( n + − λ + = . 
Thus, assuming a constant mark-up, stability-oriented nominal wages should 
increase according to the formula 
(16)      
∧ ∧
λ + π = n W ,        
where  n W
∧




21 Since the macroeconomic price inflation is not imme-
diately affected by wage policy, but depends on the pricing decisions of compa-
nies and external shocks, wage policy should generally be oriented at the tar-
geted rate of inflation by the central bank. The same applies to developments in 
labour productivity, where wage policy should account for mid-term changes in 
trend productivity only. Equation (16) thus changes to equation (16a) (Fritsche, 
2006):  





λ + π =  
                                            
21 Hein, 2004, Hein, 2006, Arestis & Sawyer, 2005 and Sawyer, 2002, amongst others, addi-
tionally stress the importance of the influence of distribution conflicts on the nominal wage set-
ting, especially when it comes to explaining persisting inflation. Since we are concerned with the 
short-run impacts of economic policy here, we will abstract from distributional conflicts.   80
We will analyse the wage bargaining policy in the Scandinavian countries Swe-
den, Finland and Denmark in this section by first estimating a wage indicator 
based on equation (16a). Due to the construction of our indicator, positive val-
ues indicate wage increases above the stability-oriented level, while negative 
values of the indicator point at wage raises below the ideal level. 
In the second part of this section the question of the relationship between wage 
policy and monetary policy will be further pursued by discriminating between 
wage induced price inflation and inflation due to external shocks, such as oil 
price increases. This will be attempted by the estimation of a wage-price system 
in a state-space model. 
3.3.1 Analysis of wage policy with a wage indicator 
The wage indicator for the investigation of wage policy in the Scandinavian 
countries since 1970 was constructed according to the rule for stability-oriented 
wage policy in equation (16a): 




t nt t W indicator wage
∧ ∧
λ − π − = −
Since time series for the targeted inflation rate by the central bank were not 
available for all the countries investigated in this study, we approximated the 
mid-term target of inflation with a backward-looking two-year moving average of 
the inflation rate represented by the change in the consumer price index, thus 
assuming adaptive expectations of the wage-setting parties.
22 The increase in 
trend productivity was calculated by extracting the trend of labour productivity 
growth with a Hodrick-Prescott filter ((Hodrick & Prescott, 1997)). 
Figure 3-8: Wage Indicators for the Nordic EU-countries 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 178) 
                                            
22 For different explanations of non-rational inflation expectations and evidence of adaptive infla-
tion expectations see for example Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 1996, Akerlof, Dickens & Perry, 
2000, Mankiw & Reis, 2002, Staiger, Stock & Watson, 1997 and Carroll, 2003. We also esti-
mated the wage indicator with the time series of expected inflation estimated with the VAR sys-
tem in section 4.3.2 as a proxy for targeted inflation to check for robustness of the indicator and 
found that there was no significant difference between the two indicators.    81
Some common features of wage indicators for the Nordic EU-countries, as de-
picted in Figure 3-8, were, first, the excessive wage increases in the mid-1970s 
due to the misleading perception of the first oil price shock as an demand 
shock, second, some increases above a stability-oriented wage norm at the end 
of the 1980s, and, third, the stabilisation of the wage indicator from the mid-
1990s onwards. The last point may reasonably be interpreted as closely related 
to  the stabilisation of the monetary policy after the complete introduction of in-
flation-targeting regimes in all of the three Nordic EU-countries. 
Considering the wage indicator for Sweden, we find negative values of the 
wage indicator for most of the periods from 1977 through 1985 suggest a dec-
ade of wage increases that were too low. This corresponds to the period of 
lower nominal wage raises due to the devaluations of the Swedish krona, on the 
one hand, and due to wage moderation, on the other hand. The deep crisis in 
Sweden in the early 1990s is also clearly visible in the wage indicator, which 
shows a period of too high nominal wage raises in the onset of the crisis, fol-
lowed by a strong and prolonged period of negative values of the wage indicator 
when mid-term inflation was still high, but employment and wage increases 
were slow to pick up after the crisis. After 1997, however, wage policy in Swe-
den seems to have been quite stability-oriented, with the wage indicator fluctu-
ating closely around the zero line.  
As far as the wage policy in Finland since 1970, is concerned, the wage indica-
tor suggests that  the period of overshooting wages in the mid-1970s was fol-
lowed by a period of wage increases considerably below the stability-oriented 
level from the mid 1970s until the end of the decade. During this period, wage 
increases deviated the strongest from the stability-oriented norm for the whole 
sample period. For the 1980s, the wage indicator alternates between positive 
and negative values. Very similar to our findings of the wage indicator for Swe-
den, the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s is also clearly visible in the nega-
tive values of the wage indicator for Finland, which can be attributed to relatively 
small wage increases and high mid-term inflation during the crisis. Even though 
the negative values persist for quite a long period, thereby indicating a pro-
longed crisis, they do not reach the strong negative values of the end-1970s.   82
After 1995, wage policy in Finland seems to have been largely stability-oriented, 
as was also indicated for Sweden. Since 2002, however, the wage indicator 
shows a rising trend which might point to an upward departure of wage in-
creases from the stability-oriented wage policy norm. 
After 1975, and in contrast to Sweden and Finland, the Danish wage indicator 
fluctuates around the zero line and shows a prolonged period of negative values 
from 1980 to 1987, when high unemployment and increased decentralisation of 
wage bargaining induced smaller nominal wage raises. The indicator suggests 
that the period of dismal macroeconomic performance with low nominal wage 
increases was followed by a short period of overshooting wage raises, when, 
after several years of wage moderation, nominal wage increases were settled 
generously. After the 1990s, the wage indicator for Denmark remains closely to 
the zero line, pointing to almost perfectly stability-oriented wage policies ever 
since.  
3.3.2 Estimation of a wage-price system with a state-space model 
While the wage indicator measures the deviation of actual increases in nominal 
wages from their ‘ideal’ increases defined in equation (16a), the indicator cannot 
discriminate between shocks to inflation that are due to nominal wage develop-
ments and shocks that are due to external price developments not directly re-
lated to nominal wages, such as oil prices, for instance. Therefore, we addition-
ally estimated a wage-price system, which enables us to identify wage price 
shocks and external price shocks as the wage and price developments that are 
not in line with the theoretically derived model. The shocks are modeled as 
time-variant random walks in a state-space model and thus measure the under-
lying, stochastic processes at any given moment that are not captured by the 
variables of the wage and price equations.
23
                                            
23 For an extensive description of state-space analysis methods see Hamilton, 1994 and espe-
cially Durbin & Koopman, 2001.   83
We assume that wages increases are influenced by expected developments in 





u u − ) (equation (18)). While prices are set by companies with a mark-up on 
unit-labour costs as in equation (14) and thus increase relative to nominal wage 
increases and expected increases in labour productivity (equation (20))
24: 
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The constant c
w in the wage equation (18) captures the average wage in-
creases throughout the estimation period that can be interpreted as a measure 
of unions’ bargaining power. The constant c
π in the price equation (20), though, 
captures average price increases that are independent of the development of 
unit labour costs and can thus be understood as companies’ risk premium. Fi-
nally, the state-variables z1 and z2 measure those shocks to inflation that can-
not be attributed to the exogenous variables in equations (18) and (20). Hence, 
z1 accounts for wage inflation shocks at any given moment that are caused by 
deviations of wage increases from their stability-oriented levels. If z1 displays 
positive values, wage increases were too high, if it shows negative values, 
wage increases were too low. Z2, on the other hand, displays those shocks to 
price inflation at any given moment that are not accounted for by developments 
in wages. These might for example be due to increases in oil and commodity 
prices, exchange rate depreciations, changes in currency or the tax system and 
so on.  
In order to be able to estimate equations (18) and (20), we had to first define 
expected inflation, expected labour productivity and the employment gap. We 
                                            
24 We assume a constant mark-up, hence the mark-up has no influence on price inflation.   84
once more employed the time series of expected inflation estimated with the 
VAR model in section 3.3.2 and assumed adaptive expectations regarding 
changes in labour productivity which we proxied with a three-year moving-
average process. The unemployment gap finally was calculated as the deviation 
of the actual unemployment rate from its time-varying trend extracted with the 
Hodrick-Prescott-filter (see (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997)). Note that although in-
cluding the unemployment gap into the wage equation implies the existence of 
a NAIRU, by refraining from using a deterministic trend we allow for a time-
varying NAIRU.
25 After having identified all variables, we proceeded to estimate 
equation (18) in a state-space model, in order to obtain the wage-induced infla-
tion shocks z1. Combining equations (18) and (20) then yields the wage-price 
system, allowing us to identify the external inflation shocks at any given moment 
during the estimation period:
26
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Since it was not possible to estimate the constants in equations (18) and (22) 
independent of the random walks z1 and z2, we extracted the constant compo-
nent of the random walks, defining the constant as their respective means and 
the wage-price and exogenous price shocks as the remaining stochastic com-
ponent.  
Our state-space estimation of the wage equation (18) and the wage-price sys-
tem (22) for Sweden gave the following results (standard errors are in paren-
theses)
27: 
                                            
25 In the literature there exist various approaches that directly estimate the time-varying NAIRU 
using for example a Kalman-filter in a similar wage equation framework (see for example 
Staiger, Stock & Watson, 1997 and Gordon, 1997). 
26 The model draws on Fritsche, 2006 and Blinder & Yellen, 2001. In contrast to their specifica-
tion we assume no asymmetry of expectations regarding labour productivity between workers 
and employers, but rather presume that both groups form their expectations of future labour 
productivity according to a moving average of its past values. 
27 In order to obtain stable and plausible results, we had to restrict some of the variances to 
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Figure 3-9: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous prices shocks 
in Sweden 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 179) 
In accordance with the results from the simple wage indicator for Sweden, z1 
also suggests that in 1975 wages experienced a considerable positive shock. A 
strong negative outlier in z2 in the same year implies that companies were not 
able to pass the increased nominal wage costs onto their prices but instead had 
to accept losses in profits. The positive peaks in z2 after the negative shock at 
the end of the 1970s clearly depict the exogenous price shocks due to the de-
valuations and the subsequent negative wage-price shocks shown in z1. The 
second half of the 1980s seems again to have been dominated by high wage 
increases along with profit cuts of firms. Around 1991, z1 once more indicates 
negative wage shocks in the advent of the crisis, although not as strong as im-
plied by the wage indicator. Once more, the negative wage-price shock is ac-
companied by a strong positive external price shock, pointing to the high infla-
tion after the banking and currency crisis. After the crisis, there seems to have 
been a period of rather high wage increases for the latter half of the 1990s. z1 
and z2 suggest that since 2000, both, wage-price inflation and exogenous price 
inflation, have hardly been disturbed by shocks. 
The state-space estimation of the wage-price system for Finland yielded the 
following coefficients
28: 
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Figure 3-10: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous prices 
shocks in Finland 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 180) 
For Finland we observe a strong shock on wage-inflation in 1975-1976, which is 
immediately followed by an even stronger negative shock to wage increases in 
Finland. This result was also suggested by the simple wage indicator for Finland 
and can be interpreted as an effect of imported inflation and overshooting nomi-
nal wage increases, on the one hand, and of the subsequent negative shock to 
wages as unemployment increased during the ensuing crisis, on the other hand. 
The wage-price shocks are matched by opposite external price shocks, which 
imply that the strong wage increases around 1975 were not passed on to prices 
immediately, but that prices increased with a lag in response to the wage-price 
shock and to the external oil price shock. Compared to our findings for Sweden, 
the deflationary shock to wages after the high wage increases in the middle of 
the 1970s seems to have been stronger than the preceding overshooting of 
wages. In 1979, the state-variables depict another positive shock to wages and 
a simultaneous negative shock to prices, which can probably be explained by 
the second oil crisis, where, again, it seems that prices increased with a lag 
while nominal wages immediately experienced the shock due to imported infla-
tion. In the second half of the 1980s, a longer period of wage-induced inflation is 
depicted by the state-variable z1. The crisis at the beginning of the 1990s is 
also depicted by the state-variable z1 which suggests deflationary influence of 
wage increases for the first half of the 1990s. On the contrary, external infla-
tionary pressure after the banking and currency crisis is reflected by a positive 
peak of z2 between 1992 and 1995. After a positive peak of z1 indicating a 
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positive wage shock after the crisis in 1995, both wage-price and exogenous 
inflation shocks seem to have diminished. 
Finally, our estimation of the wage-price system in a state-space model for 
Denmark yielded the following coefficients for equations (18) and (22)
29: 
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Figure 3-11: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous prices 
shocks in Denmark 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 181) 
Generally, the wage and price shocks depicted by z1 and z2 in the state-space 
model seem to be smaller and less significant than those found for Sweden and 
Finland. The outstanding overshooting of wages above the stability-oriented 
level around 1974, depicted by the wage indicator for Denmark in Figure 3-11, 
unfortunately cannot be confirmed by the wage-price shocks z1 since the model 
was only estimated from 1977q1 onwards due to data availability. The positive 
shock to wages caused by imported inflation after the second oil price shock, is 
now found to be insignificant. In contrast, the positive shock to wages in 1987 
with generous wage-settlements after the prolonged period of wage moderation 
in the 1980s is reflected significantly by z1. Contrary to the deflationary shocks 
to wages during the 1980s, the state-variable z2 depicts two strong inflationary 
shocks, probably due to the lagged effect of the second oil shock and the de-
valuations at the beginning of the 1980s. Finally, after 1989, both z1 and z2 ex-
perience a downward shock suggesting a strong deflationary pressure on the 
whole Danish economy in 1991 due to the recession following the German re-
unification. After the deflationary shock, the Danish price level seems to have 
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been remarkably stable, showing no external price shocks and insignificant or 
slightly positive wage shocks. 
3.3.3 Preliminary summary of the results 
In line with our results for monetary policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the 
analysis of wage policy in the Scandinavian countries suggests that wage in-
creases stabilised significantly around 1995 and have been stability-oriented 
ever since. While on the one hand this might be attributed to an increased de-
regulation of the wage bargaining systems, it is also probably due to the de-
crease in external price shocks. Departures from the stability-oriented level of 
nominal wage increases in the Scandinavian countries were generally found to 
be due either to overshooting wage increases in response to imported inflation, 
after the oil price shocks, for instance, or to overly strict wage moderation after 
the crises in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. 
3.4 VAR Analysis of macroeconomic policy regime constellations 
While we separately investigated the main areas of macroeconomic policy, i.e. 
fiscal, monetary and wage policy, for each of the Scandinavian countries in the 
previous sections of this chapter, we additionally estimated autoregressive sys-
tems (VARs) in order to trace the impact of interdependencies between the 
various areas of macroeconomic policy on the growth variable, and hence, the 
consistency of the macroeconomic regime constellations.  
There are numerous approaches to VAR analysis of one area of macroeco-
nomic policy, mostly on monetary policy.
30 However, to our knowledge none of 
them investigates the interdependencies between all the areas of macroeco-
nomic policy on the economic performance of the country. We are convinced 
that this is an important aspect of the analysis of economic policy, especially 
with regard to the current discussion about the necessity of coordination be-
                                            
30 See, amongst many others, Bagliano & Favero, 1998, Clarida, 2001 for VAR approaches to 
analyse monetary policy. For VAR-analyses of fiscal policy see for instance Blanchard & Perotti, 
1999, Fatás & Mihov, 2001 and Scheremet, 2001.   89
tween the different areas of macroeconomic policy.
31 This is why we estimated 
a structural macroeconomic policy VAR for the three Scandinavian countries, 
including fiscal, monetary and wage indicators combined with a cyclical output 
variable. In order to control for the effect of external trade and changes in the 
exchange rate on the economy, we also included the cyclical component of the 
real effective exchange rate (REER). 
3.4.1 Results for the VAR for macroeconomic policy 
In our economic policy VAR, we incorporated the fiscal, monetary and wage 
indicators which we had derived in the previous chapters as measurements of 
the cyclical impact of the respective policies. Due to statistical problems that 
arise in the VAR estimation with endogenous time series that show very persis-
tent moving-average processes arising for instance from the use of band-pass 
filters, we were not able to include the output gap as the cyclical GDP variable 
in the VAR, since it was calculated with a band-pass filter. Instead, we used the 
growth rate of real GDP as a proxy, as it can be argued that the growth of GDP 
also varies with the business cycle, but shows more variability with no frequen-
cies excluded when compared to a band-pass filter derived output gap. For the 
three Scandinavian countries under investigation here, the output gap and the 
growth of real GDP generally showed a very similar course over the span of 
time covered in our investigation. In addition to the endogenous variables, we 
included an exogenous constant and various dummies to correct for outliers 
(Finland: 1977q4, 1987q1 and 1980q3. Denmark: 1993q1) 
Since all the variables included in the VAR were found to be stationary at the 
1% significance level, with the exception of GDP growth in Denmark, where the 
null hypothesis could only be rejected at the 10% level (see Table A7 in the Ap-
pendix), it was not necessary to test for cointegration. This is why all variables 
could be included in levels. In the case of Sweden and Finland, after analysing 
the residuals of the VARs over the whole estimation period from 1970q1 until 
2006q4, we identified a structural break at the end of the 1980s in both coun-
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tries and hence divided the estimation periods. Thus, we estimated two VARs 
for Sweden for the periods 1976q2 – 1990q4 and 1991q1 – 2006q2 and two 
VARs for Finland for the periods 1975q4 – 1986q4 and 1987q1 – 2005q1. The 
varying start and end periods are due to data availability for the indicators of 
macroeconomic policy and to the fact that quarterly data for the REER was only 
available from 1975q1 onwards. Since we obtained data for the fiscal indicator 
for Denmark only after 1980q1, we estimated only one VAR for Denmark, cov-
ering the periods 1982q1 – 2006q4.  
After analysing lag length criteria and lag exclusion tests, the VARs were esti-
mated with lag lengths between 3 and 6 quarters (see Tables A8, A11, A14, 
A17 and A20 in the Appendix). Generally, all VARs are suggested to be stable, 
since all the unit roots were found to lie well within the unit circle (see Figures 
A4 – A8 in the Appendix). Autocorrelation in the residuals as tested with a LM 
test does not seem to be a major problem in any of the VARs (see Tables A9, 
A12, A15, A18 and A21 in the Appendix). The normality of the residuals for the 
second VAR for Sweden and the first VAR for Finland, however, could not be 
confirmed, which was due to kurtosis problems. Our tests confirmed that the 
remaining VARs have normally distributed residuals (see Tables A10, A13, A16, 
A19 and A22 in the Appendix). 
With the aim of identifying the structural interdependencies and hence the re-
sponse of the endogenous variables in the VAR to structural shocks either in 
macroeconomic policy or in the output variable, we imposed structural restric-
tions on the relationship between the reduced form residuals of the model (ut) 
and the underlying structural innovations (et). Suppose a relation between the 
VAR residuals ut and the structural innovations et according to 
(23)     ut = B*et, with E[ee’] = I  
where B denotes the matrix defining the contemporaneous relations between ut 
and et. In order to just identify the system, we have to impose (n² - n)/2 restric-
tions on B which in our case with five endogenous variables amounts to ten re-  91
strictions.
32 With regard to the quarterly structure of our data, we hypothesise 
that the residuals of the equation explaining the growth of GDP are influenced 
by simultaneous innovations in monetary and fiscal policy, but not by simulta-
neous shocks to wage policy. Residuals of the equation explaining monetary 
policy, though, are assumed to be influenced by structural innovations to fiscal 
policy only. One might argue that, assuming a zero influence of simultaneous 
shocks to wage policy on monetary policy and on GDP growth, does not seem 
convincing from a theoretical point of view. However, it has to be noted that this 
does not exclude the impact of lagged shocks to wage policy, and since we 
used quarterly data, it might well seem plausible that changes in wage policy, 
which usually apply to a relatively long time horizon, only would affect GDP 
growth and monetary policy with a lag of at least one quarter.  
For the residuals of the equation for fiscal policy, we allowed simultaneous in-
fluences of shocks to the growth of output and of monetary policy, since the fis-
cal automatic stabilisers usually react instantaneously to shocks to the econ-
omy. While it seems plausible that shocks to the growth of GDP itself and 
shocks to monetary policy have an immediate impact on the economy and thus 
on the automatic stabilisers, we argue that shocks to wage policy can be as-
sumed to affect the economy with a lag of at least one quarter.  
Furthermore, we restrict the simultaneous influences of shocks to the growth of 
GDP and of monetary policy on the residuals of wage policy to zero, merely al-
lowing a contemporaneous influence of shocks to fiscal policy. Finally, we hy-
pothesise that shocks to the real effective exchange have no immediate impact 
on the residuals of the equations defining the fiscal indicator and the wage indi-
cator, since these would react with a lag of at least one quarter. Conversely, we 
assume that the residuals of the equation explaining the REER are not influ-
enced instantaneously by structural shocks to GDP growth and the fiscal indica-
tor.  
In sum, the B matrix takes the following form: 
                                            
32 On the methodology of structural VARs (SVARs) and the identification of the restrictions see   92
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After solving the system with the restrictions defined in equation (24), we ana-
lysed the structural VARs  with respect to their impulse-response functions and 
their variance decompositions. While the impulse-response functions trace the 
response of the endogenous variables in the VAR to a one-standard-deviation 
structural shock in one of the endogenous variables for eight years
33, the vari-
ance decomposition depicts the percentage of the variance of one of the en-
dogenous variables that is due to immanent shocks or the other endogenous 
variables over a period of 10 years. 
4.5.1.1 Sweden 
Figure A9 in the Appendix represents the impulse-response functions for the 
first VAR for macroeconomic policy in Sweden, covering the period 1976q2 – 
1990q4. Obviously, there is no significant response of the growth of GDP to 
shocks in macroeconomic policy or the REER to be discerned. In general, the 
impulse-responses seem to be largely insignificant. Nevertheless, we observe a 
small but significant negative response of the monetary indicator to a shock in 
the fiscal indicator and, conversely, a positive response of the fiscal indicator to 
a shock in monetary policy for the first few quarters. This suggests that an ex-
pansive fiscal shock induced expansive monetary policy, while a restrictive 
monetary policy shock induced expansive fiscal policies in Sweden in the first 
estimation period. Finally, we find that the fiscal indicator reacts restrictively to a 
shock in the real effective exchange rate, albeit with a lag of some quarters and 
only to a small degree.  
                                                                                                                                
for instance Hamilton, 1994, Scheremet, 2001 and Gottschalk, 2005. 
33 We show the impulse-response functions with significance bands of +/- 2 standard errors. 
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Figure 3-12: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Pol-
icy in Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 182) 
We find that the major part of the variance of GDP growth (around 60%) is ex-
plained by a shock to itself. As far as the macroeconomic policy variables are 
concerned, we find that the fiscal indicator accounts for most of the variance of 
GDP growth (around 20%), while both the monetary indicator and the cyclical 
REER explain about 10%.  
In line with the results suggested by the impulse-response functions, we find 
that nearly 60% of the variance of the monetary indicator is explained by a 
shock to fiscal policy, while the other variables account for about 10% each.  
Conversely, the variance of the fiscal indicator is explained to nearly 80% by a 
shock to monetary policy in the first quarter, confirming the seemingly strong 
interdependence between the two areas of macroeconomic policy when control-
ling for the REER. The explanatory power of the monetary indicator for the fiscal 
indicator, however, declines in the subsequent periods to approximately 30%, 
while the part of its variance explained by GDP growth rises to 30%. It thus 
seems that fiscal policy in Sweden during the first estimation period was influ-
enced significantly by shocks to GDP growth. At the same time, however, we 
find a significant influence of monetary policy and of the REER which also ac-
counts for about 30% of the variance of the fiscal indicator.  
The variance of the wage indicator is suggested to be influenced primarily by a 
shock to itself, but also to almost 30% by a shock to GDP growth. Finally, we 
find that the variance of the REER is largely explained by shocks to itself, but 
can also be accounted for to between 10-20% by GDP growth, fiscal and mone-
tary policy. It is interesting that the impact of a shock in fiscal policy on the 
REER was found to be strongest among the macroeconomic variables.  
Figure A10 in the Appendix depicts the impulse-response functions for the sec-
ond VAR for macroeconomic policy in Sweden, covering the period 1991q1 – 
2006q2. By and large, impulse-responses of the macroeconomic policy vari-
ables and the growth of GDP are found to be small and often insignificant.   94
However, we find a negative response of GDP growth to shocks to monetary 
policy and the cyclical REER, even though it is a very small one and only sig-
nificant in the third or fourth quarter after the shock. Even though they are insig-
nificant, the impulse-responses due to shocks to fiscal and wage policy never-
theless show the expected symptoms. The significant impulse-response func-
tions operating between monetary and fiscal indicators are only hardly signifi-
cant in the second VAR for Sweden, but we do find a small but still significant 
negative response of the fiscal indicator to a shock to GDP growth, hinting at a 
countercyclical fiscal policy in Sweden even in the second estimation period. 
Furthermore, a shock to the wage indicator seems to have a significantly nega-
tive impact on the fiscal indicator after a few quarters and vice versa. Interest-
ingly, a small negative response of the fiscal indicator to a shock to the REER is 
also suggested for the first quarters after the shock.  
Figure 3-13: Variance decomposition of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Pol-
icy in Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 183) 
It is suggested by the results for the second VAR that the variance of GDP 
growth is explained almost equally by shocks to monetary, fiscal and wage pol-
icy as well as the cyclical REER (explaining around 20% each). We also ob-
serve that the variance of the monetary indicator is for the most  part explained 
by shocks to the fiscal and the wage indicator, whereas shocks to the growth of 
GDP and the cyclical REER seem to have exerted a small influence on the 
monetary indicator in the second estimation period in Sweden only.  
The variance of the fiscal indicator, on the other hand, seems to result from 
shocks to the growth of GDP (up to 60%) and to the REER (about 35%) in the 
first quarters. After about 10 quarters, however, the explanatory influence of 
shocks to the wage indicator increases to nearly 30%, whereas only 30% of the 
variance of the fiscal indicator are owed to a shock to GDP growth. Thus, it is 
suggested that after 10 quarters, fiscal policy is mainly influenced by GDP 
growth and wage policy in the second estimation period in Sweden.   95
Similar to our results for the first VAR for Sweden, the variance of the wage in-
dicator seems to be mainly explained by a shock to itself, but monetary and fis-
cal policy shocks account for about 20% and 30%, respectively.  
Finally, the variance of the REER is found to be almost completely due to 
shocks to itself in the second estimation period for Sweden, which is not surpris-
ing, in light of the fact that the Swedish krona was allowed to float in 1992. 
However, a shock to wage policy still accounts for about 20% of its variance, 
which is an interesting result reinforcing the effect that after the floating of the 
currency only shocks to labour costs had any influence on Sweden’s interna-
tional competitiveness since monetary policy no longer intervened.  
4.5.1.2 Finland 
Figure A11 in the Appendix shows the impulse-response functions for the first 
VAR for macroeconomic policy for Finland which was estimated for the period 
1975q4 – 1986q4. Generally, impulse-response functions for the endogenous 
variables in the first VAR are found to be even less significant than those in the 
VARs for Sweden. We do not identify any significant responses of GDP growth 
to shocks in the macroeconomic policy indicators or the cyclical REER. The im-
pulse-response functions for the monetary indicator hint at very small negative 
reactions to shocks in wage policy and the REER, however, these are hardly 
relevant, since they aresignificant for one quarter only. It also seems that the 
wage indicator and the cyclical REER responded positively to shocks in the 
other variable, , at least for the first few quarters. 
Figure 3-14: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Pol-
icy in Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 184) 
In line with our results for the VAR for Sweden, we find that the variance of the 
growth of GDP mostly originates from fiscal policy and monetary policy in the 
first estimation period. The fiscal indicator accounts for 30% of its variance, 
while the monetary indicator explains at least 20% of the variance of GDP 
growth. Another important finding is the evidence of significant interdependen-  96
cies between the single indicators of macroeconomic policy in the first VAR for 
Finland. With respect to the monetary indicator, a large part of its variance is 
explained by the wage indicator (around 30%); another significant part is ac-
counted for by the REER (around 20%). Furthermore, the results from the VAR 
imply that large parts of the variance of the fiscal indicator can be attributed to 
shocks either to GDP growth (around 40%) or to the monetary indicator (around 
30%), while the wage indicator accounts for 20%. Finally we find that the vari-
ance of the wage indicator is explained by shocks to GDP growth and to the 
monetary indicator.  
All things considered, we could identify strong interactions between the realms 
of macroeconomic policy in the first VAR for Finland. The REER merely ex-
plains a significant part only of the variance of the monetary indicator. This 
might be due to the fixed exchange rate regime in use in Finland during the 
1980s, which in turn led to a controlled exchange rate through monetary policy. 
With respect to the variance decomposition of the REER, we observe that al-
most equal parts of its variance are accounted for by shocks to GDP growth, the 
monetary indicator and the wage indicator, suggesting that Finland’s interna-
tional competitiveness in the first estimation period was influenced by the busi-
ness cycle and labour costs, on the one hand, and by active monetary policy, 
on the other hand.  
Figure A12 in the Appendix depicts the impulse-responses for the second VAR, 
covering the period 1987q1 – 2005q1 in Finland. Similar to the results for the 
first VAR, the results in this figure are largely insignificant. Again, we do not find 
any significant response of GDP growth to any of the shocks to the macroeco-
nomic policy indicators or the cyclical REER. The fiscal indicator responds 
slightly negatively to a shock in GDP growth, but the effect is barely discernible 
after a few quarters. It is remarkable that we also find a small significantly posi-
tive impact of a shock to the REER on the fiscal indicator. 
Figure 3-15: Variance decomposition of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Pol-
icy in Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 185)   97
In contrast to the results of the first VAR, where we found at least a significant 
influence on the variance of the monetary indicator, the REER in the second 
VAR for Finland has very little explanatory power concerning the variances of 
the other endogenous variables. . Here, it seems that shocks to the REER ex-
plain less than 10% of the variance of GDP growth and the macroeconomic pol-
icy indicators after 1987. We think that this is due to the floating of the Finnish 
exchange rate in 1992, on the one hand, and to its accession to the EMS in 
1996, on the other hand.  
In the second VAR, the major part of the variance of GDP growth is now found 
to be explained by a shock to the monetary indicator (40%). In contrast to our 
findings in the second VAR for Finland, however, shocks to the fiscal indicator 
here account for at least (30%) of the variance of GDP growth.  
Furthermore, the variance of the monetary indicator is explained by shocks to 
the fiscal indicator to as much as 50%, which suggests an increased interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy rather than less interdependency. With re-
spect to the variance of the fiscal indicator, we find that it is explained to up to 
75% by a shock to GDP growth in the first quarter and after five years. Both 
shocks to GDP growth and to the monetary indicator account for about 25% 
each, whereas shocks to the wage indicator explain about 20%. This suggests 
a rather strong mutual dependence between the single realms of macroeco-
nomic policy in Finland in the second estimation period, as well. 
The variance of the wage indicator is to large parts attributed to shocks to itself, 
but shocks to the monetary indicator explain about 20% after 15 quarters. Fi-
nally, although it had no significant impact on the variance of the other endoge-
nous variables, the variance of the REER is nevertheless influenced by shocks 
to monetary policy (20%), and even stronger, by shocks to fiscal policy (30%). 
This result suggests that changes in Finnish competitiveness after 1987 were 
due to active fiscal and monetary policies rather than to labour costs or the 
business cycle. This might be explained by the structural change to an export-
oriented economy enforced by fiscal and monetary policy after the crisis in the 
early 1990s in Finland.    98
4.5.1.3 Denmark 
Figure A13 in the Appendix finally represents the impulse-response functions 
for the VAR for macroeconomic policy in the remaining country of our Scandi-
navian sample, Denmark. As we have stated above, due to the data availability, 
we only estimated one VAR for Denmark, covering the period 1982q1 – 
2006q4. In line with our results for the impulse-response functions of the VARs 
in Sweden and Finland, impulse responses are also found insignificant in Den-
mark with no significant response of GDP growth to shocks in the macroeco-
nomic policy indicators or the cyclical REER. The impulse-responses of the 
monetary indicator in the VAR for Denmark suggest a small negative response 
to a shock to the fiscal indicator (significant after a few quarters) and to the 
wage indicator (significant in the first few quarters). Both responses, however, 
are very small and only just significant. Similarly, we find a very small significant 
response of the fiscal indicator to a shock in the wage indicator. Interestingly, 
the most significant response to an impulse is found for the cyclical REER, 
which seems to react positively to a shock in the wage indicator.  
Figure 3-16: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Pol-
icy in Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 186) 
The output variable and international competitiveness in Denmark are pre-
sented in Figure 3-16. Similar to our results for the first VAR for Finland, we find 
that shocks to the cyclical REER only influence the variance of the monetary 
indicator, explaining about 10% of its variance. Of all the three Scandinavian 
countries studied here, Denmark seems to be the country with the slightest im-
pact of the REER on the output variable and the realms of macroeconomic pol-
icy. Since Denmark neither experienced a currency crisis during the time span 
covered here, nor structural breaks with changes from a fixed exchange rate 
regime to a floating currency regime, this result seems quite plausible. Hence, it 
is not surprising that the variance of the cyclical REER in Denmark is found to 
be largely influenced by shocks to itself (about 65%) and that shocks to the 
wage indicator account for about 25% of its variance, suggesting that Den-  99
mark’s international competitiveness throughout the span of time we cover in 
this study was not influenced by fiscal or monetary policy but only by means of 
changes concerning labour costs. The implication of the interdependency be-
tween the REER and the wage indicator found in the impulse-response func-
tions is thus reinforced by the variance decomposition.  
The variance of the growth of GDP is found to be largely explained by shocks to 
itself (as much as 70%), however we also find that monetary, fiscal and wage 
policy to equal parts explain the remaining variance of GDP growth. Further-
more, it is suggested that the variance of the monetary indicator is explained to 
almost 30% by the fiscal indicator, indicating a rather strong interdependence 
between fiscal and monetary policy in Denmark. Both the monetary indicator 
and the wage indicator seem to hardly react to shocks to GDP growth. As to the 
monetary indicator, along with the impact of shocks to the fiscal indicator, 
shocks in the REER also account for about 10% of its variance, while in the 
case of the wage indicator we find a very strong impact of shocks to itself on the 
variance of the wage indicator. Hence, it seems that the Danish wage policy is 
quite independent from the other realms of macroeconomic policy. 
With regard to the fiscal indicator, we again find that its variance decomposition 
is influenced to significant parts by the output variable (30%), by the monetary 
indicator (about 25%) and by the wage indicator (about 15%). This suggests 
that fiscal policy in Denmark was quite sensitive to the other realms of macro-
economic policy.  
3.4.2 Comparison of the results 
Our results from the analysis of the variance decompositions of the variables 
contained in the VARs for macroeconomic policy in the Scandinavian countries 
presented in the preceding section are summarised in Table 4-1. 
Table 3-1: Summary of the results of the VARs for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Scandinavia 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 187)   100
Table 3-1 depicts the main effects of a shock to one of the endogenous vari-
ables of the VAR on the other variables. We define a major impact of a shock 
as explaining at least 20% of the variance of the influenced variable.  
Comparing the impact of a shock to the output variable, that is to GDP growth, 
on the macroeconomic policy indicators in the first VARs for Sweden and 
Finland, we find that the shock has had a large effect on output growth itself 
and, to a lesser extent, also on the different realms of macroeconomic policy. 
However, an effect on monetary policy could not be measured above 20% of its 
variance. For the second estimation period, it seems that both, wage policy and 
monetary policy, acted independently of shocks to output growth, and only the 
output variable itself and fiscal policy experienced the consequences of the 
shock. The same applies to the VAR for Denmark. 
With respect to the effects of shocks to fiscal and monetary policy, the VAR re-
sults won from the variance decompositions imply that in Sweden the interac-
tion of the areas of monetary policy was mostly due to shocks to fiscal policy, 
while in Finland there was more interaction of macroeconomic policies after a 
shock to monetary policy. Nevertheless, both countries show strong interde-
pendencies of all the realms of macroeconomic policy throughout both estima-
tion periods. In the case of Denmark, there seems to have been a strong inter-
action of fiscal and monetary policy, but wage policy and the exchange rate 
seem to have been rather independent. 
Interestingly, the results from the VARs for Sweden suggest a stronger interac-
tion of macroeconomic policy after a shock to wage policy in the second estima-
tion period, in contrast to Finland, where the opposite seems to have been the 
case. In Denmark, shocks to wage policy obviously did not have any impact on 
the output variable, fiscal or monetary policy; but a strong effect on the wage 
indicator itself is measured and a smaller effect on the real exchange rate is 
suggested.  
Finally, shocks to the cyclical REER seem to have had effects above 20% of 
their variance on the other variables of the VARs only in Sweden and Finland in 
the first estimation periods, namely on fiscal policy and monetary policy, respec-  101
tively. After the floating of the exchange rates and due to the stable exchange 
rate system in Denmark, shocks to the international competitiveness seem to 
have been cushioned by the exchange rate.   102
4  CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF THE WELFARE 
STATE ON THE TREND OF GDP GROWTH  
5.1 Introduction and data 
Having analysed the macroeconomic regimes in the Scandinavian countries 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland and the interdependencies between the areas of 
macroeconomic policy and the output growth in the short and medium run, we 
are going to investigate the impact of the welfare state on the trend of GDP 
growth. We hypothesise that the relative economic success of the Scandinavian 
countries in the last 30 years was to a major part due to the stabilising and con-
fidence building effects of the welfare state serving as a constant frame for mac-
roeconomic policy. Hence, we analyse the impact of welfare state proxies on 
the long-run growth of GDP so as to take into account the long-run implications 
of our hypothesis.  
Since due to the relatively small variability of standard welfare state proxies 
such as the wage share, for instance, it is difficult to obtain significant results for 
the impact of those variables in standard OLS time series regressions.
34 This is 
why we employed a cross-country approach and estimated simple cross-
country regressions with five-year-averages of the variables for a sample of up 
to 25 industrialised countries. Generally, we controlled for the effect of standard 
growth determinants such as population growth, initial GDP (the five-year-
average of the preceding five years in power purchasing parities (PPP)), in-
vestment (in % of GDP), consumption (in % of GDP) as well as exports and im-
ports (in % of GDP). Using the general-to-specific approach we eliminated the 
growth variables that were not found to be significant. In addition to the classical 
growth determinants, we included a proxy for the welfare state in each specifi-
cation. We concentrated on the effects of the welfare state on distribution and 
on education, since we assume that a relatively equal distribution and a high 
                                            
34 For an extensive summary of different econometric methods for analysing economic growth 
see Durlauf, Johnson & Temple, 2005.   103
level of education are two major effects of a functioning welfare state. Further-
more, we also chose distribution and education as the welfare state effects to 
be analysed here, as the Scandinavian countries are well known for their rela-
tively egalitarian distribution and their high-quality educational system, which 
makes these areas good proxies of the Scandinavian welfare state model. 
Thus, our model takes the following form: 
(25)       ,  t t t
trend
t Z * X * c y ε + β + α + =
∧





compasses the five-year-averages of the standard growth variables mentioned 
above and Zt represents the five-year-average of the welfare state proxy.
35  
We generally used annual data from the AMECO database of the European 
Commission (2007), covering the years 1970 – 2005. The trend of GDP growth 
was derived with a Hodrick/Prescott filter ((Hodrick & Prescott, 1997)) on the 
nominal GDP growth in PPP, thus allowing for a time-varying trend in GDP 
growth. In order to avoid distortions due to different currencies and exchange 
rates, variables were generally expressed in percent of GDP or as growth rates. 
Our proxies for distribution, on the one hand, were the wage share, adjusted for 
the compensation of the self-employed, from the AMECO Database and the 
Gini coefficient which we obtained from the Worldbank (2007) and from Euro-
stat (2007). The level of education, on the other hand, was proxied by the per-
centage of the population age 15+ that has attained secondary school and by 
the average schooling years of the population age 15+. Both measures were 
obtained from the Barro/Lee (2000, updated files) database on international 
education attainment where data is published in five-year-intervals. For the 
education proxies, we thus could not calculate five-year-averages but instead 
employed the value for the last year of the five-year-period. 
                                            
35 Equation (25) is essentially equal to the regression known as Barro regressions due to 
Barro’s extensive use of a similar specification to study alternative determinants for growth, see 
for instance Barro, 1991, Barro, 1996 and Barro, 1997. For a summary see Barro & Sala-i-
Martin, 2004.   104
The sample of countries for our cross-country analysis generally consists of in-
dustrialised or emerging countries that can be assumed to have some sort of 
welfare state system. Due to data availability for the different welfare state prox-
ies, the sample varies slightly with each regression. The whole sample contains 
a total of 28 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea 
(South), Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  
5.2 Trend growth and distribution 
As mentioned above, the effect of income distribution on the trend of GDP 
growth was first proxied by the effect of the adjusted wage share from the 
AMECO database (European Commission, 2007). Data could be obtained for 
the full estimation period since 1970, allowing us to estimate seven regressions 
covering the five-year intervals from 1971 – 2005. The cross-country regres-
sions with the wage share were estimated for a sample of 22 countries, includ-
ing Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
Table 4-1. The wage share as a proxy for the effect of income distribution 
on the growth trend 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 189) 
The estimated coefficients for the effect of the wage share on the trend of GDP 
growth over the five-year intervals from 1971 to 2005 are depicted in Table 4-1. 
Generally, we tried different specifications with regard to the control variables 
for each estimation period in order to test for the robustness of our results. The 
Durbin-Watson statistics suggest that the regressions were generally free from 
first order autocorrelation. The R² in some cases is quite low, but by and large 
shows satisfying values considering the low number of data points and the sim-  105
ple specification. For the first estimation period from 1971 – 1975, we find that 
the wage share has a highly significant positive effect on the trend of GDP with 
a very robust coefficient across different specifications. The estimation period 
covering the latter half of the 1970s also yields positive coefficients of the wage 
share, even though they are not significant. In the two estimations covering the 
1980s, we again found positive coefficients of the wage share with regard to the 
trend of GDP growth. These coefficients, however, were only significant in one 
of the specifications each. It thus seems, that while the positive sign remains 
robust across different specifications, the size of the coefficient is not found as 
robust in the 1980s as in the first half of the 1970s. The estimation for the first 
half of the 1990s yields inconclusive results with respect to the effect of distribu-
tion on the trend of GDP growth: While we find two positive coefficients, with 
one being significant at the 10% level, we also estimate a negative coefficient of 
the wage share in one of the specifications. Finally, in the remaining two estima-
tion periods, covering the latter half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, 
the wage share seems to have exerted a significantly negative influence over 
the trend of GDP growth. It is thus suggested by our cross-country estimation of 
the effect of the wage share on trend growth, that at some point in the early 
1990s a structural break occurred, and industrialised countries turned from 
wage-led growth to profit-led growth. However, since we do not analyse the di-
rection of causality between the variables under investigation here, our results 
remain preliminary and should be interpreted with care. 
The relation between trend growth and distribution was further investigated with 
the Gini coefficient as an additional proxy for distribution. Due to data availabil-
ity, we were only able to conduct cross-country estimations with the Gini coeffi-
cient from 1996 to 2005, hence only covering the last two five-year-intervals. As 
mentioned above, we obtained data for the Gini coefficient from the Worldbank 
(2007), on the one hand, and from Eurostat (2007), on the other hand. Because 
data for the Gini coefficient are only rarely published on a regularly basis, we 
were only able to include 20 countries in our sample. The Gini coefficient re-
gressions hence contain data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Nether-  106
lands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Results from the regressions are presented in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: The Gini coefficient as a proxy for the effect of income distribu-
tion on the growth trend 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 190) 
The Durbin-Watson statistics confirm freedom of first order autocorrelation for 
all the regressions, and the R² generally shows reasonable values. We find sig-
nificantly positive coefficients of the Gini coefficient with regard to the trend in 
GDP for the two estimation periods, where coefficients seem to be larger in the 
first period from 1996 – 2000. However, the coefficients are generally not robust 
with respect to size in different specifications. Since a higher Gini coefficient 
(ranging from 0 to 1) implies a less egalitarian distribution, we have to interpret 
the positive coefficients vice versa: A positive coefficient suggests that a more 
egalitarian distribution exerts a negative influence over the trend of GDP 
growth. The results of the regressions taking the Gini coefficient as the proxy for 
distribution hence confirm our findings for the last two estimation periods with 
the wage share.  
5.3 Trend growth and education 
The second part of our analysis on the effect of the welfare state on trend 
growth covers the area of education. Ever since the PISA studies on the quality 
and level of education in the European countries, the high-quality educational 
system in the Scandinavian countries has been taken as a role model for indus-
trialised countries. It is widely acknowledged that a high level of education is 
one of the requirements for a sustained growth path, since the effects of global-
isation require industrialised countries to develop highly innovative and special-
ised industries in order to be able to compete with lower labour costs in less 
developed countries.  
We thus chose to take education as the second proxy for the impact of the wel-
fare state on the trend of GDP growth. As mentioned earlier, we took the per-
centage of the population age 15+ which has attained secondary school as the   107
first proxy for the level of education and the average schooling years of the 
population age 15+ as the second proxy. Both measures were obtained from 
the Barro/Lee (2000) database on international education attainment. Since 
data from the Barro/Lee database covers a wide variety of countries on a regu-
larly basis, we were able to include a total of 25 countries in the cross-country 
regressions on education. The sample thus consists of Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea (South), Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The cross-country regressions on education and the trend of 
GDP growth cover the period from 1971 to 2000. 
Table 4-3: The percentage of the population age 15+ that has attained 
secondary school as a proxy for the effect of human capital on the growth 
trend 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 191) 
The results for the cross-country estimations of the effect of the percentage of 
the population that has attained secondary school on the trend of GDP growth 
are presented in Table 4-3. Generally, the equations seem to be well specified, 
with no first order autocorrelation indicated by the Durbin-Watson statistics. 
Values of the R² in some cases are quite low. Significance of the coefficient for 
secondary school attainment was reached at the 10% level only in a few speci-
fications, indicating that the measured effect of secondary schooling on the 
trend of growth at least in this model was rather small and not always distin-
guishable from zero. For the first estimation period, covering the first half of the 
1970s, we find that the percentage of secondary school attainment has a small 
negative influence on the trend of growth, which is found to be significant in one 
of the specifications. The same result applies to the second half of the 1970s as 
well, where we find a significant negative coefficient of secondary school at-
tainment and a very small positive and insignificant coefficient. As we had ex-
pected, it seems that in the 1970s, higher schooling had no favourable influence 
on the trend of GDP growth. This might be due to the fact that the countries in   108
our sample generally experienced a structural break in the mid-1970s, where 
the trend of growth turned negative after reaching a maximum around 1975. 
The percentage of secondary school attainment, on the other hand, seems to 
have risen rather steadily in most of the countries during this period.  
In the 1980s, we find positive, but small and insignificant coefficients for the ef-
fect of secondary school attainment on GDP growth. Especially in the latter half 
of the 1980s, the coefficient is found very close to zero and we were only able 
to estimate one specification. The same result applies to the estimation for the 
first half of the 1990s, where, again, we find an insignificant and very small posi-
tive coefficient. Finally, the cross-country estimations for the impact of secon-
dary school attainment on GDP growth in the latter half of the 1990s yield 
somewhat larger positive coefficients, which only narrowly miss significance at 
the 10% level, at least in the second specification. Although the results from the 
simple cross-country estimations are once more quite preliminary and should be 
interpreted very carefully, it is nevertheless suggested that education measured 
by the percentage of secondary school attainment in the population has played 
an increasingly important role for the trend of GDP growth after the mid-1990s. 
Table 4-4: The average schooling years of the population age 15+ as a 
proxy for the effect of human capital on the growth trend 
(cf. Appendix B, p. 192) 
Table 4-4 shows the results for the cross-country estimations with the average 
years of schooling in the population over 15 as the education proxy. Again, the 
Durbin-Watson statistics confirm freedom of first-order autocorrelation, and val-
ues of R² are reasonably high when considering the small number of data 
points. As in the estimations with the secondary school proxy, we find a nega-
tive effect of the average schooling years on the trend of GDP growth in the 
1970s. For both estimation periods, we obtain one significant coefficient at the 
5% or even 1% significance level. Our result of a negative relation between 
education and the trend of GDP growth in the 1970s is thus reinforced by the 
second proxy for the level of education. The cross-country estimations for the 
first half of the 1980s yield very small and insignificant but positive coefficients;   109
similar to the results of the estimations with the secondary schooling proxy. 
Thus, again, we find a break in the relation between the trend of GDP growth 
and the level of education in the earl 1980s. Surprisingly, we obtain a significant 
negative coefficient of the average schooling years in the estimation period of 
the latter half of the 1980s. However, we had to include a relatively high number 
of control variables to gain a statistically stable specification and were not able 
to estimate any alternative specification over this estimation period. Hence, the 
robustness of the negative coefficient can be mistrusted and the result could be 
misleading. Finally, the cross-country estimations for the 1990s again produced 
positive coefficients of the effect of the average years of schooling on the trend 
of GDP growth, albeit not significant ones. Again supporting our results with the 
secondary school attainment as the education proxy, we find that coefficients of 
the average schooling years are larger in the second half of the 1990s. How-
ever, significance even at the 10% level is still missing.  
To sum up, both proxies for education suggest in our simple cross-country es-
timations that the level of education did not influence the trend of GDP growth 
positively in the 1970s but seems to have had a slight positive influence ever 
since. However, since significance is largely missed by the positive coefficients, 
the possibility of zero influence of education on the trend of GDP growth cannot 
be dismissed. Nevertheless, it is suggested by both proxies that the positive 
effect of education on the trend of growth has increased in the second half of 
the 1990s. Since this estimation period coincides with the period where we 
found that a more egalitarian distribution seems to have exerted a negative in-
fluence on the trend of GDP growth, it might be the case that at this point distri-
bution lost some of its importance for the trend of growth, while other aspects of 
the welfare state like a high level of education consequently gained positive in-
fluence over the trend of GDP growth. Notwithstanding the simplicity of our es-
timation method and the resulting difficulties in measuring significant effects of 
the welfare state variables, there are still some indications that the different as-
pects of the welfare state mattered for the trend of growth during the estimation 
period covered here. Hence the relatively egalitarian distribution and the high 
level of education in the Scandinavian countries, to pick but two of the effects of   110
their welfare states, could explain at least to some degree their relative growth 
success. Still, our results remain preliminary and further research in this area is 
definitely required.    111
5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was provide answers to two large-scale research ques-
tions. While the first one is concerned with the causes of the remarkable mac-
roeconomic resilience of the Nordic EU-countries since the mid-1990s, the sec-
ond one is related to the sustainability of a high degree of government activity in 
times of financial globalisation. We started our inquiry with the suggestion that it 
is the Scandinavian welfare state that closely connects these short-term and 
long-term issues. It turned out that the concepts of norm-based regimes and 
regime constellations based on institutional complementarities are extremely 
helpful in the exploration of these interconnections. Based on a synthesis of 
different strands of research on welfare regimes, varieties of capitalism, and a 
norm-based macroeconomics, we developed our own model of regime constel-
lations consisting of a “demand function” for normative-institutional complemen-
tarities (NIC) and a “supply function” of macroeconomic regime constellations 
(MERC). Considering the interaction of these two functions, we hypothesised 
that the Scandinavian EU countries started with the “high road” equilibrium of 
high coordination between NIC and MERC combined with good growth per-
formances in the Bretton Woods era after WWII until 1973. A major shock to the 
macroeconomic coordination due to the end of the global fixed exchange rate 
system trapped Nordic EU-countries for some time in the “zone of transitional 
turbulence”, resulting in a NIC-MERC-equilibrium with less coordination and 
deteriorating growth performances. Against this background the recovery after 
the most severe macroeconomic crisis in the whole OECD era in the early 
1990s probably is to be interpreted as the reconstruction of a high degree of 
macroeconomic coordination by new means, in accord with the sophisticated 
coordination needs of a universalistic welfare state as the Scandinavian. 
In order to validate our hypotheses, we first studied the literature exploring the 
main features of the Scandinavian welfare regime and its interaction with the 
macroeconomic set-up starting from the early post-war period. As a first result 
we found out that the Scandinavian welfare was established in the highly coor-
dinated macroeconomic environment of the post-war period, designed to com-  112
bine full employment and price stability with a high level of income and gender 
equality. In a second step, we introduced the Swedish Rehn-Meidner model 
(RMM) as an early example for the exceptional Scandinavian choice of combin-
ing normative-institutional complementarities underlying the welfare regime with 
interactions with the macroeconomic regime constellation. Focused on guaran-
teeing full employment and price stability this approach was supposed to facili-
tate rapid structural change, a typical feature of a small, open economy with 
highly integrated goods markets. To this end it embraced two unique institu-
tional complementarities. First, the labour market regime was reshaped by 
combining a centralised regime of wage bargaining with an active governmental 
labour market policy (ALMP). This is how a significant wage drift was avoided, 
which would have endangered the trade unions’ approach of an egalitarian, 
“solidaristic” wage policy, and the overall macroeconomic goal of price stability 
at the same time. Second, a combination of high corporate taxation with a se-
lective fiscal policy was implemented, in order to facilitate rapid structural 
change by providing the infrastructure that was required by the corporate sector 
as well as for the stabilisation of the social security system for the labour force. 
As one of the key elements of this model, ALMP “outlived” the special “Bretton 
Woods” constellation, which gave birth to RMM. Especially in Sweden and 
Denmark, ALMP remained a persistent feature of the Scandinavian macroeco-
nomic regime constellation even after the breakdown of the worldwide fixed ex-
change rate system in 1973. In the course of our study we found out that the 
tremendous readiness in the Scandinavian societies to finance the welfare 
states by means of relatively high taxes and considerable social contributions is 
based on a high degree of public confidence in the system and its underlying 
egalitarian principles. Moreover, there is strong support for the formation and 
the execution of macroeconomic policies even in times of most severe macro-
economic crises, which results in a strong macroeconomic resilience. 
The second part of our consultation of the relevant literature revealed that the 
attempts of returning to a high-road growth performance by means of tiding over 
the demands shocks with the help of significant wage increases on the one 
hand and a subsequent devaluation policy on the other hand, failed. In the   113
1980s, inflation in Sweden and Finland was fuelled by foreign capital flooding 
these countries. This development was caused by a hasty liberalisation of capi-
tal accounts without careful adjustment of the tax system and bank supervision, 
hence missing institutional complementarities. In contrast to that, the first Scan-
dinavian country to opt against a similar deliberate devaluation policy was 
Denmark, with an explicit commitment to a fixed exchange rate policy in the 
framework of the ERM from 1982 on. Furthermore, Denmark was the first 
Scandinavian country to significantly enhance its banking supervision in order to 
manage the liberalised capital account and to adopt a dual-income tax. Obvi-
ously this is why Denmark was much better equipped for the turbulences 
caused by financial globalisation and the ERM crisis in 1992/93 originating in 
the German unification. 
In order to calculate indicators for fiscal, monetary and wage policy separately 
and to identify structural breaks and regime shifts, we used correlation analysis 
and state-space models. 
For the span of time we could cover due to data availability (1970 to 2006) we 
found out that fiscal policies generally follow a countercyclical pattern. The prin-
cipal task of fiscal policy of stabilising the business cycle was generally accom-
plished. However, we also identified various periods of pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
in each country: Sweden seems to have employed pro-cyclical fiscal policies in 
response to restrictive shocks such as the devaluations in the 1980s and during 
the introduction of the nominal expenditure ceiling for its government in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. In contrast, the pronounced period of pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy we identified in Finland from the 1970s until the first half of the 1980s, 
seems to have emanated from an expansive fiscal policy in a period of booming 
economic activity. The deep economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, 
though, was followed by a rather restrictive fiscal policy in the second half of the 
1990s in Finland as well, which was probably due to its commitment to the 
Maastricht criteria. In contrast to that, Denmark only shows a short period of 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy at the beginning of the 1990s.    114
The analysis of monetary policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark revealed in-
teresting insights with respect to its achievement of price stability, monetary dis-
turbances, and the role of expected inflation. We generally observed a distinct 
stabilisation of monetary policy in Sweden and Finland after 1995, which in 
Denmark, again in contrast to that, seems to have been achieved around 1985 
already. It seems that in Sweden and Finland, the introduction of an inflation 
target played a major role in the reduction of monetary shocks and the conse-
quent stabilisation of inflation expectations after the end of fixed exchange rate 
regimes. In Sweden it was the national central bank that implemented this ac-
tion, in Finland it was the ECB. In Denmark the combination of a commitment to 
a fixed exchange rate policy and a transparent monetary system that was suffi-
ciently flexible to react to domestic challenges to price stability and growth en-
sured a stable monetary environment and avoided the banking and currency 
crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Before 1995 departures from the stability-oriented level of nominal wage in-
creases in the Scandinavian countries were generally found to be either caused 
by overshooting wage increases in response to imported inflation, after the oil 
price shocks of the 1970s, for instance, or by an overly strict wage moderation 
after the crises in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. In line with our 
results for monetary policy in Sweden and Finland, the analysis of wage policy 
in the Scandinavian countries suggests that wage increases stabilised signifi-
cantly around 1995 and have been stability-oriented ever since. This is also 
probably due to the decrease in external price shocks after the huge devalua-
tions of the early 1990s as well as to the stabilisation of the inflation expecta-
tions after the shift of monetary policy regimes to inflation targeting.  
In order to validate our hypothesis on the significance of macroeconomic regime 
constellations, we attempted to identify interdependencies between the different 
areas of macroeconomic policy and output in a SVAR-model, including the ef-
fect of economic integration via the exchange rate. Due to restrictions of the 
data availability, and to the structural break we identified for Sweden and 
Finland at the end of the 1980s, we estimated two VARs for Sweden for the pe-
riods 1974 to 1990 and 1991 to 2006 and two VARs for Finland for the periods   115
1973-1986 and 1987-2005. Since we only had obtained data for the fiscal indi-
cator in Denmark after 1980, we confined ourselves to estimating one VAR, 
covering the period from 1982 to 1986. 
A diachronic comparison of the estimation periods in Sweden provides us with 
good reason to assume a shift in the orientation of the country’s economic pol-
icy from a priority of growth and full employment to a priority of price stability, 
and hence, of the macroeconomic regime constellation. It is well documented 
that this development took place in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s. 
When including the real effective exchange rate, strong interdependencies be-
tween the areas of macroeconomic policy in Sweden become apparent and it is 
difficult to identify a hierarchy between them. Each variable of the macroeco-
nomic policy apparently accounts to almost equal parts for the variance of GDP 
growth. 
In line with our results for Sweden it is also suggested by our findings for 
Finland that the growth of output had a decreasing influence on the macroeco-
nomic policy indicators in the second estimation period. Consequently, the vari-
ance of output growth was to an increased degree caused by shocks to itself. 
With regard to the areas of macroeconomic policy, it seems that monetary pol-
icy had a much stronger impact on the growth of output and on the other mac-
roeconomic policy areas in the second estimation period. This might be ex-
plained by the structural change of the Finnish economy from a priority of full 
employment ensured by the public sector to an export-oriented economy within 
the regulative framework of the EMS. While we still find that shocks to the 
growth of output explain less of the variance of the macroeconomic policy vari-
ables in the second augmented VAR than in the first one, it still seems that 
there were significant interdependencies between the areas of macroeconomic 
policy in both estimation periods. Nevertheless, the structural break due to the 
increased openness of the Finnish economy after the deregulation of the capital 
markets and the crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, is still obvious in the de-
creased effects of shocks to the REER on other endogenous variables, and in 
the decreased impact of shocks to the business cycle or to labour costs on the 
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The macroeconomic policy VAR for Denmark suggests that, of all policy areas, 
it was the fiscal policy that had the strongest impact on GDP growth, even in the 
period after 1990, while all areas of macroeconomic policy reacted to shocks to 
GDP growth. Furthermore, we observe a strong interaction between the areas 
of macroeconomic policy, suggesting that the degree of coordination in macro-
economic policy in general was rather high in Denmark throughout the whole 
estimation period. It is suggested that the real effective exchange rate had no 
significant impact on the growth of GDP or on the macroeconomic policy areas 
during the span of time of the investigation, but was itself only influenced by 
wage policy. Equally, it seems that wage policy in Denmark was largely inde-
pendent from the other areas of macroeconomic policy. But we have to keep in 
mind that especially fiscal policy and, to a slightly lesser degree also monetary 
policy, must have been subject to interdependences with the growth of GDP 
and the other areas of macroeconomic policy. 
The results of our estimations of the impact of different welfare state proxies on 
the long-run growth trend in the Nordic countries were much more ambiguous 
than our analysis of the macroeconomic regimes. But despite the simplicity of 
our estimation method and the resulting difficulties in measuring significant ef-
fects of the welfare state variables, evidence suggests that the different aspects 
of the welfare state have played a decisive role in the trend of growth during the 
estimation period covered here. Hence the relatively egalitarian income distribu-
tion (with decreasing significance) and the high level of education in the Scan-
dinavian countries (with increasing significance), to pick out but two of the ef-
fects of their welfare states, could explain at least to some degree their relative 
growth success. For the long-run growth trends, this might indicate a shift of the 
relative importance of income equality to an equality of opportunity, as it were. 
These results, however, are still preliminary, and further research in this area is 
definitely required.   117
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Table A 1: VAR for expected inflation in Sweden 1973q1-1990q4 
 Included observations: 72 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.722660   0.166432   43.71271 
   (0.08364)   (0.05779)   (176.333) 
  [ 8.64013]  [ 2.87992]  [ 0.24790] 
    
I_N(-4)   0.062549   0.020863   390.2879 
   (0.09731)   (0.06723)   (205.149) 
  [ 0.64279]  [ 0.31030]  [ 1.90246] 
    
I_N(-6) -0.177790  -0.178216    127.7958 
   (0.10986)   (0.07590)   (231.602) 
 [-1.61839]  [-2.34790]  [  0.55179] 
    
I_N(-8)   0.360475  -0.107260  -676.2570 
   (0.09848)   (0.06804)   (207.621) 
 [  3.66034]  [-1.57631]  [-3.25716] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.059462   0.693201  -682.2933 
   (0.14104)   (0.09745)   (297.348) 
  [ 0.42160]  [ 7.11329]  [-2.29459] 
    
INFL(-4)   0.206091  -0.284954   317.7006 
   (0.15145)   (0.10464)   (319.285) 
  [ 1.36082]  [-2.72315]  [ 0.99504]   131
    
INFL(-6)  -0.316518   0.203685   447.7090 
   (0.16281)   (0.11250)   (343.251) 
  [-1.94405]  [ 1.81061]  [ 1.30432] 
    
INFL(-8)   0.147702   0.113173  -200.8308 
   (0.11609)   (0.08021)   (244.748) 
  [ 1.27229]  [ 1.41091]  [-0.82056] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)   1.17E-05  -3.85E-07   1.002270 
   (1.4E-05)   (9.6E-06)   (0.02914) 
  [ 0.84666]  [-0.04033]  [ 34.3935] 
    
YGAP_BP(-4)   2.26E-06   1.53E-05  -0.495671 
   (2.1E-05)   (1.5E-05)   (0.04451) 
  [ 0.10713]  [ 1.04799]  [-11.1366] 
    
YGAP_BP(-6)   3.15E-05  -4.56E-06   0.463516 
   (2.7E-05)   (1.8E-05)   (0.05625) 
  [ 1.18048]  [-0.24719]  [ 8.23983] 
    
YGAP_BP(-8) -2.49E-05    3.89E-06  -0.459930 
   (2.2E-05)   (1.5E-05)   (0.04571) 
 [-1.14650]  [  0.25979]  [-10.0623] 
    
C  -0.485106   2.684041   2125.888 
   (1.07884)   (0.74542)   (2274.45) 
  [-0.44965]  [ 3.60071]  [ 0.93468] 
    
INFL_ENERGY   0.023009   0.040067  -13.17912 
   (0.02291)   (0.01583)   (48.3089) 
  [ 1.00414]  [ 2.53067]  [-0.27281] 
 R-squared   0.854840   0.898702   0.972738 
 Adj. R-squared   0.822304   0.875997   0.966627 
 Sum sq. resids   113.7602   54.30951   5.06E+08 
 S.E. equation   1.400494   0.967663   2952.571 
 F-statistic   26.27373   39.58200   159.1922 
 Log likelihood  -118.6309  -92.01277 -669.6906 
 Akaike AIC   3.684192   2.944799   18.99141 
 Schwarz SC   4.126877   3.387484   19.43409 
 Mean dependent   9.806529   8.617645   1739.165 
 S.D. dependent   3.322325   2.747942   16162.40 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   15477834 
 Determinant resid covariance   8090897. 
 Log likelihood  -879.1157 
 Akaike information criterion   25.58655 
 Schwarz criterion   26.91460   132
Table A 2: VAR for expected inflation in Sweden 1991q1-2006q2 
 Included observations: 62 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.942467  -0.034697  -42.65530 
   (0.13589)   (0.11541)   (94.2021) 
 [  6.93545]  [-0.30064]  [-0.45281] 
    
I_N(-2)  -0.232141   0.417463   153.8423 
   (0.18227)   (0.15480)   (126.351) 
  [-1.27362]  [ 2.69682]  [ 1.21758] 
    
I_N(-3)   0.156063  -0.308586  -129.9072 
   (0.17529)   (0.14887)   (121.512) 
 [  0.89032]  [-2.07286]  [-1.06909] 
    
I_N(-4)   0.017884   0.406955   95.91435 
   (0.17106)   (0.14528)   (118.583) 
  [ 0.10455]  [ 2.80116]  [ 0.80884] 
    
I_N(-5)  -0.025058 -0.409546 -22.09981 
   (0.12010)   (0.10200)   (83.2544) 
 [-0.20865]  [-4.01521]  [-0.26545] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.135130   0.863724  -1.596388 
   (0.13947)   (0.11845)   (96.6823) 
  [ 0.96889]  [ 7.29191]  [-0.01651] 
    
INFL(-2)  -0.420436 -0.170090 -86.30961 
   (0.17365)   (0.14748)   (120.378) 
 [-2.42115]  [-1.15331]  [-0.71699] 
    
INFL(-3)   0.552953   0.266547   33.79726 
   (0.17146)   (0.14562)   (118.858) 
  [ 3.22500]  [ 1.83045]  [ 0.28435] 
    
INFL(-4) -0.383228  -0.429189    161.2369 
   (0.17794)   (0.15112)   (123.352) 
 [-2.15368]  [-2.83999]  [  1.30713] 
    
INFL(-5)   0.236129   0.221812  -204.1087 
   (0.11874)   (0.10085)   (82.3153) 
  [ 1.98856]  [ 2.19947]  [-2.47960] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)  -9.44E-06   0.000376   4.042659 
   (0.00015)   (0.00013)   (0.10350) 
  [-0.06323]  [ 2.96184]  [ 39.0588] 
    
YGAP_BP(-2)   0.000133  -0.001270  -7.166343   133
   (0.00049)   (0.00041)   (0.33745) 
 [  0.27353]  [-3.07142]  [-21.2367] 
    
YGAP_BP(-3)  -0.000245   0.001847   6.937064 
   (0.00068)   (0.00057)   (0.46819) 
  [-0.36297]  [ 3.21921]  [ 14.8167] 
    
YGAP_BP(-4)   0.000182  -0.001354  -3.653619 
   (0.00047)   (0.00040)   (0.32746) 
 [  0.38579]  [-3.37608]  [-11.1574] 
    
YGAP_BP(-5)  -5.49E-05   0.000419   0.828526 
   (0.00014)   (0.00012)   (0.09911) 
  [-0.38404]  [ 3.44768]  [ 8.35961] 
    
C   0.468701  -0.209128  -114.9551 
   (0.21986)   (0.18672)   (152.411) 
 [  2.13182]  [-1.11998]  [-0.75425] 
    
INFL_ENERGY  -0.035550   0.059149   7.637643 
   (0.02111)   (0.01793)   (14.6310) 
  [-1.68436]  [ 3.29978]  [ 0.52202] 
 R-squared   0.971845   0.959592   0.999699 
 Adj. R-squared   0.961834   0.945225   0.999592 
 Sum sq. resids   19.46494   14.03991   9353859. 
 S.E. equation   0.657689   0.558568   455.9205 
 F-statistic   97.07979   66.79030   9350.955 
 Log likelihood  -52.06008  -41.93204 -457.6233 
 Akaike AIC   2.227745   1.901034   15.31043 
 Schwarz SC   2.810991   2.484280   15.89368 
 Mean dependent   5.550338   2.025263  -1852.226 
 S.D. dependent   3.366521   2.386626   22582.79 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   21507.96 
 Determinant resid covariance   8223.594 
 Log likelihood  -543.3802 
 Akaike information criterion   19.17356 
 Schwarz criterion   20.92329 
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Table A 3: VAR for expected inflation in Finland 1972q1-1992q4 
 Included observations: 84 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.692434  -0.005723  -1.118227 
   (0.08824)   (0.05387)   (16.3467) 
 [  7.84680]  [-0.10622]  [-0.06841] 
    
I_N(-4)   0.082287  -0.121183  -18.41855 
   (0.09985)   (0.06096)   (18.4962) 
 [  0.82412]  [-1.98796]  [-0.99580] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.081621   0.894064   11.77606 
   (0.11770)   (0.07186)   (21.8035) 
  [ 0.69346]  [ 12.4420]  [ 0.54010] 
    
INFL(-4)  -0.066335 -0.010012 -2.508922 
   (0.09559)   (0.05836)   (17.7066) 
 [-0.69398]  [-0.17156]  [-0.14169] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)   0.000298   0.000145   1.151012 
   (0.00013)   (7.8E-05)   (0.02368) 
  [ 2.33209]  [ 1.86111]  [ 48.6161] 
    
YGAP_BP(-4)   2.50E-05  -0.000109  -0.333136 
   (0.00015)   (9.0E-05)   (0.02741) 
 [  0.16928]  [-1.20730]  [-12.1530] 
    
C   2.831824   2.038263   178.1433 
   (1.22188)   (0.74597)   (226.345) 
  [ 2.31760]  [ 2.73236]  [ 0.78704] 
    
INFL_ENERGY -0.033208    0.041132  -2.941637 
   (0.02261)   (0.01380)   (4.18849) 
 [-1.46868]  [  2.97971]  [-0.70231] 
 R-squared   0.717148   0.966616   0.979753 
 Adj. R-squared   0.691096   0.963541   0.977889 
 Sum sq. resids   136.7318   50.96322   4691981. 
 S.E. equation   1.341306   0.818883   248.4685 
 F-statistic   27.52737   314.3611   525.3880 
 Log likelihood  -139.6534  -98.20291 -578.2739 
 Akaike AIC   3.515557   2.528641   13.95890 
 Schwarz SC   3.747064   2.760147   14.19041 
 Mean dependent   11.73106   8.518691   35.58682 
 S.D. dependent   2.413325   4.288635   1670.948 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   66547.28   135
 Determinant resid covariance   49287.10 
 Log likelihood  -811.4000 
 Akaike information criterion   19.89048 
 Schwarz criterion   20.58500 
 
 
Table A 4: VAR for expected inflation in Finland 1993q1-2006q4 
 Included observations: 56   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.638070  -0.023009  -239.2592 
   (0.04472)   (0.05302)   (62.4796) 
 [  14.2683]  [-0.43394]  [-3.82939] 
    
I_N(-6) -0.118398  -0.195163    62.38872 
   (0.04020)   (0.04766)   (56.1621) 
 [-2.94540]  [-4.09462]  [  1.11087] 
    
I_N(-8)   0.197710   0.186252   93.27762 
   (0.04014)   (0.04759)   (56.0814) 
  [ 4.92553]  [ 3.91328]  [ 1.66325] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.299327   0.877145   205.1976 
   (0.06726)   (0.07975)   (93.9744) 
  [ 4.45020]  [ 10.9982]  [ 2.18355] 
    
INFL(-6) -0.108115    0.249397  -221.7738 
   (0.06512)   (0.07722)   (90.9868) 
 [-1.66017]  [  3.22978]  [-2.43743] 
    
INFL(-8) -0.007943  -0.228286    43.78698 
   (0.06654)   (0.07889)   (92.9623) 
 [-0.11937]  [-2.89356]  [  0.47102] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)   5.82E-05   4.37E-05   0.948951 
   (3.9E-05)   (4.6E-05)   (0.05469) 
  [ 1.48763]  [ 0.94126]  [ 17.3518] 
    
YGAP_BP(-6)   0.000116  -3.22E-05   0.087465 
   (6.0E-05)   (7.1E-05)   (0.08322) 
  [ 1.93964]  [-0.45567]  [ 1.05106] 
    
YGAP_BP(-8) -0.000157    3.76E-05  -0.219587 
   (5.6E-05)   (6.7E-05)   (0.07864) 
 [-2.78384]  [  0.56360]  [-2.79234] 
    
C   0.524198   0.064823   41.63443 
   (0.10554)   (0.12514)   (147.452) 
  [ 4.96693]  [ 0.51801]  [ 0.28236]   136
    
INFL_ENERGY   0.018613   0.042781   45.73087 
   (0.00794)   (0.00942)   (11.0975) 
  [ 2.34328]  [ 4.54243]  [ 4.12083] 
 R-squared   0.974891   0.885703   0.930469 
 Adj. R-squared   0.969311   0.860303   0.915018 
 Sum sq. resids   3.500198   4.921066   6832484. 
 S.E. equation   0.278895   0.330692   389.6575 
 F-statistic   174.7182   34.87104   60.21959 
 Log likelihood  -1.829652  -11.36941  -407.3923 
 Akaike AIC   0.458202   0.798908   14.94258 
 Schwarz SC   0.856039   1.196744   15.34042 
 Mean dependent   3.851143   1.347977   128.0379 
 S.D. dependent   1.592024   0.884770   1336.656 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   1010.985 
 Determinant resid covariance   524.5878 
 Log likelihood  -413.7348 
 Akaike information criterion   15.95482 
 Schwarz criterion   17.14833 
 
 
Table A 5: VAR for expected inflation in Denmark 1973q3-1989q4 
 Included observations: 66 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.451801   0.023193  -119.1142 
   (0.13563)   (0.07323)   (59.4998) 
  [ 3.33118]  [ 0.31673]  [-2.00193] 
    
I_N(-2)   0.201609   0.133550  -76.00755 
   (0.14752)   (0.07965)   (64.7174) 
  [ 1.36664]  [ 1.67676]  [-1.17445] 
    
I_N(-5)   0.068089  -0.031988   108.6802 
   (0.15004)   (0.08101)   (65.8238) 
  [ 0.45380]  [-0.39486]  [ 1.65108] 
    
I_N(-6)   0.046772  -0.194803   92.42072 
   (0.13254)   (0.07156)   (58.1462) 
  [ 0.35288]  [-2.72221]  [ 1.58945] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.700617   0.594854  -10.46903 
   (0.25691)   (0.13870)   (112.704) 
  [ 2.72713]  [ 4.28863]  [-0.09289] 
    
INFL(-2) -0.657171  -0.124600    277.4494   137
   (0.26811)   (0.14476)   (117.621) 
 [-2.45109]  [-0.86076]  [  2.35884] 
    
INFL(-5)   0.306216   0.143212  -229.5058 
   (0.25752)   (0.13904)   (112.975) 
  [ 1.18908]  [ 1.03002]  [-2.03147] 
    
INFL(-6)  -0.430916   0.108989   58.93929 
   (0.25020)   (0.13509)   (109.763) 
  [-1.72227]  [ 0.80682]  [ 0.53697] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)   8.78E-05  -5.80E-05   2.244348 
   (0.00012)   (6.7E-05)   (0.05461) 
  [ 0.70552]  [-0.86363]  [ 41.1002] 
    
YGAP_BP(-2) -0.000101    7.96E-05  -1.530792 
   (0.00016)   (8.7E-05)   (0.07091) 
 [-0.62765]  [  0.91250]  [-21.5873] 
    
YGAP_BP(-5)   4.45E-06  -9.92E-05   0.605227 
   (0.00015)   (8.1E-05)   (0.06569) 
  [ 0.02972]  [-1.22733]  [ 9.21362] 
    
YGAP_BP(-6) -6.31E-05    6.23E-05  -0.390445 
   (0.00011)   (6.0E-05)   (0.04869) 
 [-0.56834]  [  1.04009]  [-8.01881] 
    
C   2.833927   1.907242  -514.0648 
   (1.16246)   (0.62762)   (509.970) 
  [ 2.43787]  [ 3.03886]  [-1.00803] 
    
INFL_ENERGY   0.064804   0.083319  -25.02885 
   (0.02533)   (0.01368)   (11.1141) 
  [ 2.55798]  [ 6.09142]  [-2.25200] 
 R-squared   0.733747   0.924415   0.996412 
 Adj. R-squared   0.667184   0.905518   0.995515 
 Sum sq. resids   222.7357   64.92672   42866900 
 S.E. equation   2.069632   1.117404   907.9446 
 F-statistic   11.02330   48.92041   1110.902 
 Log likelihood  -133.7889  -93.10889 -535.3205 
 Akaike AIC   4.478450   3.245724   16.64608 
 Schwarz SC   4.942923   3.710196   17.11055 
 Mean dependent   12.01864   8.433744  -1091.925 
 S.D. dependent   3.587491   3.635270   13557.91 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   3703869. 
 Determinant resid covariance   1811481. 
 Log likelihood  -756.4685 
 Akaike information criterion   24.19601   138
 Schwarz criterion   25.58943 
 
 
Table A 6: VAR for expected inflation in Denmark 1990q1-2006q4 
 Included observations: 68   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
 I_N  INFL  YGAP_BP 
I_N(-1)   0.527397  -0.066045  -214.7188 
   (0.12715)   (0.02643)   (117.328) 
 [  4.14796]  [-2.49928]  [-1.83007] 
    
I_N(-2)   0.434920   0.009379   156.6231 
   (0.15564)   (0.03235)   (143.626) 
  [ 2.79433]  [ 0.28994]  [ 1.09050] 
    
I_N(-4)  -0.087348   0.045937   258.9607 
   (0.14969)   (0.03111)   (138.136) 
  [-0.58351]  [ 1.47651]  [ 1.87468] 
    
I_N(-8)   0.033710   0.013823  -98.26480 
   (0.09304)   (0.01934)   (85.8578) 
  [ 0.36231]  [ 0.71480]  [-1.14451] 
    
INFL(-1)   0.137051   0.602874   779.4239 
   (0.55782)   (0.11594)   (514.746) 
  [ 0.24569]  [ 5.20010]  [ 1.51419] 
    
INFL(-2)   0.339873  -0.013846  -273.5072 
   (0.56997)   (0.11846)   (525.956) 
 [  0.59630]  [-0.11688]  [-0.52002] 
    
INFL(-4)  -0.279051 -0.011294 -454.3298 
   (0.34735)   (0.07219)   (320.529) 
 [-0.80337]  [-0.15644]  [-1.41744] 
    
INFL(-8)   0.116934   0.098063  -99.29153 
   (0.22840)   (0.04747)   (210.766) 
  [ 0.51197]  [ 2.06576]  [-0.47110] 
    
YGAP_BP(-1)  -1.21E-05   1.83E-06   2.035467 
   (6.7E-05)   (1.4E-05)   (0.06178) 
  [-0.18099]  [ 0.13142]  [ 32.9482] 
    
YGAP_BP(-2)   6.68E-05   7.01E-06  -1.361193 
   (8.9E-05)   (1.9E-05)   (0.08258) 
  [ 0.74694]  [ 0.37669]  [-16.4843] 
    
YGAP_BP(-4) -5.35E-05  -1.91E-07    0.277537 
   (3.8E-05)   (7.9E-06)   (0.03497)   139
 [-1.41276]  [-0.02429]  [  7.93561] 
    
YGAP_BP(-8) -2.94E-06    1.76E-07  -0.089553 
   (1.5E-05)   (3.2E-06)   (0.01411) 
 [-0.19235]  [  0.05541]  [-6.34575] 
    
C -0.328204    0.454069  -635.2763 
   (0.68313)   (0.14198)   (630.382) 
 [-0.48044]  [  3.19813]  [-1.00776] 
    
INFL_ENERGY  -0.014542   0.048439   77.48336 
   (0.05019)   (0.01043)   (46.3179) 
  [-0.28973]  [ 4.64331]  [ 1.67286] 
 R-squared   0.912628   0.837812   0.993949 
 Adj. R-squared   0.891595   0.798767   0.992492 
 Sum sq. resids   65.54713   2.831375   55815389 
 S.E. equation   1.101742   0.228982   1016.670 
 F-statistic   43.38849   21.45746   682.2785 
 Log likelihood  -95.23872   11.58952  -559.5016 
 Akaike AIC   3.212903   0.070896   16.86769 
 Schwarz SC   3.669861   0.527854   17.32465 
 Mean dependent   5.560978   2.109162   346.5437 
 S.D. dependent   3.346220   0.510449   11733.11 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)   52760.91 
 Determinant resid covariance   26422.07 
 Log likelihood  -635.6499 
 Akaike information criterion   19.93088 
 Schwarz criterion   21.30175 
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Table A 7: Test for stationarity of the variables in the VARs for Macroeconomic 
Policy 






 monetary-indicator  -9.259*** 
 fiscal  indicator  -4.195*** 
  wage indicator   -3.004*** 






 monetary-indicator  -4.767*** 
 fiscal  indicator  -6.089*** 
  wage indicator   -2.622*** 






 monetary-indicator  -7.076*** 
 fiscal  indicator  -3.837*** 
  wage indicator   -2.526*** 
 reer_cycle  -4.701*** 
Notes: Null hypothesis: The variable has a unit root. ADF Test without intercept or 
trend. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, 
* significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A 8: VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
 Included observations: 59 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 GR_Y 
MONETAR
Y-IND FISCALIND WAGEIND 
REER_ 
CYCLE 
GR_Y(-1)  -0.802044   0.269861  -0.020025   0.173296   0.723062 
   (0.16388)   (0.19508)   (0.04923)   (0.22963)   (0.57431) 
 [-4.89403]  [  1.38334]  [-0.40679]  [ 0.75467]  [ 1.25901] 
       
GR_Y(-2)  -0.402594   0.584175  -0.078371   0.446149   0.974824 
   (0.20067)   (0.23888)   (0.06028)   (0.28118)   (0.70324) 
 [-2.00620]  [  2.44552]  [-1.30016]  [ 1.58668]  [ 1.38619] 
       
GR_Y(-3)  -0.172106   0.216765  -0.044027   0.486385   1.574966 
   (0.22353)   (0.26608)   (0.06714)   (0.31321)   (0.78334) 
 [-0.76994]  [  0.81465]  [-0.65571]  [ 1.55291]  [ 2.01058] 
       
GR_Y(-4)   0.107392   0.298662   0.034114   0.613831   1.189689 
   (0.19863)   (0.23644)   (0.05966)   (0.27832)   (0.69607) 
  [ 0.54067]  [ 1.26316]  [ 0.57176]  [ 2.20551]  [ 1.70914] 
       
GR_Y(-5)   0.026589  -0.053719   0.036998   0.429297   0.212254 
   (0.14188)   (0.16888)   (0.04262)   (0.19880)   (0.49719) 
  [ 0.18741]  [-0.31808]  [ 0.86816] [  2.15948] [  0.42691] 
       
MONETARYIND(-1)   0.163534   0.511157   0.044453  -0.069190  -0.236938 
   (0.14292)   (0.17013)   (0.04293)   (0.20027)   (0.50087) 
  [ 1.14420]  [ 3.00446]  [ 1.03543] [-0.34549] [-0.47306] 
       
MONETARYIND(-2) -0.117534 -0.376913 -0.099257 -0.018299 -1.130708 
   (0.16057)   (0.19114)   (0.04823)   (0.22499)   (0.56270) 
  [-0.73198] [-1.97196] [-2.05792] [-0.08133] [-2.00944] 
       
MONETARYIND(-3)   0.123367   0.093743   0.047698  -0.489161  -0.998631 
   (0.15861)   (0.18881)   (0.04764)   (0.22225)   (0.55584) 
  [ 0.77779]  [ 0.49650]  [ 1.00114] [-2.20098] [-1.79661] 
       
MONETARYIND(-4) -0.161320 -0.410038 -0.022807   0.473799   0.177983 
   (0.17567)   (0.20911)   (0.05277)   (0.24614)   (0.61560) 
  [-0.91834] [-1.96091] [-0.43222]  [ 1.92491]  [ 0.28912] 
       
MONETARYIND(-5) -0.011893   0.199932 -0.144533 -0.159753   0.437746 
   (0.16006)   (0.19052)   (0.04808)   (0.22427)   (0.56090) 
 [-0.07430]  [  1.04938]  [-3.00627] [-0.71233] [  0.78044] 
       
FISCALIND(-1)  -0.749996   0.119305   2.150236  -1.545750   1.512666 
   (0.48601)   (0.57853)   (0.14599)   (0.68100)   (1.70318) 
  [-1.54316]  [ 0.20622]  [ 14.7289] [-2.26984] [  0.88814] 
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FISCALIND(-2)   0.777119   0.412729  -1.630948   2.526223  -2.662375 
   (1.19406)   (1.42137)   (0.35867)   (1.67311)   (4.18446) 
  [ 0.65082]  [ 0.29037]  [-4.54720] [  1.50990] [-0.63625] 
       
FISCALIND(-3)   0.321694  -0.298145   0.089916  -0.993567  -0.806882 
   (1.47822)   (1.75962)   (0.44403)   (2.07127)   (5.18028) 
  [ 0.21762]  [-0.16944]  [ 0.20250] [-0.47969] [-0.15576] 
       
FISCALIND(-4)  -1.253363   0.062535   0.461879  -0.425129   5.751974 
   (1.14860)   (1.36725)   (0.34501)   (1.60940)   (4.02514) 
  [-1.09121]  [ 0.04574]  [ 1.33873] [-0.26415] [  1.42901] 
       
FISCALIND(-5)   0.824381   0.249061  -0.143105   0.298741  -4.016327 
   (0.48981)   (0.58305)   (0.14713)   (0.68631)   (1.71647) 
  [ 1.68308]  [ 0.42717]  [-0.97266] [  0.43528] [-2.33987] 
       
WAGEIND(-1)   0.038660  -0.035685   0.039805   0.811166   0.006775 
   (0.10432)   (0.12417)   (0.03133)   (0.14617)   (0.36556) 
  [ 0.37060]  [-0.28738]  [ 1.27034] [  5.54961] [  0.01853] 
       
WAGEIND(-2)   0.057256   0.108272  -0.107012  -0.079844  -0.009440 
   (0.11616)   (0.13827)   (0.03489)   (0.16276)   (0.40708) 
  [ 0.49290]  [ 0.78303]  [-3.06690] [-0.49055] [-0.02319] 
       
WAGEIND(-3)  -0.189590  -0.050032   0.121956   0.068128   0.027897 
   (0.10658)   (0.12686)   (0.03201)   (0.14933)   (0.37348) 
 [-1.77893]  [-0.39438]  [  3.80959] [  0.45622] [  0.07469] 
       
WAGEIND(-4)  -0.123113   0.118676 -0.077460 -0.467406 -0.119682 
   (0.09456)   (0.11257)   (0.02841)   (0.13250)   (0.33139) 
 [-1.30189]  [  1.05429]  [-2.72697] [-3.52753] [-0.36115] 
       
WAGEIND(-5)   0.068743   0.124968   0.009315   0.435740   0.321108 
   (0.08895)   (0.10588)   (0.02672)   (0.12463)   (0.31170) 
  [ 0.77286]  [ 1.18029]  [ 0.34866]  [ 3.49625]  [ 1.03017] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-1)    0.024784 -0.016192 -0.022320 -0.021602   0.291391 
   (0.04664)   (0.05552)   (0.01401)   (0.06536)   (0.16346) 
 [  0.53134]  [-0.29162]  [-1.59306] [-0.33051] [  1.78264] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-2)  -0.101516 -0.048951 -0.006180 -0.042289   0.209314 
   (0.04911)   (0.05846)   (0.01475)   (0.06881)   (0.17210) 
  [-2.06719] [-0.83739] [-0.41894] [-0.61458] [  1.21627] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-3)   0.037945   0.074143  -0.014445  -0.046587   0.041992 
   (0.04989)   (0.05939)   (0.01499)   (0.06991)   (0.17485) 
  [ 0.76050]  [ 1.24836]  [-0.96383] [-0.66638] [  0.24016] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-4)  -0.030643   0.037581  -0.016083   0.090037   0.013595 
   (0.04838)   (0.05759)   (0.01453)   (0.06779)   (0.16955) 
 [-0.63337]  [  0.65255]  [-1.10668]  [ 1.32816]  [ 0.08018]   143
       
REER_CYCLE(-5)  -0.020957   0.026206   0.044783   0.005065   0.266450 
   (0.04511)   (0.05370)   (0.01355)   (0.06321)   (0.15809) 
  [-0.46455]  [ 0.48800]  [ 3.30476] [  0.08013] [  1.68538] 
       
C   0.892108  -0.203215   0.014962  -1.487623  -1.713585 
   (0.30746)   (0.36599)   (0.09235)   (0.43081)   (1.07746) 
  [ 2.90154]  [-0.55525]  [ 0.16200] [-3.45309] [-1.59039] 
 R-squared   0.655242   0.599026   0.985565   0.883324   0.723912 
 Adj. R-squared   0.394061   0.295258   0.974629   0.794933   0.514754 
 Sum sq. resids   42.63680   60.41476   3.847001   83.71035   523.6127 
 S.E. equation   1.136672   1.353052   0.341432   1.592695   3.983347 
 F-statistic   2.508770   1.971987   90.12362   9.993390   3.461085 
 Log likelihood  -74.13519  -84.41640  -3.175185 -94.03722 -148.1222 
 Akaike AIC   3.394413   3.742929   0.988989   4.069058   5.902448 
 Schwarz SC   4.309938   4.658454   1.904514   4.984583   6.817973 
 Mean dependent   0.489492   0.055771  -0.310463  -1.148017   0.274881 
 S.D. dependent   1.460229   1.611757   2.143566   3.517102   5.718305 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)    7.216876     
 Determinant resid covariance   0.395056       
 Log likelihood  -391.1894       
 Akaike information criterion   17.66744       
 Schwarz criterion   22.24506       
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Table A 9: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests for VAR I for 
Macroeconomic Policy in  Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 59 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1   35.75206   0.0754 
2   31.71064   0.1666 
3   24.07232   0.5152 
4   17.72961   0.8537 
5   32.64554   0.1402 
6   26.12277   0.4011 
7   16.39475   0.9026 
8   14.99657   0.9415 
9   36.20186   0.0686 
10   24.69445   0.4796 
11   23.18170   0.5670 
12   33.52356   0.1185 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
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Table A 10: VAR Residual Normality Tests for VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)   
H0: residuals are multivariate normal   
Included observations: 59     
     
Component Skewness  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1  -0.072296   0.056851  1   0.8115 
2  -0.064140   0.044748  1   0.8325 
3   0.248728   0.672926  1   0.4120 
4   0.106270   0.122839  1   0.7260 
5   0.173038   0.325687  1   0.5682 
Joint     1.223051  5   0.9426 
     
Component Kurtosis  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.791391   14.05206  1   0.0002 
2   1.031913   11.02915  1   0.0009 
3   1.007400   11.32050  1   0.0008 
4   1.670468   4.777796  1   0.0288 
5   1.745608   4.211675  1   0.0401 
Joint     45.39119  5   0.0000 
     
Component Jarque-Bera  df  Prob.   
1   14.10891  2   0.0009   
2   11.07390  2   0.0039   
3   11.99343  2   0.0025   
4   4.900635  2   0.0863   
5   4.537362  2   0.1034   
Joint   128.6142  105   0.0586   
 
Table A 11: VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
 Included observations: 62 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 GR_Y 
MONETAR
Y-IND FISCALIND WAGEIND 
REER_ 
CYCLE 
GR_Y(-1)    0.161058 -0.287607 -0.248534 -0.267620 -0.375617 
   (0.14696)   (0.21909)   (0.07128)   (0.32336)   (1.03828) 
 [  1.09593]  [-1.31272]  [-3.48672] [-0.82762] [-0.36177] 
       
GR_Y(-2)   0.392787   0.290400  -0.072495   0.161112   1.460515   146
   (0.15729)   (0.23449)   (0.07629)   (0.34609)   (1.11125) 
  [ 2.49724]  [ 1.23844]  [-0.95026]  [ 0.46553]  [ 1.31430] 
       
GR_Y(-3)   0.088123   0.264326  -0.056349  -0.096950   1.002659 
   (0.12703)   (0.18938)   (0.06161)   (0.27951)   (0.89748) 
  [ 0.69371]  [ 1.39574]  [-0.91455] [-0.34686] [  1.11720] 
       
GR_Y(-4)  -0.110206   0.489323 -0.096266   0.572241 -2.087988 
   (0.13350)   (0.19903)   (0.06475)   (0.29375)   (0.94320) 
 [-0.82550]  [  2.45858]  [-1.48669] [  1.94807] [-2.21374] 
       
GR_Y(-5)   0.623079   0.084659   0.081380   0.120091   1.432418 
   (0.15170)   (0.22616)   (0.07358)   (0.33379)   (1.07176) 
  [ 4.10734]  [ 0.37434]  [ 1.10602]  [ 0.35978]  [ 1.33651] 
       
GR_Y(-6)  -0.256419   0.521483 -0.119779   0.602582 -0.322189 
   (0.15186)   (0.22640)   (0.07366)   (0.33414)   (1.07290) 
 [-1.68852]  [  2.30341]  [-1.62619] [  1.80337] [-0.30030] 
       
MONETARYIND(-1)  -0.092369   0.443626   0.054518   0.208084   0.947598 
   (0.09559)   (0.14251)   (0.04637)   (0.21034)   (0.67538) 
  [-0.96626]  [ 3.11285]  [ 1.17582] [  0.98928] [  1.40306] 
       
MONETARYIND(-2) -0.242875 -0.266895 -0.106944 -0.021503 -0.548887 
   (0.09570)   (0.14266)   (0.04642)   (0.21056)   (0.67609) 
  [-2.53800] [-1.87078] [-2.30409] [-0.10212] [-0.81185] 
       
MONETARYIND(-3) -0.054159 -0.345808 -0.021912 -0.197608 -0.076500 
   (0.09951)   (0.14835)   (0.04826)   (0.21895)   (0.70301) 
  [-0.54427] [-2.33110] [-0.45401] [-0.90254] [-0.10882] 
       
MONETARYIND(-4)   0.079747 -0.479719 -0.003940 -0.125038   0.881660 
   (0.09133)   (0.13615)   (0.04430)   (0.20095)   (0.64523) 
 [  0.87321]  [-3.52342]  [-0.08894] [-0.62224] [  1.36643] 
       
MONETARYIND(-5)  -0.059613   0.388573  -0.038195   0.292031   0.645048 
   (0.08735)   (0.13023)   (0.04237)   (0.19221)   (0.61716) 
 [-0.68243]  [  2.98378]  [-0.90149]  [ 1.51936]  [ 1.04519] 
       
MONETARYIND(-6)   0.007866  -0.198324  -0.024962   0.067561   0.054886 
   (0.08574)   (0.12782)   (0.04159)   (0.18866)   (0.60575) 
 [  0.09174]  [-1.55156]  [-0.60026]  [ 0.35812]  [ 0.09061] 
       
FISCALIND(-1)   0.676198  -0.253349   2.090045  -0.588935  -2.692458 
   (0.32039)   (0.47764)   (0.15540)   (0.70496)   (2.26355) 
  [ 2.11056]  [-0.53042]  [ 13.4497] [-0.83542] [-1.18948] 
       
FISCALIND(-2)  -1.890599   2.007916  -2.086328   1.856296   12.07173 
   (0.72296)   (1.07780)   (0.35066)   (1.59075)   (5.10773) 
 [-2.61509]  [  1.86298]  [-5.94979]  [ 1.16693]  [ 2.36342] 
         147
FISCALIND(-3)   2.727567  -2.693391   1.469426  -2.612241  -20.60296 
   (0.93459)   (1.39330)   (0.45330)   (2.05641)   (6.60291) 
  [ 2.91847]  [-1.93310]  [ 3.24160] [-1.27029] [-3.12028] 
       
FISCALIND(-4)  -1.730266   1.394159  -1.033259   3.667265   18.77533 
   (1.05265)   (1.56932)   (0.51057)   (2.31619)   (7.43704) 
 [-1.64372]  [  0.88839]  [-2.02375]  [ 1.58332]  [ 2.52457] 
       
FISCALIND(-5)   0.264494   0.005736   0.606468  -3.443062  -10.15511 
   (0.81536)   (1.21556)   (0.39548)   (1.79407)   (5.76058) 
  [ 0.32439]  [ 0.00472]  [ 1.53352] [-1.91913] [-1.76286] 
       
FISCALIND(-6)   0.180458  -0.228109  -0.171729   1.379778   2.890939 
   (0.29561)   (0.44070)   (0.14338)   (0.65044)   (2.08849) 
 [  0.61046]  [-0.51761]  [-1.19773]  [ 2.12131]  [ 1.38423] 
       
WAGEIND(-1)   0.158226   0.268134  -0.036477   0.756979  -0.875215 
   (0.08315)   (0.12396)   (0.04033)   (0.18295)   (0.58743) 
  [ 1.90300]  [ 2.16315]  [-0.90451] [  4.13766] [-1.48991] 
       
WAGEIND(-2)   0.111449  -0.017127   0.177494   0.243693   1.166464 
   (0.10889)   (0.16233)   (0.05281)   (0.23959)   (0.76928) 
  [ 1.02354]  [-0.10551]  [ 3.36081] [  1.01714] [  1.51630] 
       
WAGEIND(-3)  -0.233640 -0.117825 -0.131288   0.192851 -0.727697 
   (0.10127)   (0.15098)   (0.04912)   (0.22284)   (0.71551) 
  [-2.30700] [-0.78039] [-2.67274] [  0.86543] [-1.01704] 
       
WAGEIND(-4)   0.027066  -0.151178   0.007805  -0.712729  -0.914364 
   (0.07931)   (0.11824)   (0.03847)   (0.17452)   (0.56036) 
  [ 0.34125]  [-1.27852]  [ 0.20289] [-4.08396] [-1.63173] 
       
WAGEIND(-5)   0.095520  -0.095585  -0.048392   0.258516   0.564445 
   (0.08227)   (0.12266)   (0.03991)   (0.18103)   (0.58128) 
 [  1.16099]  [-0.77929]  [-1.21266]  [ 1.42801]  [ 0.97104] 
       
WAGEIND(-6)  -0.065488  -0.041998   0.041546   0.104271   1.001253 
   (0.07603)   (0.11335)   (0.03688)   (0.16730)   (0.53718) 
 [-0.86131]  [-0.37051]  [  1.12657] [  0.62327] [  1.86392] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-1)  -0.044411   0.038758  -0.035709   0.048673   1.199106 
   (0.02476)   (0.03691)   (0.01201)   (0.05448)   (0.17493) 
 [-1.79360]  [  1.04996]  [-2.97338]  [ 0.89339]  [ 6.85460] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-2)  -0.003845 -0.089440   0.009225 -0.124719 -0.598015 
   (0.03908)   (0.05826)   (0.01896)   (0.08599)   (0.27611) 
 [-0.09839]  [-1.53512]  [  0.48665] [-1.45037] [-2.16587] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-3)   0.056032   0.114999  -0.006284   0.126061   0.682683 
   (0.03398)   (0.05066)   (0.01648)   (0.07477)   (0.24008) 
  [ 1.64889]  [ 2.26998]  [-0.38123]  [ 1.68596]  [ 2.84353]   148
       
REER_CYCLE(-4)   0.044156  -0.001871   0.014861  -0.091560  -0.460585 
   (0.03083)   (0.04596)   (0.01495)   (0.06783)   (0.21780) 
  [ 1.43233]  [-0.04071]  [ 0.99387] [-1.34979] [-2.11469] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-5) -0.037367    0.056041 -0.001301   0.077009 -0.128852 
   (0.03120)   (0.04652)   (0.01513)   (0.06865)   (0.22044) 
 [-1.19762]  [  1.20480]  [-0.08596] [  1.12172] [-0.58453] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-6)   0.028477  -0.027507  -0.008871   0.012151   0.061683 
   (0.02080)   (0.03101)   (0.01009)   (0.04577)   (0.14695) 
 [  1.36905]  [-0.88706]  [-0.87927]  [ 0.26549]  [ 0.41974] 
       
C   0.104130  -0.925959   0.324908  -0.694999  -0.517267 
   (0.18049)   (0.26908)   (0.08755)   (0.39715)   (1.27520) 
  [ 0.57692]  [-3.44114]  [ 3.71133] [-1.74998] [-0.40564] 
 R-squared   0.880189   0.950058   0.997147   0.955179   0.911910 
 Adj. R-squared   0.764242   0.901727   0.994385   0.911805   0.826662 
 Sum sq. resids   3.388166   7.530360   0.797078   16.40370   169.1201 
 S.E. equation   0.330599   0.492864   0.160350   0.727428   2.335698 
 F-statistic   7.591330   19.65739   361.1174   22.02154   10.69712 
 Log likelihood   2.138025  -22.62025   46.99785  -46.75574  -119.0819 
 Akaike AIC   0.931031   1.729686  -0.516060   2.508250   4.841352 
 Schwarz SC   1.994599   2.793253   0.547508   3.571817   5.904919 
 Mean dependent   0.546797  -0.038621   0.350474  -1.063099  -0.163388 
 S.D. dependent   0.680876   1.572210   2.139982   2.449442   5.610090 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)    0.001285     
 Determinant resid covariance   4.01E-05       
 Log likelihood  -126.0571       
 Akaike information criterion   9.066359       
 Schwarz criterion   14.38420       
 
   149









-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial
 
 
Table A 12: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests for VAR II for 
Macroeconomic Policy in  Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 62 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1   30.52829   0.2051 
2   39.11340   0.0359 
3   40.10301   0.0285 
4   24.40053   0.4963 
5   47.96018   0.0038 
6   29.86370   0.2294 
7   21.26818   0.6776 
8   20.33861   0.7288 
9   31.98535   0.1584 
10   15.75565   0.9219 
11   13.58515   0.9685 
12   9.765176   0.9972 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
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Table A 13: VAR Residual Normality Tests for VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)   
H0: residuals are multivariate normal   
Included observations: 62     
     
Component Skewness  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.046112   0.024186  1   0.8764 
2   0.032619   0.012103  1   0.9124 
3  -0.057676   0.037840  1   0.8458 
4   0.148972   0.252441  1   0.6154 
5  -0.105985   0.127774  1   0.7208 
Joint     0.454344  5   0.9937 
     
Component Kurtosis  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.711771   15.78108  1   0.0001 
2   0.588830   17.60008  1   0.0000 
3   0.783343   14.76781  1   0.0001 
4   1.043616   11.36643  1   0.0007 
5   0.769331   14.96353  1   0.0001 
Joint     74.47892  5   0.0000 
     
Component Jarque-Bera  df  Prob.   
1   15.80526  2   0.0004   
2   17.61219  2   0.0001   
3   14.80565  2   0.0006   
4   11.61887  2   0.0030   
5   15.09130  2   0.0005   
Joint   154.4011  105   0.0012   
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Table A 14: VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
 Included observations: 45 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 GR_Y 
MONETAR
Y-IND FISCALIND WAGEIND 
REER_ 
CYCLE 
GR_Y(-1)  -0.490265 -0.264285   0.073764 -0.044777   0.306924 
   (0.18549)   (0.29802)   (0.04977)   (0.40317)   (1.43188) 
 [-2.64308]  [-0.88681]  [  1.48200] [-0.11106] [  0.21435] 
       
GR_Y(-2)  -0.251609   0.186374 -0.002197 -0.223785   1.147357 
   (0.19209)   (0.30862)   (0.05154)   (0.41752)   (1.48284) 
 [-1.30984]  [  0.60389]  [-0.04261] [-0.53599] [  0.77376] 
       
GR_Y(-3)   0.048674   0.525007  -0.020145  -0.592175  -0.071986 
   (0.14018)   (0.22523)   (0.03762)   (0.30470)   (1.08215) 
  [ 0.34721]  [ 2.33101]  [-0.53555] [-1.94348] [-0.06652] 
       
MONETARYIND(-1)  -0.153721   0.102146   0.024160  -0.000828  -0.066457 
   (0.11463)   (0.18417)   (0.03076)   (0.24916)   (0.88489) 
  [-1.34100]  [ 0.55462]  [ 0.78545] [-0.00332] [-0.07510] 
       
MONETARYIND(-2)  -0.078832   0.061850  -0.052787   0.035949   2.042957 
   (0.13057)   (0.20979)   (0.03504)   (0.28381)   (1.00796) 
 [-0.60374]  [  0.29483]  [-1.50658]  [ 0.12667]  [ 2.02683] 
       
MONETARYIND(-3)   0.292157   0.121002   0.009873   0.299854  -1.270166 
   (0.11743)   (0.18868)   (0.03151)   (0.25525)   (0.90653) 
  [ 2.48783]  [ 0.64132]  [ 0.31332]  [ 1.17475]  [-1.40113] 
       
FISCALIND(-1)   2.738810   1.511679   2.089331   3.920077  -0.354537 
   (0.77958)   (1.25251)   (0.20919)   (1.69445)   (6.01792) 
  [ 3.51319]  [ 1.20692]  [ 9.98780]  [ 2.31348]  [-0.05891] 
       
FISCALIND(-2)  -4.770763 -4.702613 -1.700102 -4.018412   3.531195 
   (1.37308)   (2.20604)   (0.36844)   (2.98444)   (10.5994) 
  [-3.47451] [-2.13170] [-4.61427] [-1.34646] [  0.33315] 
       
FISCALIND(-3)   2.797556   3.617833   0.460301   2.120649  -3.323919 
   (0.79994)   (1.28521)   (0.21465)   (1.73870)   (6.17507) 
  [ 3.49722]  [ 2.81497]  [ 2.14442]  [ 1.21968]  [-0.53828] 
       
WAGEIND(-1)  -0.038858  -0.098157   0.037589   0.079678   0.737529 
   (0.09634)   (0.15478)   (0.02585)   (0.20940)   (0.74369) 
 [-0.40334]  [-0.63416]  [  1.45403] [  0.38051] [  0.99172] 
       
WAGEIND(-2)  -0.117631  -0.022551   0.013046   0.092216   0.478801 
   (0.09100)   (0.14621)   (0.02442)   (0.19779)   (0.70247) 
 [-1.29264]  [-0.15425]  [  0.53427] [  0.46622] [  0.68159] 
         152
WAGEIND(-3) -0.018193    0.006725 -0.041760   0.143783 -0.027803 
   (0.07963)   (0.12794)   (0.02137)   (0.17308)   (0.61470) 
 [-0.22846]  [  0.05257]  [-1.95438] [  0.83074] [-0.04523] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-1)  -0.010086 -0.040035 -0.003217   0.091710   0.485987 
   (0.02565)   (0.04121)   (0.00688)   (0.05575)   (0.19801) 
  [-0.39323] [-0.97148] [-0.46744]  [ 1.64497]  [ 2.45442] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-2)   0.044726  -0.047497  -0.002904   0.093594   0.619550 
   (0.02257)   (0.03627)   (0.00606)   (0.04907)   (0.17426) 
 [  1.98124]  [-1.30958]  [-0.47940]  [ 1.90749]  [ 3.55527] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-3)   0.038136   0.005809  -0.003984  -0.024967  -0.338702 
   (0.02492)   (0.04004)   (0.00669)   (0.05417)   (0.19239) 
  [ 1.53018]  [ 0.14507]  [-0.59579] [-0.46090] [-1.76050] 
       
C   0.878434  -0.037790   0.020277  -0.772750  -0.993041 
   (0.30211)   (0.48539)   (0.08107)   (0.65665)   (2.33213) 
  [ 2.90765]  [-0.07786]  [ 0.25013] [-1.17680] [-0.42581] 
       
DUMMY78 -0.434681    2.021411  -0.185694   1.106269 -2.177061 
   (0.92924)   (1.49296)   (0.24935)   (2.01974)   (7.17321) 
 [-0.46778]  [  1.35397]  [-0.74472] [  0.54773] [-0.30350] 
       
DUMMY78(-1)    1.569967 -2.787805 -0.000964 -0.103014   65.13611 
   (0.96762)   (1.55461)   (0.25964)   (2.10315)   (7.46945) 
 [  1.62251]  [-1.79325]  [-0.00371] [-0.04898] [  8.72033] 
       
DUMMY78(-2)   0.327416   1.295095  -0.033950  -7.906209  -42.99066 
   (1.78009)   (2.85997)   (0.47766)   (3.86909)   (13.7413) 
  [ 0.18393]  [ 0.45284]  [-0.07108] [-2.04343] [-3.12858] 
       
DUMMY78(-3)  -2.491069   0.933706   0.376935  -5.067439   20.57399 
   (1.26522)   (2.03275)   (0.33950)   (2.75000)   (9.76678) 
  [-1.96888]  [ 0.45933]  [ 1.11026] [-1.84270] [  2.10653] 
       
DUMMY80Q3   3.507461  -0.427759  -0.145129   1.559402  -3.173331 
   (0.85507)   (1.37379)   (0.22944)   (1.85852)   (6.60063) 
 [  4.10198]  [-0.31137]  [-0.63252] [  0.83906] [-0.48076] 
       
DUMMY80Q3(-1)  -1.219573 -0.349670 -0.534014   4.186285 -3.781339 
   (1.06450)   (1.71027)   (0.28564)   (2.31374)   (8.21736) 
  [-1.14567] [-0.20445] [-1.86952] [  1.80932] [-0.46016] 
       
DUMMY80Q3(-2)  -1.140595 -2.535849 -0.109786   3.796324 -2.362495 
   (1.25952)   (2.02360)   (0.33797)   (2.73762)   (9.72281) 
  [-0.90558] [-1.25314] [-0.32484] [  1.38672] [-0.24298] 
       
DUMMY80Q3(-3)   0.066485  -4.786407   0.011558   4.279596   9.783003 
   (1.23703)   (1.98747)   (0.33194)   (2.68874)   (9.54919) 
  [ 0.05375]  [-2.40829]  [ 0.03482] [  1.59167] [  1.02448]   153
 R-squared   0.832199   0.823646   0.988085   0.903636   0.909774 
 Adj. R-squared   0.648416   0.630497   0.975036   0.798095   0.810955 
 Sum sq. resids   9.388112   24.23355   0.675978   44.35208   559.4357 
 S.E. equation   0.668620   1.074234   0.179414   1.453274   5.161375 
 F-statistic   4.528173   4.264298   75.71831   8.561918   9.206462 
 Log likelihood  -28.58982  -49.92644   30.60856  -63.52592  -120.5582 
 Akaike AIC   2.337325   3.285619  -0.293714   3.890041   6.424810 
 Schwarz SC   3.300879   4.249173   0.669839   4.853594   7.388363 
 Mean dependent   0.726518   0.514681  -0.024040  -2.167758  -0.511974 
 S.D. dependent   1.127626   1.767217   1.135527   3.234251   11.87087 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)    0.538125     
 Determinant resid covariance   0.011910       
 Log likelihood  -219.5780       
 Akaike information criterion   15.09235       
 Schwarz criterion   19.91012       
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Table A 15: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests for VAR I for 
Macroeconomic Policy in  Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 45 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1   25.25187   0.4483 
2   44.42191   0.0097 
3   23.92935   0.5235 
4   31.37091   0.1770 
5   17.95410   0.8443 
6   21.48009   0.6656 
7   12.32706   0.9837 
8   33.41277   0.1211 
9   18.40483   0.8247 
10   18.41040   0.8245 
11   20.89327   0.6985 
12   31.13222   0.1847 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
 
Table A 16: VAR Residual Normality Tests for VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)   
H0: residuals are multivariate normal   
Included observations: 45     
     
Component Skewness  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.009442   0.000763  1   0.9780 
2   0.395038   1.335539  1   0.2478 
3   0.227845   0.444280  1   0.5051 
4  -0.011010   0.001037  1   0.9743 
5   0.099637   0.084962  1   0.7707 
Joint     1.866581  5   0.8673 
     
Component Kurtosis  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.572280   13.74090  1   0.0002 
2   1.229791   7.000897  1   0.0081 
3   0.892642   10.17572  1   0.0014 
4   0.587399   13.56064  1   0.0002 
5   0.618321   13.19565  1   0.0003 
Joint     57.67380  5   0.0000 
       155
Component Jarque-Bera  df  Prob.   
1   13.74166  2   0.0010   
2   8.336436  2   0.0155   
3   10.62000  2   0.0049   
4   13.56167  2   0.0011   
5   13.28061  2   0.0013   
Joint   121.1992  105   0.1334   
 
 
Table A 17: VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
 Included observations: 73 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 GR_Y 
MONETAR
Y-IND FISCALIND WAGEIND 
REER_ 
CYCLE 
GR_Y(-1)  -0.304838   0.046723 -0.021947 -0.092493 -0.080673 
   (0.12801)   (0.14984)   (0.04348)   (0.14906)   (0.44150) 
 [-2.38133]  [  0.31182]  [-0.50472] [-0.62050] [-0.18272] 
       
GR_Y(-2)   0.165402  -0.010946   0.026408   0.113919   0.710188 
   (0.10457)   (0.12240)   (0.03552)   (0.12176)   (0.36064) 
  [ 1.58178]  [-0.08943]  [ 0.74348]  [ 0.93558]  [ 1.96923] 
       
GR_Y(-3)   0.527948  -0.133042  -0.114960   0.150434  -0.696069 
   (0.10345)   (0.12109)   (0.03514)   (0.12046)   (0.35678) 
 [  5.10355]  [-1.09871]  [-3.27152] [  1.24883] [-1.95097] 
       
GR_Y(-4)   0.300643   0.021708  -0.035760   0.033772   0.709458 
   (0.13045)   (0.15270)   (0.04431)   (0.15190)   (0.44992) 
  [ 2.30463]  [ 0.14216]  [-0.80698]  [ 0.22232]  [ 1.57686] 
       
MONETARYIND(-1)   0.024920   0.784053   0.036858  -0.079736   0.067448 
   (0.11524)   (0.13490)   (0.03915)   (0.13419)   (0.39746) 
  [ 0.21624]  [ 5.81226]  [ 0.94155] [-0.59418] [  0.16970] 
       
MONETARYIND(-2)  -0.135845  -0.238136   0.089112   0.086186  -0.757258 
   (0.10938)   (0.12803)   (0.03715)   (0.12737)   (0.37724) 
 [-1.24197]  [-1.85998]  [  2.39844] [  0.67668] [-2.00738] 
       
MONETARYIND(-3)  -0.032691   0.058328  -0.003465   0.259823   0.415121 
   (0.10912)   (0.12773)   (0.03707)   (0.12706)   (0.37634) 
 [-0.29960]  [  0.45666]  [-0.09349]  [ 2.04483]  [ 1.10305] 
       
MONETARYIND(-4) -0.184665 -0.066747   0.037754 -0.016464 -1.141584 
   (0.09879)   (0.11564)   (0.03356)   (0.11504)   (0.34073) 
 [-1.86922]  [-0.57719]  [  1.12501] [-0.14312] [-3.35042] 
       
FISCALIND(-1)   0.546147  -0.149045   1.873887  -0.535059   1.636321   156
   (0.39120)   (0.45792)   (0.13289)   (0.45554)   (1.34922) 
  [ 1.39608]  [-0.32548]  [ 14.1015] [-1.17457] [  1.21279] 
       
FISCALIND(-2) -1.204030    0.345253 -1.217702   0.550587 -3.013405 
   (0.87978)   (1.02982)   (0.29885)   (1.02447)   (3.03431) 
 [-1.36855]  [  0.33525]  [-4.07463] [  0.53744] [-0.99311] 
       
FISCALIND(-3)   1.406251  -0.246719   0.037926  -0.065168   2.066766 
   (0.86430)   (1.01170)   (0.29359)   (1.00644)   (2.98092) 
  [ 1.62703]  [-0.24386]  [ 0.12918] [-0.06475] [  0.69333] 
       
FISCALIND(-4)  -0.444996  -0.047610   0.239128   0.109853  -1.091876 
   (0.37741)   (0.44177)   (0.12820)   (0.43947)   (1.30165) 
 [-1.17908]  [-0.10777]  [  1.86527] [  0.24996] [-0.83884] 
       
WAGEIND(-1)  -0.081675   0.137033   0.047170   0.618089   0.331494 
   (0.11737)   (0.13738)   (0.03987)   (0.13667)   (0.40480) 
  [-0.69589]  [ 0.99744]  [ 1.18314] [  4.52248] [  0.81892] 
       
WAGEIND(-2)   0.163299  -0.426940  -0.048814   0.225574  -0.449131 
   (0.13597)   (0.15915)   (0.04619)   (0.15833)   (0.46894) 
 [  1.20103]  [-2.68257]  [-1.05690] [  1.42474] [-0.95776] 
       
WAGEIND(-3)   0.072369   0.130528   0.040561   0.186554   0.940135 
   (0.14200)   (0.16622)   (0.04824)   (0.16536)   (0.48976) 
  [ 0.50963]  [ 0.78527]  [ 0.84086]  [ 1.12819]  [ 1.91958] 
       
WAGEIND(-4)  -0.078326   0.058200 -0.029590 -0.143790 -1.110957 
   (0.11170)   (0.13076)   (0.03794)   (0.13008)   (0.38526) 
 [-0.70118]  [  0.44511]  [-0.77983] [-1.10544] [-2.88364] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-1)  -0.087937   0.013123   0.025164   0.069485   1.033579 
   (0.03510)   (0.04108)   (0.01192)   (0.04087)   (0.12105) 
  [-2.50542]  [ 0.31942]  [ 2.11065] [  1.70012] [  8.53830] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-2)    0.002144 -0.031426 -0.012781 -0.017300 -0.502856 
   (0.05116)   (0.05989)   (0.01738)   (0.05957)   (0.17645) 
 [  0.04190]  [-0.52476]  [-0.73545] [-0.29039] [-2.84987] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-3)  -0.004565   0.036161  -0.000537   0.018362   0.301180 
   (0.04620)   (0.05408)   (0.01569)   (0.05380)   (0.15933) 
 [-0.09881]  [  0.66871]  [-0.03424]  [ 0.34134]  [ 1.89025] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-4)   0.050992   0.022606  -0.008413  -0.066125  -0.062177 
   (0.03365)   (0.03939)   (0.01143)   (0.03918)   (0.11605) 
  [ 1.51544]  [ 0.57394]  [-0.73605] [-1.68764] [-0.53578] 
       
C   0.205052  -0.088597   0.101080  -0.155028  -0.607417 
   (0.16935)   (0.19824)   (0.05753)   (0.19721)   (0.58409) 
  [ 1.21078]  [-0.44693]  [ 1.75708] [-0.78613] [-1.03994]   157
 R-squared   0.722647   0.760425   0.989398   0.898634   0.931625 
 Adj. R-squared   0.615973   0.668280   0.985320   0.859647   0.905327 
 Sum sq. resids   24.93967   34.17147   2.877699   33.81700   296.6594 
 S.E. equation   0.692538   0.810644   0.235245   0.806428   2.388512 
 F-statistic   6.774330   8.252530   242.6280   23.04954   35.42581 
 Log likelihood  -64.38152  -75.87652   14.43909  -75.49591  -154.7601 
 Akaike AIC   2.339220   2.654151   0.179751   2.643724   4.815345 
 Schwarz SC   2.998119   3.313050   0.838650   3.302623   5.474244 
 Mean dependent   0.594257  -0.181455   0.040909  -0.567493   0.276383 
 S.D. dependent   1.117539   1.407487   1.941577   2.152556   7.762747 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)    0.055421     
 Determinant resid covariance   0.010164       
 Log likelihood  -350.4189       
 Akaike information criterion   12.47723       
 Schwarz criterion   15.77173       
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Table A 18: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests for VAR II for 
Macroeconomic Policy in  Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 73 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1   28.14103   0.3014 
2   32.79009   0.1364 
3   47.33410   0.0045 
4   41.33828   0.0211 
5   29.08080   0.2606 
6   19.31297   0.7819 
7   29.99784   0.2244 
8   31.66337   0.1680 
9   29.61537   0.2390 
10   28.02711   0.3066 
11   26.77243   0.3673 
12   38.97878   0.0370 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
 
Table A 19: VAR Residual Normality Tests for VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
Orthogonalization: Residual Covariance (Urzua)   
H0: residuals are multivariate normal   
Included observations: 73     
     
Component Skewness  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1  -0.363914   1.748367  1   0.1861 
2   0.027226   0.009786  1   0.9212 
3  -0.292994   1.133321  1   0.2871 
4  -0.214237   0.605934  1   0.4363 
5   0.023052   0.007016  1   0.9332 
Joint     3.504423  5   0.6227 
     
Component Kurtosis  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   1.768302   4.935632  1   0.0263 
2   2.090483   2.558580  1   0.1097 
3   2.330064   1.292700  1   0.2556 
4   1.950138   3.498904  1   0.0614 
5   1.850795   4.253281  1   0.0392 
Joint     16.53910  5   0.0055 
       159
Component Jarque-Bera  df  Prob.   
1   6.683999  2   0.0354   
2   2.568366  2   0.2769   
3   2.426021  2   0.2973   
4   4.104838  2   0.1284   
5   4.260297  2   0.1188   




Table A 20: VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
 Included observations: 100     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]    
 GR_Y 
MONETAR
Y-IND FISCALIND WAGEIND 
REER_ 
CYCLE 
GR_Y(-1)  -0.284764   0.087036 -0.177774   0.065320 -0.319195 
   (0.10476)   (0.12400)   (0.15181)   (0.11589)   (0.27994) 
 [-2.71837]  [  0.70187]  [-1.17101] [  0.56365] [-1.14023] 
       
GR_Y(-3)    0.037473 -0.018299 -0.041841 -0.064203   0.497580 
   (0.10539)   (0.12475)   (0.15272)   (0.11658)   (0.28162) 
 [  0.35558]  [-0.14669]  [-0.27396] [-0.55070] [  1.76683] 
       
GR_Y(-4)   0.043395  -0.110915  -0.080300   0.127117   0.103285 
   (0.10133)   (0.11995)   (0.14685)   (0.11210)   (0.27079) 
 [  0.42825]  [-0.92466]  [-0.54682]  [ 1.13396]  [ 0.38142] 
       
MONETARYIND(-1)  -0.047021   0.660767   0.090291   0.024605   0.130992 
   (0.07038)   (0.08331)   (0.10199)   (0.07785)   (0.18806) 
  [-0.66814]  [ 7.93172]  [ 0.88530] [  0.31604] [  0.69653] 
       
MONETARYIND(-3)  -0.074828   0.236107   0.106907  -0.009951   0.091385 
   (0.06488)   (0.07680)   (0.09402)   (0.07177)   (0.17337) 
  [-1.15340]  [ 3.07441]  [ 1.13708] [-0.13865] [  0.52711] 
       
MONETARYIND(-4)   0.038630 -0.371516 -0.088046 -0.065786 -0.225794 
   (0.06341)   (0.07507)   (0.09190)   (0.07015)   (0.16946) 
 [  0.60918]  [-4.94923]  [-0.95808] [-0.93776] [-1.33243] 
       
FISCALIND(-1)  -0.093886  -0.134100   0.558528   0.044374   0.221486 
   (0.07980)   (0.09447)   (0.11565)   (0.08828)   (0.21326) 
 [-1.17646]  [-1.41954]  [  4.82942] [  0.50263] [  1.03858] 
       
FISCALIND(-3)    0.036909 -0.075980 -0.097540 -0.215303 -0.461189 
   (0.08696)   (0.10293)   (0.12602)   (0.09620)   (0.23237) 
 [  0.42445]  [-0.73814]  [-0.77402] [-2.23814] [-1.98469] 
         160
FISCALIND(-4)   0.169680  -0.085392   0.154287   0.031717   0.523576 
   (0.08488)   (0.10048)   (0.12301)   (0.09390)   (0.22682) 
  [ 1.99909]  [-0.84988]  [ 1.25430] [  0.33778] [  2.30831] 
       
WAGEIND(-1)   0.080638  -0.115802   0.051483   0.909351   0.208334 
   (0.07725)   (0.09145)   (0.11195)   (0.08546)   (0.20644) 
  [ 1.04383]  [-1.26632]  [ 0.45986]  [ 10.6404]  [ 1.00916] 
       
WAGEIND(-3) -0.231806    0.101451 -0.468547   0.148910 -0.004706 
   (0.11943)   (0.14137)   (0.17307)   (0.13212)   (0.31914) 
 [-1.94101]  [  0.71762]  [-2.70723] [  1.12710] [-0.01475] 
       
WAGEIND(-4)   0.022795  -0.109426   0.280783  -0.177413   0.226922 
   (0.10212)   (0.12088)   (0.14799)   (0.11297)   (0.27289) 
  [ 0.22322]  [-0.90524]  [ 1.89734] [-1.57046] [  0.83156] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-1)  -0.028202 -0.072269 -0.012729   0.050656   0.604466 
   (0.03529)   (0.04178)   (0.05114)   (0.03904)   (0.09431) 
  [-0.79912] [-1.72992] [-0.24888]  [ 1.29750]  [ 6.40944] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-3)  -0.005424 -0.006464   0.089294 -0.052893   0.103298 
   (0.04279)   (0.05065)   (0.06201)   (0.04733)   (0.11434) 
 [-0.12677]  [-0.12763]  [  1.44012] [-1.11748] [  0.90346] 
       
REER_CYCLE(-4)   0.038560   0.013817  -0.020666  -0.021446  -0.296238 
   (0.04141)   (0.04902)   (0.06001)   (0.04581)   (0.11066) 
  [ 0.93117]  [ 0.28188]  [-0.34437] [-0.46813] [-2.67701] 
       
C   0.574254  -0.037863   0.145659  -0.140532   0.003099 
   (0.11835)   (0.14010)   (0.17151)   (0.13093)   (0.31627) 
  [ 4.85216]  [-0.27026]  [ 0.84925] [-1.07336] [  0.00980] 
       
DUMMY93Q1  -1.707737   5.562529 -1.324562 -0.117433   1.944682 
   (0.74269)   (0.87916)   (1.07631)   (0.82161)   (1.98469) 
 [-2.29940]  [  6.32711]  [-1.23065] [-0.14293] [  0.97984] 
       
DUMMY93Q1(-1)  -0.397301 -4.232095 -0.624839 -0.988462 -3.651620 
   (0.92871)   (1.09936)   (1.34589)   (1.02741)   (2.48180) 
  [-0.42780] [-3.84960] [-0.46426] [-0.96210] [-1.47136] 
       
DUMMY93Q1(-3)   1.691412  -2.966633  -0.974126   1.087628  -0.444943 
   (0.90942)   (1.07652)   (1.31793)   (1.00606)   (2.43025) 
 [  1.85988]  [-2.75575]  [-0.73913] [  1.08107] [-0.18309] 
       
DUMMY93Q1(-4)   1.622307   0.500066   0.441259   1.414026   3.077815 
   (0.88264)   (1.04483)   (1.27913)   (0.97644)   (2.35869) 
  [ 1.83801]  [ 0.47861]  [ 0.34497]  [ 1.44814]  [ 1.30488] 
 R-squared   0.384587   0.772598   0.442642   0.870673   0.592352 
 Adj. R-squared   0.238426   0.718590   0.310270   0.839958   0.495535 
 Sum sq. resids   35.91305   50.32378   75.42452   43.95178   256.4641   161
 S.E. equation   0.670010   0.793125   0.970982   0.741213   1.790475 
 F-statistic   2.631259   14.30523   3.343917   28.34666   6.118297 
 Log likelihood  -90.69038  -107.5592 -127.7920 -100.7900 -188.9848 
 Akaike AIC   2.213808   2.551185   2.955839   2.415800   4.179696 
 Schwarz SC   2.734842   3.072219   3.476873   2.936834   4.700730 
 Mean dependent   0.573032  -0.030415   0.056723  -0.594852  -0.170805 
 S.D. dependent   0.767759   1.495105   1.169154   1.852789   2.520885 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof 
adj.)    0.378776     
 Determinant resid covariance   0.124117       
 Log likelihood  -605.1428       
 Akaike information criterion   14.10286       
 Schwarz criterion   16.70803       
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Table A 21: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests for VAR I for 
Macroeconomic Policy in  Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Included observations: 100 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1   43.49514   0.0123 
2   22.85202   0.5862 
3   39.40221   0.0336 
4   38.01082   0.0461 
5   32.42118   0.1462 
6   23.60535   0.5423 
7   29.26206   0.2531 
8   24.38466   0.4972 
9   35.96632   0.0721 
10   44.10143   0.0106 
11   30.41524   0.2091 
12   33.75711   0.1132 
Probs from chi-square with 25 df. 
 
Table A 22: VAR Residual Normality Tests for VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy 
in Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)   
H0: residuals are multivariate normal   
Included observations: 100     
     
Component Skewness  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   0.395893   2.612191  1   0.1060 
2   0.012085   0.002434  1   0.9607 
3  -0.230636   0.886552  1   0.3464 
4   0.053257   0.047271  1   0.8279 
5   0.181539   0.549272  1   0.4586 
Joint     4.097720  5   0.5354 
     
Component Kurtosis  Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
1   2.677535   0.433265  1   0.5104 
2   3.178447   0.132681  1   0.7157 
3   1.969400   4.425571  1   0.0354 
4   2.633391   0.560008  1   0.4543 
5   3.653955   1.781905  1   0.1819 
Joint     7.333430  5   0.1970 
     
Component Jarque-Bera  df  Prob.     163
1   3.045456  2   0.2181   
2   0.135115  2   0.9347   
3   5.312123  2   0.0702   
4   0.607279  2   0.7381   
5   2.331178  2   0.3117   
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Figure A 9: Impulse-Response Functions of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
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Notes: Structural 1 s.d. shock +/- 2 s.e. 
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Figure A 10: Impulse-Response Functions of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
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Notes: Structural 1 s.d. shock +/- 2 s.e. 
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Figure A 11: Impulse-Response Functions of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
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Notes: Structural 1 s.d. shock +/- 2 s.e. 
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Figure A 12: Impulse-Response Functions of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
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Notes: Structural 1 s.d. shock +/- 2 s.e. 
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Figure A 13: Impulse-Response Functions of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
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3  Figures and Tables for Part 3 
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Figure 3-5: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and the 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Sweden 
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Figure 3-6: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and the 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Finland 










1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
z1 +/- 2 s.e.
 







1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
z2 +/- 2 s.e.
 








1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
z3 +/- 2 s.e.
   177
 
Figure 3-7: Time-varying coefficients of expected inflation, output gap and the 
nominal effective exchange rate in a Taylor-rule for Denmark 
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Figure 3-9: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous price shocks in 
Sweden 
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Figure 3-10: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous price shocks in 
Finland 
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Figure 3-11: Time-varying wage-price shocks and exogenous price shocks in 
Denmark 
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Figure 3-12: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1976q2 – 1990q4 
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Figure 3-13: Variance decomposition of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Sweden 1991q1 – 2006q2 
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Figure 3-14: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1975q4 – 1986q4 
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Figure 3-15: Variance decomposition of the VAR II for Macroeconomic Policy in Finland 1987q1 – 2005q1 
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Figure 3-16: Variance decomposition of the VAR I for Macroeconomic Policy in Denmark 1982q1 – 2006q4 
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Table 3-1: Summary of the results of the VARs for Macroeconomic Policy in Scandinavia 
      Sweden 1976-90  Sweden 1991-2006 
 
Finland 1975-86 Finland  1987-2005 Denmark  1982-2006
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4  Figures and Tables for Part 4 
 
Table 4-1: The wage share as a proxy for the effect of income distribution on 
the growth trend 
Time 
range





gr_pop, inv  0.144*** 
(0.033) 
0.672 2.136  22 
 inv  0.162*** 
(0.039) 
0.596 1.673  22 
 gr_pop  0.155*** 
(0.037) 





0.498 2.213  22 
 gr_pop  0.067 
(0.050) 







0.488 1.999  22 
 gr_pop  0.062 
(0.049) 







0.629 2.513  22 
 ex,  im  0.188** 
(0.073) 







0.500 2.295  22 
 ex,  im  0.154* 
(0.076) 
0.186 1.494  22 
 inv  -0.049 
(0.076) 
0.190 2.602  22 
1996-
2000 
gr_pop, inv  -0.138** 
(0.053) 
0.548 1.961  22 
 inv  -0.183** 
(0.066) 
0.276 2.200  22 
2001-
2005 
gr_pop, ex  -0.046 
(0.055) 
0.388 1.688  22 
 inv  -0.133** 
(0.057) 
0.214 1.693  22 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, * significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. X-
variables are: population growth (gr_pop), investment (% of GDP, inv), private 
consumption (% of GDP, cons), exports (% of GDP, ex) and imports (% of GDP, im). 
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Table 4-2: The Gini coefficient as a proxy for the effect of income distribution 
on the growth trend 
Time 
range
X-variables β R² DW-
Statistic
N
1996-2000 ex  0.082** 
(0.037) 
0.376 1.946  20 
 ex,  im  0.866** 
(0.041) 
0.342 1.849  20 
 cons  0.148** 
(0.059) 
0.218 1.649  20 
2001-2005 ex,  inv  0.073 
(0.044) 
0.376 2.070  20 
 ex  0.076 
(0.047) 
0.297 1.601  20 
 cons  0.141* 
(0.078) 
0.119 1.675  20 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, * significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. X-
variables are: population growth (gr_pop), investment (% of GDP, inv), private 
consumption (% of GDP, cons), exports (% of GDP, ex) and imports (% of GDP, im). 
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Table 4-3: The percentage of the population age 15+ that has attained 











0.321 2.112  25 
 ex,  im  -0.016 
(0.022) 
0.284 1.456  25 
 cons,  inv  -0.011 
(0.022) 
0.339 1.765  25 
1976-
1980 
gr_pop, inv  0.006 
(0.017) 
0.566 2.086  25 
 inv  -0.031* 
(0.018) 
0.250 1.411  25 
1981-
1985 
gr_pop, inv  0.019 
(0.018) 
0.321 2.241  25 
 gr_pop  0.024 
(0.019) 















gr_pop, ex  0.026 
(0.021) 
0.380 2.139  25 
 gr_pop  0.038 
(0.023) 
0.216 2.345  25 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, * significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. X-
variables are: population growth (gr_pop), investment (% of GDP, inv), private 
consumption (% of GDP, cons), exports (% of GDP, ex) and imports (% of GDP, im). 
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Table 4-4: The average schooling years of the population age 15+ as a proxy 
for the effect of human capital on the growth trend 
Time 
range





gr_pop, inv  -0.359*** 
(0.118) 
0.479 2.300  25 
 cons,  inv  -0.208 
(0.168) 
0.377 1.692  25 
 ex,  im  -0.261 
(0.156) 
0.353 1.372  25 
1976-
1980 
inv, im  -0.262** 
(0.122) 
0.294 1.466  25 
 gr_pop,  inv  -0.080 
(0.107) 
0.575 2.187  25 
1981-
1985 
gr_pop, inv  0.001 
(0.118) 
0.285 2.281  25 
 gr_pop  0.018 
(0.126) 
0.186 2.428  25 
1986-
1990 









0.165 2.612  25 
 ex,  inv  0.009 
(0.134) 
0.208 2.462  25 
1996-
2000 
gr_pop, ex  0.098 
(0.125) 
0.356 1.956  25 
 gr_pop  0.133 
(0.142) 
0.157 2.106  25 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% 
level, * significance at the 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. X-
variables are: population growth (gr_pop), initial GDP (average GDP of the 
preceding five years in PPP), investment (% of GDP, inv), private consumption (% of 
GDP, cons), exports (% of GDP, ex) and imports (% of GDP, im). 
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